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ABSTRACT 
THE REINVENTION OF NATO
Robert M. Antis 
Old Dominion University, 2006 
Director: Dr. Regina Karp
In 2006, NATO is operating well out of area and conducting missions beyond the 
collective defense limits of its founding Treaty. NATO increasingly supports 
humanitarian relief operations, while also engaged in Afghanistan, the Mediterranean, 
and African crisis spots.
These changes provide the reason to examine the thesis: only i f  NATO is able to 
effectively transform will it be able to continue in its role as the primary European 
security institution. This transformation of the Alliance is a process, and one that could 
yet come to an untimely conclusion following any crisis. How NATO has adapted so far, 
and the potential for further successful adaptation are important European and 
Transatlantic issues.
The reinvention of a treaty-based collective defense Alliance signed in 1949 to an 
institution projecting power and stability well beyond its own region resulted from slow 
and methodical consensus building since the end of the Cold War. Rather than 
disappearing, NATO enlarged and changed. Alliance members continued to see value in 
the institution that provided security for decades. Meanwhile, emerging dangers 
reinvigorated the collective defense nature of the Alliance.
As an intergovernmental organization, NATO is not quickly changed.
Nevertheless, since 1989 the Alliance has transformed remarkably. Changes in NATO 
policies, structure, and capabilities have resulted in a significantly different institution.
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Externally, NATO has provided a sense of stability and security as it enlarged and 
engaged the newly democratic nations of Europe. Through partnership activities, NATO 
provides regional transparency, resulting in the continuation of stability that began at the 
end of World War Two.
Internally, NATO continues developing a European identity in order to provide a 
more balanced relationship within the Alliance. It has established the CJTF as a means 
of supporting the EU in selected contingencies when the Alliance as a whole does not 
wish to be involved.
NATO has shown great flexibility and adaptability since the end of the Cold War. 
It is imperative that Alliance members begin to share a common vision and an 
understanding of their differences. It is also critical that changes within the EU and a 
future constitution not limit Alliance flexibility.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The Question
On 4 April 1949, as representatives of twelve nations gathered in Washington to 
sign the North Atlantic Treaty, the world seemed on the brink of another conflict. The 
Soviet Union had only recently staged a coup in Czechoslovakia. Europe’s economy 
was in turmoil, and Soviet forces currently blockaded Berlin in an attempt to gain control 
of the entire city and break the West’s foothold in the East. This treaty linked the US and 
its atomic bombs to Europe, but most importantly, established a collective defense 
agreement between Western Europe and North America, even before the structure of the 
Alliance was established after the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950. The East -  
West confrontation that was to persist for 40 years had begun.
On 28 June 2004, NATO heads of state and government participated in a meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul. They expanded the Alliance from 19 to 26 
members, now including many of the nations they had faced in 1949. No longer focused 
solely on collective defense in the North Atlantic area, NATO forces were or had 
recently been deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan conducting 
peace operations and support to nation building, while also assisting in the training of 
Iraqi security forces. Standing NATO naval forces provided security patrols in the 
Mediterranean for protection against terrorism.
This paper follows the format requirements o f  The Chicago Manual o f  Style, 15th edition by University o f  
Chicago Press.
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2NATO force structure changes provided the Alliance with new capabilities such as 
a multinational chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defensive battalion and the 
NATO Response Force to respond more quickly out of area. The Combined Joint Task 
Force provided the Alliance and member nations a capability to respond to crises either 
within NATO or as a coalition of the willing separate from Alliance requirements.
NATO also now met and worked regularly with nations in the Mediterranean, the 
Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The discussions with these new partners 
were wide-ranging and often well outside strict matters of traditional security.
How did the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 become the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization of 2004? How did a well-defined collective defense relationship focused 
on a specific threat in a specific geographic region become a form of collective security 
providing security, stability, and even humanitarian assistance in regions far from 
Europe? This study will demonstrate how NATO accurately anticipated many of the 
regional and global challenges that arose following the end of the Cold War. While the 
Alliance might not have always acted quickly, it carefully considered options, and as the 
analysis will show, responded to changes, and over the course of time completely 
transformed itself. Not only is this a study of NATO transformation during this period 
potentially a useful example of change for other institutions, but the roles NATO has 
grown into might also be a positive example for other regional institutions.
The reinvention of NATO is a story of nations, institutions, and individuals 
working over time to preserve what they had, while also working to better prepare for 
their future. Many actions and decisions were neither anticipated nor expected. Some 
were unsuccessful. But as June 2004 arrived, NATO had been reinvented. It is worth 
examining how this metamorphosis took place.
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3Reinvention Begins
Gorbachev’s rise to power in the Soviet Union and his introduction of Glasnost, 
Perestroika, and New Political Thinking fed the winds of change in Europe. When seen 
in concert with the rising dissatisfaction of many of the peoples of Eastern Europe, and 
the contrasting desire of national leadership in many East European countries to maintain 
their power as it had always been, transformation was inevitable. Gorbachev's desire for 
reform within the Soviet Union implicitly supported change in Eastern Europe. The 
follow-on to these actions drove him to reconsider the relationship of the Soviet Union 
with the remainder of the region and the world.
To many it seemed that this historic change in the political landscape of Europe 
would mean the end of the East-West confrontation, and therefore the end of Cold War 
institutions such as NATO. Since NATO had originally been formed as a collective 
defense organization dedicated to maintaining the balance of power in Europe, it seemed 
logical that such a fundamental restructuring of the balance would remove the need for 
the alliance.1 However, it is not as though the European regional security landscape 
changed overnight. While the Soviet Union disappeared, the Russia that remained was 
not necessarily seen as a friendly and non-threatening neighbor. NATO also noted the 
potential for new threats from terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and regional instability following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The 
desire for NATO’s continued existence was furthered by members who recognized that 
an effective organization developed over four decades of political conflict was not 
something to lightly let go. Therefore, they were not inclined to lose the benefits and
1 John S. Duffield, “NATO ’s Functions After the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 5 
(1994-95): 764.
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4advantages they perceived in its existence. It seemed important to consider how NATO 
could continue contributing to Euro-Atlantic security. So, between the search for options 
for NATO’s role in the new international environment, and the continued uncertainty 
about the strength and durability of democratic reform within Russia, NATO remained.
From those nations outside of NATO, several perspectives helped maintain 
institutional vitality. In most cases, these newly free nations did not yet perceive Russia 
as a friend or ally, and due to their proximity to Russia, and sometimes economic 
dependence on Russia, they still had security concerns. Additionally, it was also 
apparent to the leadership within many East European countries that European 
institutions held the key to their entry into Europe. To some, membership in the Council 
of Europe (CoE) was a stepping stone to NATO and European Union (EU) membership. 
EU Membership offered access to the better life they all desired. Membership in NATO, 
on the other hand, offered stability and a certainty that they would not soon be dominated 
again by another state. It would also provide them not only greater access to the United 
States, but would also provide them a more substantial voice in European security 
matters because of the consensus based decisionmaking within NATO.
NATO remains a unique institution in the history of security organizations and 
alliances. Traditional balance of power theory would have indicated that when the 
situation that brought about its creation disappeared, NATO should have likewise 
disappeared. Once the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were no longer potential 
adversaries, the reason for NATO’s existence was gone. “If two coalitions form and one 
of them weakens, perhaps because of the political disorder of a member, we expect the 
extent of the other coalition’s military preparation to slacken or its unity to lessen. The 
classic example of the latter effect is the breaking apart of a war-winning coalition in or
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5just after the moment of victory.” However, due to the interests and desires of member 
nations as well as those nations aspiring to membership, that did not happen in the case 
of NATO. Instead, there was almost an immediate effort to transform and adapt the 
institution to the new environment. The question remains how NATO can continue to 
expand, in area as well as membership, while maintaining the capabilities and resources 
that made it such a successful and enduring organization. Table 1 shows the extensive 
restructuring of NATO from an extensive military structure to one with a much leaner 
military structure and new commands for research and education.
The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union created a 
totally new situation in Europe. To some, such as Robert W. Tucker, the results of the 
situation were obvious. “The principal consequence will be evisceration of the Atlantic 
alliance. When alliances lose their common adversary, their normal fate is to break up.
If this is not to be the fate of the Western alliance, the principal foundation of the postwar 
order, either the persistence of the old adversary and the threat it held out or a new 
adversary must be assumed.” While Tucker’s statement focused on the expectation that 
the disappearance of the Soviet Union would drive the end of NATO, he unintentionally 
was accurate. As he notes, an Alliance might remain if a new adversary was assumed.
As the next chapter will show, by the 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO was discussing a 
variety of new, though non-traditional, threats. NATO’s continued existence in response 
to these changes provides important considerations from practical and theoretical 
perspectives.4
2 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, Inc, 1979), 126.
3 Robert W. Tucker, “1989 And All That,” Foreign Affairs 69, no. 4 (Fall 1990): 96.
4 NATO, “The 1991 Strategic Concept,” NATO Review  39, no. 6 (December 1991): 25 -  32.
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6Table 1. The Reinvention Of NATO’s Structures5
NATO’s Structure in 1989
S u b m arin e s  Allied 
C om m and
E a s te rn  A tlantic A rea  
(8 S ubord inates^
S tand ing  Naval 
F o rc es  A tlantic
UK Air F o rces Plym outh  S ub-A rea 
?1 Subordinated
Striking F lee t A tlantic 
(3 S ubord inates^
C an ad a-U S  R egiona l 
P lanning G roup
W este rn  A tlantic A rea 
(5 S ubord ina tes^
ACE Mobile F orce- 
_______ Land_______
Allied F o rces 
N orthern E urope
Iberian Atlantic A rea 
(2 S ubord inates^
S u p re m e  Allied 
C o m m a n d e r Atlantic
Military C om m ittee
S u p re m e  Allied 
C o m m an d er E urope
Allied C om m an d er- 
In-C hief C hannel
Allied F o rc es  C entral 
 E urope_______
Allied F orces 
S ou th ern  E urope
S tand ing  N aval Force 
. C hannel _
BENELUX Sub-A rea
Allied M aritim e Air 
 F orce______
N O R E S ub-A rea 
(1 Subordinated
NATO’s Structure in 20056
E ducation  an d  Training 
(4 S ch o o ls  an d  cen te rs)
Jo in t F o rce  C om m and  
N aples 
(3 S u b o rd in a te s)
Jo in t H ead q u a rte rs  
Lisbon
F uture  C apabilities 
(1 C en te r)
Allied C om m and 
O pera tio n s
Jo in t F o rce  C om m and  
B runssum  
(3 S u b o rd in a te s)
Allied C om m and  
T ransform ation
C o n c ep ts  
(3 C e n te rs)
C a n ad a-U S  R egional 
P lanning G roup
Military C om m ittee
5 Drawn from information provided in, Wolfgang Altenburg, “NATO ’s Integrated Military 
Structure, A Unique Success” N ATO ’s Sixteen Nations, Special Edition  34, no. 1 (1989): 36-47.
6 Drawn from information provided in, NATO, NATO M ilitary Structure Briefing, August 2005.
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7Purpose Of Inquiry
This study examines how NATO adapted to the changed environment of post- 
1989, and then concludes with how it can most logically continue its transformation and 
reinvention in a positive manner. The institution has changed its missions, operating 
structure, and procedures, both internal and external, in order to accommodate additional 
members. As an intergovernmental organization, can it make the changes necessary to 
adapt to a larger membership and increased area of responsibility while still remaining 
effective?
Argument
As 1989 opened, NATO stood opposite the Soviet Union throughout Europe and 
nearby regions. The Alliance was a well-defined collective defense organization with a 
substantial structure, elaborate warplans, and a standing multinational structure such as 
had never been seen. When the dust settled from the changes in Europe, and the Soviet 
Union no longer existed, the NATO of 2004 remained as an institution with much 
broader responsibilities, larger membership, and involvement world-wide.
NATO was designed and nurtured throughout the decades after the Second World 
War to provide very specific advantages to its members. Following the disappearance of 
the Soviet Union, the Alliance seemingly lost its purpose along with its primary 
adversary. The background and reasons explaining why these changes took place 
provides the underpinning for this analysis.
As a result of these changes, the Alliance had four options. First, and most 
logically, NATO could have disappeared with its adversary. This was a reasonable 
expectation and one that was anticipated by many and hoped for by others such as
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Russia. Next, NATO could have remained exactly as it had always been, a collective 
defense organization in Western Europe, unchanging with the new situation. However, 
this would have been totally illogical, since there was no longer a specific threat to 
provide purpose. In fact, many of its former adversaries in East Europe were seeking to 
re-join Europe, and as such, would have disagreed with this approach by the West 
European nations.
A third option would have been for NATO to continue, but with a reduced 
structure, responsibilities, and capabilities. As advocated by some, NATO could have 
become a more broadly based security institution, primarily serving to facilitate a 
dialogue among all of the nations within the region. However, in its own way, this 
option is just as illogical as the previous. The CSCE, later OSCE, was already in 
existence. If all that was desired was a forum for dialogue on security related matters, 
one already existed. It is difficult to perceive what additional advantages would have 
accrued from the transition of NATO into such a forum.
If NATO was not to disappear, or become only a security forum, or to remain just 
as it had for the previous forty years, then it had to transform. As the situation stood, 
NATO could not remain the institution it had been. At the same time, no one could 
predict the changing characteristics of the international environment. Therefore, 
determining how to transform NATO was no easy matter. This analysis suggests that a 
review of three characteristics that make up NATO as an institution can provide a 
framework for considering this transformation. These characteristics are first, NATO’s 
structure, which includes its organization and procedures, second, the policies that 
govern its external actions, and finally, its capabilities that reflect the substance of what 
the institution can implement. A review of Alliance decisions to change those
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
9characteristics in response to the international environment provides a greater 
understanding of NATO’s future. A single decision on how to change NATO was not 
made. Nor was there a single point in time identified where the specific nature of 
transformation was stated. Instead, NATO faced a series of decision points that drove 
transformation. The decision to enlarge, the response to Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 
NATO’s response to conflict in the Balkans, specifically Bosnia and Kosovo, all served 
to mark possible paths for NATO. How it responded to each of these events and others 
could have determined if the path was to end, or, as did occur, where the path would 
lead. These points are critical issues that are examined in the overview and case studies 
to provide a partial explanation of the nature of NATO transformation.
This study shows that as NATO faced different crises, a general process seemed to 
evolve. First, there were internal and sometimes public discussions where options were 
considered. A strength of NATO in such situations is that discussions can be held out of 
the public eye while potential responses are debated and considered among member 
nations. Then, through NATO announcements, communiques and declarations, the 
responses become public. Finally, a period of time occurs in the process where these 
responses are implemented and assessed. The responses are eventually either 
incorporated into Alliance procedures if successful, or in examples such as the Defense 
Capabilities Initiative that is discussed later, replaced with something else that might be 
more effective.
As an intergovernmental institution, NATO is comprised of nations that willingly 
chose to be members because of the advantages that such membership seemed to 
provide. With the end of the Cold War, why would a need for continued membership 
persist? Even if all members did not decide to disband the organization, the possibility
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
10
existed that selected nations might choose to exit. That did not prove to be the case. 
Instead, enlargement became one of the first major issues to confront NATO, which 
provided its own series of decision points along the road to transformation.
Internally, the institution is structured and governed by rules and procedures. The 
structure provided an integrated forward defense of national military capabilities, and 
politically, was surprisingly elaborate based on the collective defense requirements. 
Agreements were designed to support interoperability on military matters and consensus 
on political matters. A changing international environment might necessitate structural 
change, but changes to rules and procedures might be more problematic. Such 
procedures not only define the internal relationship among the members, but also 
between the members individually and the institution as a whole. As NATO reached 
each decision point, the membership as a whole would need to identify those areas where 
change was possible, and those not open for negotiation. For example, a change away 
from consensus based decisionmaking might completely transform the Alliance or doom 
it. So far, no initiative or decision to push for such a fundamental change has occurred. 
This is one of those issues where NATO could not negotiate.
Decisions to change membership or structure would almost certainly be driven at 
least in part by changes to Alliance policies. These policies would govern areas such as 
mission and strategy that determine how the Alliance sees the world, and the role that it 
envisions for itself and its members. A policy change to remove the Article 5 collective 
defense commitment would have doomed the Alliance and seems to be another of those 
nonnegotiable issues. At the other extreme, to have kept Article 5 as the only basis for 
Alliance policy would be to sentence NATO to eventual irrelevancy in the absence of 
specific and agreed upon threats. Therefore, once the decision was made to keep the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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Alliance, the expansion of the NATO mission can be seen as the only logical alternative. 
The process of continued evolution and adaptation of the NATO strategy and 
accompanying policies has been critical for ensuring that a consensus vision exists 
among the Alliance members.
Finally, it is only through its capabilities that the Alliance influences its own 
environment. The capabilities in 1989 were designed for that Cold War situation, and 
can arguably be said to have been successful. Nevertheless, as NATO structure and 
policies change, capabilities must likewise change. As a topic that in large part reflects 
national resources, it is one that often reflects domestic political challenges as opposed to 
the consensus language of international agreements and communiques. The NATO 
decisions since 1989 such as the Combined Joint Task Force and the NATO Response 
Force illustrate efforts to both create and employ appropriate capabilities for the 
changing missions. As such, their success or failure serves as the final measure of 
successful transformation.
While these characteristics can be discussed separately, they cannot be assessed in 
isolation. NATO efforts to resolve membership questions such as enlargement or 
rejection of an applicant, are related to external policies of the Alliance in its relations 
with other nations, as well as internal policies of structure and process. Internal changes 
of NATO structure and procedures interact with membership questions and policy issues, 
along with the capabilities that are necessary for implementing missions. These 
interrelationships will be examined in greater detail in the overview and case studies. 
Additionally, this analysis will argue that within this framework, there are three themes 
that not only signify critical areas for improvement, but are also significant areas for 
future successful transformation. These three critical areas are decisionmaking,
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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burdensharing, and NATO external relations. The following overview, case studies, and 
analysis chapters will all illustrate the central role of these areas in the continued 
transformation of NATO.
Methodology
This study is a qualitative analysis of NATO actions during the sixteen years 
from 1989 through 28 June, 2004. It begins with the end of the Soviet Union and ends 
with the 28 June 2004, NATO Istanbul Summit. This particular summit is appropriate 
since it is known as the NATO transformation summit, where the heads of state noted 
that they, “...have given further shape and directions to this transformation in order to 
adapt NATO’s structures, procedures and capabilities to 21st century challenges.”7 
NATO cannot help but change as the political situation in Europe evolves and as 
additional nations seek membership. An institution in a changing international 
environment and with new and more diverse members must adapt, whether only to 
maintain the status quo or improve its effectiveness. Institutional change in and of itself 
is neither positive nor negative. The results of such change are important, however, 
especially as these results relate to the transformation of the institution. Therefore, this 
time period provides a framework for the hypothesis that allows specific actions, 
decisions, and activities to be examined.
This analysis examines the hypothesis: only if NATO is able to effectively 
transform will it be able to continue in its role as the primary European security 
institution. An examination of this hypothesis must first define what is meant for NATO 
to “effectively transform.” Even more fundamental, how is transformation defined and
7 NATO, “Istanbul Summit Communique, ” Istanbul Summit R eader’s Guide, (2004): 9.
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what is effective versus ineffective transformation? The statement that will drive the 
examination of transformation is the definition of the “NATO continuation of its role as 
the primary European security institution.” In other words, the degree of positive 
transformation is the causal phenomenon, resulting in the corresponding continued 
effectiveness of NATO as the primary European security institution. The relative nature 
of each of the variables in this type of hypothesis is illustrated by Stephen Van Evera 
when he notes that in, “...the hypothesis “literacy causes democracy,” the degree of 
literacy is the independent variable...(and)...the degree of democracy is the dependent 
variable.”8
In 1989, NATO was a collective defense organization, standing firmly opposite the 
Soviet Union. In 2004, it is fulfilling a variety of crisis management tasks with a 
significantly greater membership and a substantial level of international engagement. To 
use the term effective implies that this new form will reflect positive change. By saying 
“effective transformation,” we assert that NATO will continue being perceived as an 
institution that represents the interests and concerns of its members. Hence, effective 
transformation of NATO signifies that political decision making within NATO continues 
to satisfy an even larger number of members.
Additionally, the institution must continue to have adequate flexibility and 
adaptability in order to meet unforeseen situations. Effective transformation, the 
independent variable, is a process, not a specific endstate. It is also time dependent: 
changes that are effective under one set of conditions, may no longer be appropriate or 
effective following unforeseen changes in the institution or the international
8 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods fo r  Students o f  P olitical Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 10-11.
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environment. Militarily, effective transformation ensures that NATO military 
capabilities remain viable, substantive, and appropriate for the missions it adopts. 
Politically, the institution must continue to be seen as useful by its members and those 
other states and institutions with whom it interacts.
The dependent variable on the other hand is an examination of NATO’s ability to 
continue to serve as the primary European security institution. In other words, change 
within the institution, whether internal or external, is examined for how it affects the 
adaptation capability of the institution over time. Whether such change is reactive or 
proactive, and whether or not it covers internal changes relative to structure and 
processes, or external adaptation resulting from policy changes, are key issues that define 
the eventual nature of the institution.
Therefore, the dependent variable must also be carefully defined. If NATO is to 
continue in its role as the primary European security institution, then that phrase must 
also be defined. First and most importantly, this role must continue to include NATO’s 
original Article 5 collective defense mission. Article 5 reflects the original purpose for 
the Alliance, and as such, contains the foundation of the organization’s continued 
existence. Additionally, since NATO has added new missions and expanded its area of 
operations, the case can be made that its mission is now similar to that of a collective 
security organization. An important consideration is whether or not NATO is able to 
achieve a balance between these new missions and its Article 5 commitment. In this new 
role, NATO can be perceived as serving as a force for regional security as long as it is 
perceived as possessing effective capabilities, with the institutional strength and will to 
employ those capabilities in threatening or dangerous situations.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
15
The preceding discussion about the hypothesis and its variables provides for a 
further refinement of the hypothesis. Re-stating this thesis clarifies the goal of this 
research: The degree to which NATO adopts changes in its structure and procedures, 
leading to greater operational effectiveness and efficiencies in the way in which it 
operates determines the degree to which the Alliance will continue to be able to conduct 
collective defense and crisis management missions.
In order to ensure that this examination of NATO is as comprehensive as possible, 
the actions of NATO and its members are considered using three critical thresholds. The 
first threshold involves an overview chapter, and is then followed two case studies.
These thresholds are issues that individually reflect a chain of events that led to 
substantial change within the Alliance. They highlight significant examples of not only 
how NATO reached out to nations, regions, and institutions, but also how it implemented 
selected internal changes. An awareness of the interrelationships among these critical 
events taking place simultaneously helps to assess the relative significance of events 
revolving around NATO and its members.
This study is conducted on several levels. First, as an institution, what did NATO 
say and what did it do? Secondly, how did the member nations behave? The reason 
why NATO leadership makes particular decisions and takes specific actions might well 
affect the perception of the institution by its member’s nations. These reasons are also 
significant to those nations seeking to join the Alliance, as well as nations that interact 
with NATO. As these perceptions influence national decisions, they become part of the 
substance of change.
The first level is an assessment of NATO’s words is accomplished by examining 
official NATO documentation regarding specific events and NATO’s responses. The
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words are significant, in that they reflect the consensus of the institutions members. Next, 
if the words are to have any substance, then the actions taken by the institution must also 
be considered. Do NATO’s actions support the words and implement the vision, or do 
they lessen institutional credibility by being at odds with the stated purpose? Next, as an 
intergovernmental organization, NATO actions only result from national decisions or 
agreements. Therefore, it is important to recognize what member nations say and do in 
support of, or counter to, institutional initiatives. If the consensus within NATO reflects 
goals for positive change, but the actions of the members states run counter to those 
goals, there is little possibility for success.
An examination of the issues at the second level that must be considered in 
answering this question requires considering change within NATO from two 
perspectives. First, we must examine how NATO adapted externally in order to establish 
more effective relationships with non-member states and other regional and international 
institutions. What policy helped maintain the vitality of the organization? Second, what 
internal structural or procedural changes have been necessary in order for NATO to not 
only adapt to the new international environment, but to begin to increasingly represent 
the needs and interests of the European members of the Alliance on both a political and 
operational basis. Can these changes take place while also considering the interests of 
the US? How have these changes affected the relationship of the European members 
with the US?
The central theme of this study is to examine NATO’s effectiveness by 
demonstrating how the institution maintained consensus amidst the extensive changes in 
the international environment. This consensus is the critical factor, since as an 
intergovernmental organization, all NATO members must agree on all changes.
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Considering the extensive changes implemented by NATO and examined in the form of 
exemplary case studies, maintenance of consensus has been a major accomplishment.
Importance
This research enhances the empirical development of existing literature in three 
areas. First, it gathers the evidence presented from the overview and case studies to 
better understand why NATO did not disappear as expected following the end of the 
Cold War. As a collective defense alliance that had been created to protect its members 
from a very specific threat, the logic was clear. NATO and the Warsaw Pact presented 
the classic image of a balance of power. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, it seemed that NATO should have likewise 
vanished. It has always been accepted that when it comes to security, the demands and 
limitations on a state’s flexibility imposed by institutional membership are temporary. 
They will only be tolerated when there is a clear value of the additional protection 
provided by the alliance or other security structure. Once that threat disappears, it is in 
the best interest of all participating members to regain that lost flexibility by exiting from 
previous security arrangement. As Stephen M. Walt’s sixth hypothesis on balancing 
says, “Alliances formed during wartime will disintegrate when the enemy is defeated.” 9 
For NATO members, this did not prove to be the case.
Second, as a logical follow-on to this question, the research examines possible 
changes to the future role of NATO as well as the nature of its enlargement. A NATO 
that adds more members to the decision-making table is not simply an institution that has 
added new voices to the discussion. Each new member not only expands the area
9 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins o f  Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 32.
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covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, but also makes it more difficult for the alliance to 
move resources or deploy forces throughout the Alliance area of responsibility. Each 
new member also increases the responsibilities of all of the current and future members. 
For each new member and its corresponding area, the alliance must now consider the 
possibilities of local or regional disturbances or disagreements that might conceivably 
involve the other members of the alliance.
Third, an undercurrent of this entire process is the increasing interaction of 
institutions within Europe. Throughout the cold war, NATO specifically addressed 
security issues, while the European Community considered economic matters. Since 
1989, the functional separation and distinctiveness of these institutions is no longer so 
clear. NATO increasingly acts in a variety of areas other than collective defense. It is 
increasingly a forum for its members and other nations in areas of crisis management and 
scientific exchange as well as environmental issues and societal interactions. For its part, 
the EU is entering areas of security and foreign policy once only controlled by the state 
or NATO. The European Union seeks a coordinated voice in security and foreign policy 
matters among its members, many of whom are also members of NATO. As an 
institution that promotes democratic values and human rights, the Council of Europe 
provides a forum for non-security related dialogue within most of Europe, as well as 
providing legitimacy to the newly democratic governments of Eastern Europe. Finally, 
while originally convened as a European security conference during detente in the early 
1970s, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has now become the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It interacts with the 
nations of Europe as well as a variety of other institutions in security areas such as arms
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control, preventive diplomacy, and confidence and security building measures among 
others.
These and other institutions result in an often interdependent network of 
relationships among themselves and their member-states. These relationships must also 
be considered. Changes within the institutions, and the overlapping responsibilities 
among them demands more effective coordination. This study also considers the 
continuing development of these relationships.
An additional aspect of this research that adds to its importance is the extensive 
use of NATO documentation throughout the study. The development of policies and 
concepts, the their eventual implementation or change as evidenced in NATO literature 
serves as a window into the thoughts of Alliance members. An examination of 
ministerial communique’s leading up to particular summits provides an opportunity to 
see Alliance consensus decisionmaking at work. Documentation from communique’s 
immediately prior to summits routinely provides a near-perfect review of the summit 
declarations. Therefore, this use of NATO documentation throughout the period of the 
study and for all case studies provides a unique perspective in the literature.
Critical Thresholds Of Transformation
Throughout the Cold War, NATO maintained its focus on collective defense.
Issues relating to East-West security matters, European security, and the defense of 
member states were all considered appropriate for the institution. The development of 
other security-related forums such as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) were more in response to NATO efforts rather than in competition to it. 
Economic and other issues were addressed in venues considered more appropriate. The
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European Community served as the forum for an ever-increasing variety of European 
issues relating to trade, economics and human rights. Defense and security issues were 
carefully excluded, and NATO and the EC had few formal interactions.
When the Cold War ended, the major question was what would happen to NATO.
In its original state and based on its original purpose, it seemed it no longer had a 
mission. The issue of whether it could quickly and effectively adapt must be considered 
from several critical thresholds. These are several long-term issues that can help analyze 
whether or not NATO was going to be able to adapt to the post-Cold War environment. 
These three thresholds are first, an overview that provides a look at policy changes in 
NATO outreach, second, the further development of a European voice within NATO, 
and finally, the operationalization of that voice through the unique evolution of the 
Combined Joint Task Force.
The first of these critical thresholds is how NATO adapted its policies and reached 
out to its neighbors during the period under examination. This process is examined in 
the overview chapter. In order to examine this issue and the following two case studies, 
this first chapter also provides an examination of the events that took place during the 
period of the analysis. The decisions NATO made and the actions the institution 
implemented were not done in isolation, but rather were in the context of the period and 
the events affecting the member nations. This examination shows the often competing 
demands on the institution and its members. When seen in this perspective, the 
accomplishments of the Alliance seem more impressive. At any of the decision points, 
NATO and its members could usually respond in a variety of directions. By examining 
the overall context, it is easier to see the pitfalls present and the opportunities taken.
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In order to assess the full range of change within the institution, this chapter, “The 
Road to Reinvention,” examines the first critical threshold of NATO’s external relations 
in the context of significant regional and international events. Politically, the Alliance 
must be capable of interacting with other nations and institutions. It must represent 
institutional and national interests within geographic regions as well as within functional 
areas. As NATO began interacting with the newly democratic states of Eastern Europe, 
it had to quickly develop ways of establishing new external relationships. There was no 
shortage of competing issues in the initial discussions. If there was no longer a specific 
adversary for NATO, was it even appropriate for NATO to consider new members?
Through policy changes that facilitated a variety of institutional and outreach 
adaptation, NATO reached out to its neighbors. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) first served as a forum for NATO and its newly independent East European and 
Baltic neighbors at the 19 December 1991, Brussels Summit. As the desire for a more 
substantive relationship increased, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was initiated 
at the Brussels Summit on 10 January 1994, in order to provide a more structured 
relationship between NATO as an institution and each individual nation seeking to either 
join NATO or to establish a more rewarding relationship with the institution. The 
evolution of the NACC into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) on 30 May 
1997, provided a more versatile organization that now works in concert with PfP. It not 
only includes NATO applicants but also those nations that only wish to share in the 
exchange of information and training within Europe.
At the same time, Europe has increasingly become a region of interlocking 
institutions. NATO has an ever more complex relationship with the European Union as 
the EU seeks to develop its own foreign policy perspective and a military capability. The
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transformation of NATO has quietly paralleled the evolution of the OSCE. As Europe 
and neighboring nations seek greater dialogue in security matters, OSCE actions serve to 
keep communications open without directly engaging the Alliance. When NATO’s new 
missions take the institution out of area, the relations with the United Nations become 
even more important. While many NATO members agree with the changes in the 
mission, they nevertheless feel that whenever possible, the execution of these new 
missions should be under the auspices of the UN. Inherent in this institutional 
development is the danger that the interlocking institutions might develop into 
interblocking institutions as their respective roles and missions potentially negatively 
influence on one another.
In addition to dealing with individual nations, NATO also increasingly works 
with regions. Through the Mediterranean Dialogue initiated on 1 December 1994,
NATO recognizes the importance of that region to European security. It introduced 
dialogue and other activities as a means of maintaining strong relationships with nations 
in the region. The Southeast Europe Initiative was launched during the Washington 
Summit on 24 April 1999, in an effort to promote regional cooperation and security and 
stability in the region. Most recently, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was initiated 
during the Istanbul Summit with the intent of contributing to Middle East peace 
initiatives while also cooperating as part of the Mediterranean Dialogue.10 Through these 
various initiatives, NATO seeks a stronger and more effective relationship with its 
neighbors.
In addition to the Partnership, bi-lateral, and regional activities of NATO, the 
institution also has new initiatives involving topics bearing little relationship to
10 NATO, Istanbul Summit R eader’s Guide (2004), 100.
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traditional security discussions. These additional discussions are more functional in 
nature, and fall under the authority of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. They are 
examples where NATO increasingly supports various non-security related dialogues with 
other nations.11 Through these discussions, NATO increasingly supports an exchange in 
economic, scientific, and environmental matters that provides value to all involved. At 
the same time, these discussions also serve to support the idea of trust and transparency 
among the nations.
The next chapter, “The European Security And Defense Identity: A Voice For 
Europe,” is the first case study and examines the development of a European voice 
within NATO. While NATO developed new initiatives for outreach, it expanded old 
concepts as seen in the first case study. In this case, the idea of a European voice within 
the Alliance was resurrected and over time became the European Security and Defense 
Identity. This process provides an ideal opportunity to examine issues of decisionmaking 
within the Alliance as well as issues of burdensharing. With these two issues 
fundamental to successful NATO transformation, they provide the means of examining 
NATO’s ability to take an old concept and add new meaning and purpose to it. In the 
areas of decisionmaking and burden sharing, the European Security and Defense Identity 
(ESDI) has potentially been a way for European NATO members to attempt more 
effectively represent their interests in dealings with the United States. This chapter then 
becomes an important tool to answer the question concerning how NATO is defined, 
particularly as a Euro-Atlantic organization. Does this internal adaptation serve to 
increase institutional effectiveness by coordinating national and regional issues within
11 Article 2 states in part that the member states will promote peaceful relations and attempt to 
eliminate economic conflict and encourage economic collaboration among themselves. NATO, NATO  
Handbook, (Brussels, 2001), 527.
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the Alliance, or does it instead serve a divisive role, pitting the European members 
against the U.S.?
A concern running throughout this adaptation is burdensharing, and the apparent 
disparity of contributions to Alliance capabilities. An obvious and increasing gap 
between the capabilities of the United States and the other members of NATO resulted in 
the 23-24 April 1999, Washington Summit Declaration o f a Defense Capabilities 
Initiative, intended to more uniformly ensure that all members contribute to the overall 
capabilities of the Alliance. This development necessitates certain types of internal 
adaptation in order to facilitate the European pillar serving as an effective voice for its 
members.
Based on some of the changes in the institution and its growing membership, 
reorganization has been seen as necessary. As missions expand, the institution must 
reconsider how to most effectively implement them. Structural changes seem necessary 
not only to address the new missions and areas of responsibility, but also to ensure that 
new members are effectively integrated into the organization. In most cases, structural 
changes such as recent changes of the NATO command structure also necessitate the 
need for procedural changes to provide the framework for the new missions and the 
capabilities provided by new members. Military adaptation on each level provides more 
effective command and control in this new situation and allow the full capabilities of the 
member nations and the Alliance to be fully utilized.
The next chapter and second case study, “Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF),
The Bridge Between Military Capability and Political Will,” takes the issues of 
transformation and ESDI to a greater level of detail by examining the development and 
purpose of this new organization. This case study provides an opportunity for to see how
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NATO operationalized ESDI. The CJTF is a multinational and multi-service force,
designed to effectively bring force capabilities and command and control elements
together in support of missions. The CJTF has been envisioned as a structure that will
allow NATO European members to organize and respond to regional crises that might
1not be of value or of interest for all members of the Alliance. It is also a means by 
which European members can have a greater say and involvement in a variety of crisis 
situations. It shows how the Alliance took a military command and control concept, and 
over time turned it into a means of enabling partner nations to participate in crisis 
management operations. More significantly, it became the diplomatic means by which 
the Alliance remained as the leader in security decisionmaking in dealings with the 
European Union.
The CJTF could improve institutional effectiveness by allowing limited resources 
to be more effectively employed while also providing access to limited NATO support. 
Perhaps even more importantly, it could ensure that national considerations to participate 
or not participate in particular crises are accommodated.
These chapters provide an important opportunity to consider the breadth and depth 
of NATO transformation. They also provide an opportunity to examine not only what 
has taken place to date, but insight to future developments. These three critical 
thresholds each built on the previous, and laid the foundation for the next. Failure in any 
of these areas might well have ended NATO’s ongoing progress.
12 NATO, NATO Handbook, 254.
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NATO’s Transformation In The Literature 
During the course of the Cold War, NATO’s existence was seldom questioned. As 
dangerous as the world seemed, NATO and the Warsaw Pact facing each other presented 
a comforting symmetry in international politics. This nuclear-armed balance of power 
seemed dangerous, but at the same time, its deterrent effect helped to maintain the peace 
for decades after the end of the Second World War.
With the arrival of 1989 and the beginning of the end of the Cold War, this balance 
of power began to change. At first, it only appeared that the Soviet Union’s control of 
Eastern Europe would be relaxed. It quickly developed however, that more was 
changing than just the departure of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe. Instead, it 
was the very existence of the superpower and its associated alliance that came into 
question. Since this study examines how NATO adapted to the changed environment of 
post-1989, it is important to consider the literature that predicted that the events involved 
in this study could not or should not have taken place.
When examining the changes as they took place, those who questioned NATO’s 
existence fall into two categories. First, there were the theorists such as Kenneth N. 
Waltz and John J. Mearsheimer. Based on the theory of realism, they were confident that 
NATO would disappear. On a more practical approach, others saw NATO as no longer 
needed and felt that the logical decision was that the Alliance should go away. 
Additionally, a third group had practical concerns about the nature of NATO’s existence. 
They felt that NATO might remain, but there were abundant reasons why its mission 
should not change and it should not enlarge. These perspectives will also be considered 
since they directly relate to the thesis of this study.
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The Theoretical Approach 
A realist perspective expected a major change in the system following the end of 
the Cold War. Under realism, the international system is made up of nations operating 
under a system of anarchy, or a system where there is no higher directing authority. In 
the absence of a directing authority, relations among nations ends up being a system of 
balance of power.13 In his book, Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, 
published in 1954, Kenneth N. Waltz discussed the reasons for an alliance such as 
NATO. In it, he stated that, “Pursuing a balance of power policy is still a matter of 
choice, but the alternatives are those of probably suicide on the one hand and the active 
playing of the power-politics game on the other.”14 According to Charles and Clifford 
Kupchan, “ .. .states have two principal means of providing security in an anarchic setting 
-  balancing against others through domestic mobilization (self-help) or, when necessary, 
balancing through the formation of temporary alliance.”15 In other words, the collective 
defense foundation provided by the Article 5 guarantee of the North Atlantic Treaty 
brought about the formal Alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This 
collective defense agreement helped ensure that the Alliance institutionalized the 
balance of power efforts of the North Atlantic neighbors. This consolidated their 
defensive power in a way that ensured their total capability was greater then any of them 
would have been alone.
In an analysis of theory and the end of the Cold War, five predictions were 
advanced based on neorealist alliance theory. First, NATO members would reduce
13 Waltz, Theory o f  International Politics, 124.
14 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New  York: Columbia 
University Press, 1954), 205.
15 Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future o f  
Europe,” International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 117.
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efforts to coordinate security responses since these matters would no longer be of such 
importance. This would be followed closely by their increasing independence in foreign 
policy issues since a common threat was no longer an overriding national interest. 
Members would then be more likely to bargain, since relative gains would be more 
important to them. Fourth, because of the diverging policies already noted, there would 
be a decrease in the amount of cooperation among members. These four changes in 
member perspectives and actions would lead to the fifth change, the eventual dissolution 
of NATO.16
Therefore, as the threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact began to 
disappear, realists anticipated specific responses. These changes in the international 
environment caused Waltz to directly question of the future of NATO. “But we must 
wonder how long NATO will last as an effective organization. As is often said, 
organizations are created by their enemies. Alliances are organized against a perceived 
threat. We know from balance-of-power theory as well as from history that war-winning 
coalitions collapse on the morrow of victory, the more surely if it is a decisive one. 
Internal and external examples abound.”17
Closely in agreement with Waltz on this view is John J. Mearsheimer. In 1990, he 
considered a scenario where, “ .. .the Cold War comes to a complete end. The Soviet 
Union withdraws all of its forces from Eastern Europe, leaving the states in that region 
fully independent. Voices are thereupon raised in the United States, Britain, and 
Germany, arguing that American and British military forces in Germany have lost their
16 Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future 
o f  NATO,” Security Studies 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993): 18.
17 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure o f  International Politics,” International Security 18, 
no. 2 (Fall 1993): 75.
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principal raison d ’etre, and these forces are withdrawn from the Continent. NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact then dissolve; they may persist on paper, but each ceases to function as 
an Alliance.18 With this change, Mearsheimer saw the potential for great danger in 
Europe in the new multipolar environment. He provides a number of situations to 
demonstrate how the stability of bipolarity was much safer than the new environment he 
predicts. In the predicted multipolar environment, there are a variety of options for the 
control or proliferation of nuclear weapons that could result in threats to Europe.
As opposed to these potentially threatening eventualities, Mearsheimer also 
projects three possible scenarios following the demise of NATO that might result in 
peace. The first, is “obsolescence of war,” which says that following the end of the Cold 
War, the nations of Europe learn not to engage in conflict. In the second, the EC grows 
stronger, and eventually helps bring peace by replacing NATO as a force in Europe, and 
more importantly, enmeshes Germany in a more peaceful liberal order, thereby ensuring 
that this larger unified nation is no threat to the region. Finally, war is avoided in the 
scenario where most of the countries of Europe become liberal democracies, and such, as 
refuse to engage in conflict since democracies do not fight with each other.
In a speculative article shortly after the 1990 -  1991 Gulf War, Barry Buzan 
predicted some very specific changes to the international security environment. First, 
NATO would be replaced by a new multipolar structure. Between emerging nations and 
institutions such as the European Community, the international framework would be very 
different. Second, since this new multipolar framework would be much looser, there 
would be a significantly lower degree of ideological division and rivalry. The absence of
18 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” 
International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5.
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true alliances would bring about a global dominance of a security community among the 
leading capitalist powers. He anticipated Europe, North America, Japan, and Australia 
gaining an immense advantage in the world. Finally, as a product of the previous three, 
he saw a strengthening of international society, quite possibly building on greater support 
for focusing on the UN Security Council.19
On the other hand, there were others who felt that the move away from bi-polarity 
would increase the difficulties for national decisionmaking and the very nature of foreign 
policy among nations. “The disappearance of bipolarity left interdependence as the 
single most important structural feature of the international system and thus the single 
most important challenge for foreign policy makers in Europe and around the world.”20
Practical Implications Of NATO Existence
While the theoretical challenges to NATO’s continued existence primarily revolve 
around realism, the practical reasons that some felt would cause NATO’s disappearance 
are more numerous. First to be examined, is literature that discusses whether or not 
NATO should continue to exist, just as the realists claimed, will be examined. Second, 
there is a much larger group that did not necessarily speak out against the existence of 
NATO, but instead were against the institutional change of NATO beyond its original 
purpose. To these individuals, if NATO existed within the intent of its founding as a 
collective defense organization, it was acceptable. Instead, these individuals and 
organizations questioned whether NATO had the need or right to enlarge. Since this
19 Barry Buzan, “N ew  Patterns o f  Global Security in the Twenty-First Century, International Affairs 
67, no. 3 (July 1991): 434-439.
20 Dirk Peters, “The Debate About a N ew  German Foreign Policy After Unification,” in German 
Foreign Policy Since Unification, ” ed. Volker Rittberger, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2001), 25.
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concept lies at the heart of this research, it must also be considered for the perspective it 
provides.
Should NATO Exist?
While realists made the point that NATO was likely to disappear, others discussed 
practical matters and whether NATO should continue to exist. According to this belief, 
it was more an issue of NATO member nations making the appropriate decision to 
dissolve the Alliance, rather than theoretical forces of nature that drive a particular 
response.
First, the question was whether NATO should continue to exist in the absence of a 
threat. In this case, no one disagrees with the premise of realism. The Alliance was 
formed as a means by which the US and Europe could provide a unified front opposite 
the Soviet Union and eventually the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, logic says that once that 
threat disappears, there is no reason for the Alliance to remain. Any endeavor as 
expensive and complicated as the North Atlantic Alliance, should not continue without a 
purpose. Ted Galen Carpenter noted that, “ .. .if NATO has accomplished the mission 
for which it was designed, then it is reasonable to ask whether it should go out of 
business. The responsibility of U.S. policymakers is to protect the security interests of 
the American people, not to preserve an alliance for its own sake.... a policy of “NATO
9 1forever” is not necessarily wise or even sustainable.”
Similarly, Steven E. Meyer also addresses the issue of NATO’s existence and its 
affects on US foreign policy. He sees NATO’s continuing existence as a danger. He
21 Ted Galen Carpenter, Beyond NATO: Staying Out o f  E urope’s Wars (Washington, DC: Cato 
Institute, 1994), 7.
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believes US support for NATO is merely an effort to maintain old policies, even if the 
situation for which it was designed is completely gone. In fact, he feels that, . .for both
the United States and Europe, NATO is at best an irrelevant distraction and at worst toxic
22to their respective contemporary security needs.” He presents a variety of reasons for 
this belief, with a consistent approach of the absence of a real threat to NATO, while the 
Alliance continues trying to reinvent itself. Additionally, he feels that the situation in 
Europe has grown beyond the need for any sort of NATO-like alliance. NATO has 
ceased to even be of concern to Russia, but in fact is dangerous to the continued growth 
and improvements of the new members.
The other issue of NATO existence, and in actuality a subset of the first, is that in 
the absence of a distinct threat, the Europeans should be left to take care of themselves. 
No longer is there a need for the US to spend the resources and effort for European 
defense, while potentially keeping open old conflicts from the past. Carpenter is also a 
proponent of this perspective, suggesting that a European only organization could serve 
to ensure that Europe remains secure without the entangling requirements placed on the 
US. He suggests the CSCE and Western European Union (WEU) as two possible 
replacements, with the WEU being the more likely of the two based on the mutual
93defense relationship contained in the Brussels Treaty. In fact, Czechoslovakia was an 
early advocate for a re-vitalized CSCE replacing NATO. However, concerns about 
German unification, turmoil in Russia and the Balkans changed their view.24
22 Steven E. Meyer, “Carcass o f  Dead Policies: The Irrelevance o f  NATO,” Parameters 33, no. 4 
(Winter 2003-04): 83.
23 Carpenter, Beyond NATO, 123-131.
24 Thomas S. Szayna, “The Czech Republic, A  Small Contributor or a ‘Free Rider’?” in A m erica’s 
New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO, ed. Andrew A. Michta, (Seattle: 
University o f  Washington Press, 1999), 121.
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A similar perspective was also espoused by Hugh De Santis. In 1991, he declared 
that based on the changes currently underway in Europe, . .allied policymakers ought to 
be planning for its eventual dissolution.”25 By maintaining the Alliance beyond its time 
he saw the possibility that NATO would be harming Europe’s future. Remaining as a 
crutch for European integration efforts, NATO might eventually serve to slow progress 
towards European unity. As with Carpenter, he also suggests a variety of options for 
European self-help through further development of the WEU as a new European security 
structure.
While Guillaume Parmentier does not necessarily question NATO’s continued 
existence, he does however, identify a fundamental flaw in the organization that makes it 
ineffective in the new security environment. Rather than focusing on broad challenges of 
Alliance unity, capabilities, or enlargement, he instead focuses on the dominating role of 
the United States in the operational management of NATO. Specifically, he identifies 
the role of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (S ACEUR), as the weak point in the 
NATO structure and one that must be fixed if the Alliance is to have an effective role. 
Since S ACEUR is dual-hatted as the Commander, US European Command, Parmentier 
feels that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) does not control him. “There is a 
fundamental gap, already noted, between the appearance and reality of NATO authority. 
‘Pretend’ authority lies with the North Atlantic Council; real authority lies with 
SACEUR.”26 Using Operation Allied Force as his case study, he identifies how US 
unilateral decisions were implemented outside the realm of NATO political-military
25 Hugh De Santis, “The Graying o f  NATO,” The Washington Quarterly 14, no. 4 (Autumn 1991):
51.
26 Guillaume Parmentier, “Redressing NATO ’s Imbalances,” Survival 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000):
104.
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decisionmaking. This ability to act within a US operational headquarters is what 
deceptively provides NATO with the appearance of effectiveness. “Since the end of the 
Cold War, many have described NATO as the only international security organisation 
capable of effective action. This description is strictly speaking, inaccurate: NATO’s 
capability is derived from the readiness of the United States to assume responsibility for 
action.”27
Should NATO Enlarge?
Within the subject of NATO’s existence there is an additional subset of three 
predictions concerning enlargement that require consideration. First, there are the 
opinions. These are cases where the issue is based on the belief of the individual. While 
the individuals maintain that they have a solid foundation for their opinions, these are 
situations that cannot be concretely measured, and are instead predictions of how things 
could develop. While useful for discussion, they are extremely problematic for 
supporting decisionmaking. The second category is that of analytical judgments. In 
these situations, the analysis examines an actual situation that might have some degree of 
specificity to consider and even measure. Nevertheless, they are situations where there is 
not enough detail to truly make a solid prediction. The third category is that of factual 
issues. In these situations, the individuals have identified actual, measurable concerns 
regarding the decision by NATO to enlarge. It is within these three categories that the 
concerns will be examined.
27 Ibid., 100.
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Should NATO Enlarge: Opinions
A significant number of the those opinion-based issues concerning NATO 
enlargement can be studied in several works written or edited by Ted Galen Carpenter of 
the CATO Institute in Washington, DC. One area of concern seen by many was the 
danger to US interests, as well as those of Europe, based on Russia’s response to
9 8  90enlargement. To individuals such as Susan Eisenhower and Stanley Kober , NATO 
enlargement is seen as a threat to Russia. It labels them as the loser of the Cold War, 
abandoning promises made when Germany reunified, and in fact, threatening Russia by 
moving NATO to its borders. That train of thought is carried even further by Anatol 
Lieven who is concerned about NATO enlargement for its potential affects on Russia’s 
borders. Regions near Poland, Romania and Moldova, the Ukraine, and the Baltics are 
areas that Russia sees as important. He believes that NATO is disregarding Russia’s
TOlegitimate security interests by these anticipated actions.
This concern for Russia’s security perspective is also shared by Johanna Granville. 
By definition, an Alliance must have a threat, yet NATO continues (according to her) to 
have no enemies. NATO enlargement is designed only to provide security assurances for 
those new members, yet it does so while moving the boundaries of the Alliance close to 
Russia. “This situation evokes the classic “security dilemma”: despite one nation’s 
defensive motives in raising an army or joining an alliance, its neighbors will always
28 Susan Eisenhower, “The Perils o f  Victory,” in NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, ed. Ted 
Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, (Washington DC: Cato Institute, 1998), 103.
29 Stanley Kober, “Russia’s Search for Identity,” in Carpenter and Conry, NATO Enlargement,
130.
30 Anatol Lieven, “The NATO-Russia Accord: An Illusory Solution,” in Carpenter and Conry, 
NATO Enlargement, 144-146.
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construe such actions to be potentially offensive in nature.”31 In fact, Charles L. Glaser 
uses the similar example. “In the current debate over NATO expansion, for example, 
opponents argue that even though expansion into Central Europe would increase 
NATO’s military capability, it would also increase Russian insecurity and therefore make 
Russian invasion of its neighbors more likely.”32
A concern for how Russia might respond to enlargement is also a foundation of 
Michael E. Brown’s argument. He feels that enlargement would have three harmful 
consequences for Europe. Not only would it play into the hands of radical Russian 
nationalists, but might also lead Russia to adopt a more aggressive policy in Eastern 
Europe. These two changes could well lead to the third, to Russian policy makers seeing 
NATO enlargement as a change in the balance of power and therefore, something that 
Russian domestic politics would have to address.33
In dealings with the other countries of Europe, Hugh De Santis sees dangers 
resulting from those countries that seek NATO membership but are unsuccessful. Such 
“failed suitors” could potentially threaten European security by backsliding into non- 
democratic activities since they would feel they have nothing to lose.34 James Chace 
and Eugene J. Carroll Jr. both address the dangers of NATO enlargement redividing 
Europe. Long term peace in Europe will depend on a feeling of inclusiveness, yet to 
establish arbitrary boundaries of NATO membership might easily turn into an
31 Johanna Granville, “The Many Paradoxes o f  NATO Enlargement,” Current History, (April 
1999): 167.
32 Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics  50 (October 1997): 179.
33 Michael E. Brown, “The Flawed Logic o f  NATO Expansion,” Survival 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995):
41-42.
34 Hugh De Santis, “N A T O ’s Manifest Destiny: The Risks o f  Expansion, in Carpenter and Conry, 
NATO Enlargement, 1 5 9 -  176.
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environment where regional factions rise again. Others see these regional factions or 
disappointment perhaps even being worsened by states that are allowed to participate in 
outreach such as the NACC or PfP, but are then kept out of initial enlargement. The 
wide range of nationality issues present in Europe is seen as a critical danger in NATO
•3 /:
enlargement.
Should NATO Enlarge: Judgments
The problems concerning NATO enlargement already identified in these previous 
issues are based on the opinion and perceptions of the respective authors, more than on 
other facts or documentation that can be examined. The next category of issues 
considered are those that while perhaps not quite strictly opinions, are still very much 
judgments of the authors as opposed to issues of fact. In the two examples provided, it is 
more a question of how enlargement might affect the Alliance, and what the meaning of 
enlargement and its accompanying expansion of NATO’s mission might mean.
In the first example, James W. Morrison writes of how expansion should have 
waited until NATO could first establish its European pillar and solidify its institutional 
role in Europe. In his opinion, this was important in order to ensure that NATO was 
working from a position of stability and strength. This was necessary since there was 
initially so much instability and uncertainly in Central and East European countries. 
Those countries needed additional time in order to stabilize their governments and
35 James Chace, “A Strategy to Unite Rather than Divide Europe, in Carpenter and Conry, NATO 
Enlargement, 111 -  186. Eugene J. Carroll Jr., “NATO Enlargement: To What End?, in Carpenter and 
Conry, NATO Enlargement, 199-206.
36 David M. Law and S. Neil MacFarlane, “NATO Expansion and European Regional Security,” in, 
Will NATO go east? The Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance, ed. David G. Haglund, (Kingston 
Ontario: Queen’s University Centre for International Relations, 1996), 41-42.
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economies. Additionally, there was also a possible danger of NATO’s diluting its 
capabilities by expanding its missions. By broadening the missions of the Alliance, 
NATO runs the risk of losing the focus on those tasks it does well. At the same time, 
these new missions could also potentially weaken the cohesion of the Alliance if all 
members were not as solidly in agreement with them, as they have been with the 
fundamental collective defense mission.
Should NATO Enlarge: Issues
There are however, some issues raised that are more distinct and measurable. 
William G. Hyland identified the practical problems resulting from NATO enlargement. 
As a natural extension of NATO enlargement, the area of responsibility of the North 
Atlantic Treaty is similarly enlarged. In other words, as each new country is added, the 
area covered by the collective defense of the Alliance is likewise enlarged. This larger 
area requires greater military capability in order to be able to provide support within this 
expanded region. This greater responsibility is accepted by all signatories, yet at the 
same time defense expenditures were continuing to decrease. To significantly increase 
the collective defense responsibilities of the Alliance while national defense expenditures
•5 0
are reduced is clearly an issue that must be considered. This is closely related to a 
number of concerns highlighted by James W. Morrison. He notes that the expansion of 
NATO responsibilities, including those resulting from expanded missions, to include a 
promise of US defensive assistance, is unrealistic when NATO members are reducing
37 James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments, McNair 
Paper 40  (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1995): 40-42.
38 William G. Hyland, “NATO ’s Incredible Shrinking Defense,” in Carpenter and Conry, NATO  
Enlargement, 31-40.
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their defense expenditures. At the same time, the countries interested in membership are
-IQ
increasingly spending their resources on domestic reform. This has even been noted by 
those who are not necessarily against the enlargement, but see lowered defense spending 
as problematic for further improvements in European security.40
Chapter Summaries
This dissertation is composed of five chapters researching the transformation of 
NATO following the end of the Cold War and leading to the reinvention of NATO as 
highlighted during the 28 June 2004, Istanbul Summit. The following is a succinct 
review of each chapter which includes: an introduction that includes a review of critical 
literature; a chapter that describes the historical framework and an examination of how 
NATO reacted to the end of the Cold War, in particular, how it reached out to the nations 
of Eastern Europe as well as other institutions; a case study that considers the 
development of the European pillar within NATO; a case study that examines the 
development of the CJTF as the operationalization of the European pillar within NATO; 
and an analysis chapter and conclusion that examines the historical framework and the 
two case studies and the measures taken by NATO and its members in their efforts to 
transform the Alliance, and then brings together the information and highlights the 
significance of the study.
Following this introduction, the next three chapters provide the means of 
examining the hypothesis. This is done through the identification and analysis of 
NATO’s critical thresholds during this period of reinvention. The first provides an
39 Morrison, NATO Expansion, 39-40.
40 Philip Zelikow, “The N ew  Concert o f  Europe,” Survival 34, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 24-25.
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overview of the context of NATO transformation. The major international events at the 
time of the external changes and actions taken by NATO are considered. How did 
NATO respond to the end of the Cold War and the rapid change within its region? How 
is NATO now working with members and non-members as well as with nearby regions? 
Additionally, how is the institution of NATO working with other institutions?
The words of the Alliance are examined for what they tell of the plans and 
expectations of the organization and its members. The evolution of the 1991 and 1999 
NATO Strategic Concepts provides Alliance perspectives and how the institution 
proposed to adapt. The institutions words must then be compared to its actions. This 
analysis provides insight into whether changes are disjointed, reactive, or proactive when 
seen in concert with ongoing events. This discussion of events within the time period 
and the words and actions of the Alliance serve as the backdrop for the three critical 
thresholds in the following chapters.
Then, in the next chapter, the development of the European Pillar within NATO 
provides a backdrop for many of the internal changes within the Alliance. The Western 
European Union is seen initially as the bridge between NATO and the EU. Then, over 
time, the EU begins to assume a more direct role in security matters and eventually 
absorbs most of the functions of the WEU.
In the second case study, one aspect of the European Pillar, the CJTF, is 
examined in greater detail. This is used as a means to examine one specific metric of 
success on the part of the development of the European Pillar. Is this a situation where 
the desire to implement specific changes has had a positive impact on the Alliance in any 
substantive way? Has this effort to accommodate the national interests of some members 
served to improve the overall effectiveness of the institution?
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The cumulative effect of the overview and the two case studies provides an 
assessment of important aspects of NATO change during the period. By seeing how 
NATO reached out to the newly freed neighbors, and then how it developed and 
operationalized a voice for selected European member nations, we should be able to 
determine how effective transformation has been.
The analysis and conclusion chapter considers two important questions. First, 
how has NATO adapted so far to the changing international environment and its new 
missions and enlarged membership? Second, what is the likelihood of NATO 
implementing reform in concert with its enlargement that will keep the institution 
operating effectively? NATO is a major actor in the European and international 
environment. The shape and form of its future existence is an important feature of the 
future of Europe and the United States.
In the conclusion, the information brought together from the case studies and the 
analysis is examined with a view of identifying the overall significance of the study. 
Specifically, what has the study shown regarding the original thesis statement? The 
question to finally be summarized is whether or not it appears that NATO has effectively 
transformed to date and if such transformation appears likely to continue. Based on that 
examination, what does the future of NATO seem to be regarding the likelihood of its 
continuing in its role as the primary European security institution? The overall nature of 
the trans-Atlantic security environment in large part depends on the answer to such 
questions.
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CHAPTER II 
THE ROAD TO NATO’S REINVENTION
This chapter examines the first critical threshold of NATO’s policy changes and 
their effects on its external relations. By providing background information from the 
time period of the study, it examines how NATO members transformed the institution in 
order to establish a new relationship with East European neighbors. How did changes in 
NATO policy help direct the transformation from a collective defense alliance 
confronting the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, to an institution with a variety of new 
missions, now being viewed as the security institution of choice for many of its former 
adversaries? This examination considers the historical background of the period in order 
to provide a context for the varying issues, restraints, and ramifications of national 
decisions for all those involved, both NATO members as well as potential applicants. It 
also considers other institutions and organizations involved in, or being affected by, the 
evolution of NATO. Additionally, it considers how NATO managed to implement a 
transformation felt impossible by many, and how that transformation resulted in many 
nations now being interested and supportive of enlargement as opposed to supporting the 
dissolution of the institution. This chapter also provides the historical framework for the 
two following case studies.
This chapter analyzes the words and actions of NATO and its members in the 
context of the time. It is only through an examination of what the institution planned and 
then implemented that one can truly assess the nature and success of its transformation.1
1 When discussing the words o f  NATO, there are two primary venues used in this study. NATO  
routinely holds M inisterial, usually with Foreign Ministers or with Defense Ministers. Upon the
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The turmoil that took place throughout Europe as the Berlin wall came down and the 
Soviet Union exited from the region, in force as well as influence, confronted the states 
of the West with formidable challenges. These regional and other international crises 
provide the framework for NATO evolution. One cannot truly understand institutional 
change and evolution without an understanding of the competing forces that influence the 
situation. While not presenting a comprehensive history of the period, this chapter 
presents the scope of change underway throughout Europe as the backdrop to NATO 
evolution. Through a series of declarations from Summits or Ministerial, NATO 
declared its perception of the on-going and future changes in the international situation, 
while simultaneously describing the necessity of its own institutional change. Through 
the evolution of its Strategic Concept during this period, NATO described in detail how 
the institution and its members would adapt. What NATO perceived, the statements it 
made, and the actions taken, consistent or inconsistent with the declarations, are critical 
to understanding its institutional strength and vitality. The world that drove the creation 
of NATO was gone. In its place was an international environment of interdependence 
and globalization. The question of NATO’s ability to effectively adapt to such turmoil is 
fundamental to this analysis.
At the beginning of 1989, the world situation remained one of confrontation. The 
West, headed by the United States and NATO, stood squarely against the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact. Large nuclear arsenals ensured that neither side took precipitous 
action against the other. The strategy of deterrence effectively maintained a balance of
conclusion o f  these meetings, the Alliance publishes the Communique’s from the meetings. Over time, 
these meetings tend to provide the substance for discussion and agreements at the Summit meetings, where 
the Heads o f  State and Government will assemble. Depending on the particular matters at the time, the 
Summits will publish a variety o f  documentation. Quite often, the Summit Declarations are very close to 
the Communique’s that have been published in recent Ministerials, demonstrating the long-term effort by 
the Alliance to reach consensus on important matters.
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power among the two alliances. While the relationship between the two blocs could not 
be called peaceful, neither could it be called open conflict. The system, such as it was, 
had kept an uneasy peace for decades. There was no expectation on the part of any 
serious actor that the situation would change anytime soon.
While NATO and the Warsaw Pact continued to face one another, there were other 
institutions in the region that played specific roles during the Cold War, and were 
destined to play even more important roles in the transformation of Europe. A 
significant issue related to these organizations results from their partially overlapping 
memberships. The membership disconnects and growing interdependence among 
institutions adds a level of complexity to the emerging relationships that developed 
during this period.
At the same time that NATO was serving as a primary security and military voice 
for many European nations, the European Community (EC) was similarly the primary 
voice in matters of economics and trade. However, Article 223 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community specifically excluded security issues 
and military production from consideration by the organization. At times, this was a 
frustrating situation to some of the European members of NATO. There had been efforts 
to develop some form of European Political Cooperation (EPC) since 1953, but it was 
not until 1970 that any sort of formal cooperation was instituted. However, the 
insistence of many countries to keep security matters strictly under the auspices of
2 European Economic Community, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 
25 March 1957, 152. Specifically, the Article states in part: “1. The provisions o f  the Treaty shall not 
preclude the application o f  the following rules: (a) N o member State shall be obliged to supply information 
the disclosure o f  which it considers contrary to the essential interests o f  its security;...” It also then goes on 
to exclude all security related trade and production from the rules o f  the EEC.
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NATO, kept the EC from developing along those lines. This resulted in renewed 
interest in a European security organization that had been nearly dormant for years. 
Evolving from the 1948 Brussels Treaty Organization, the Western European Union 
(WEU) had been formed in 1954, in part as a means of allowing Germany to be 
reintegrated into the Western security system. As NATO became the most significant 
actor in European security, the WEU role diminished. It was not until the 27 October 
1984, Rome Declaration at the thirtieth anniversary of the Modified Brussels Treaty that 
this changed. At the initiative of the French and Belgian foreign ministers, the foreign 
and defense ministers of member nations met and defined a European security identity, 
and determined that the WEU could not only contribute to European security, but could 
also improve the security of the Atlantic Alliance. The Rome Declaration stated that,
“ .. .a better utilisation of W.E.U. would not only contribute to the security of western 
Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all countries of the 
Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members.”4 This declaration was a 
precursor to the more recent effort to develop a more effective European voice regarding 
European security, especially within NATO.5
In addition to the formal institutions that played important roles during this time 
period, there have also been more unique organizations. One of these non-state actors
3 As part o f  the “European Defence Community” initiative in 1950 there was also a call for a 
European Political Community. It failed with the EDC. There were also two efforts by Christian Fouchet 
to submit draft treaties on European Political Union, Fouchet Plan I (2 November 1961) and Fouchet Plan 
II, (18 January 1962. These too, were unsuccessful. In 1970 EPC began informally, and was finally 
instituted legally in the Single European Act in 1987. It was eventually replaced by the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy established in the 1993 Treaty on European Union. European Union, The Common 
Foreign and Security Policy: Introduction, (Brussels), 2,
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00001.htm (accessed 10 September 2005).
4 Western European Union, Rome Declaration, (Brussels, 24 October 1984), at www.weu.int, Key 
Texts, 20 June 2004 2, para. 4.
5 Development o f  the European identity within NATO will be extensively covered in the next 
chapter.
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was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).6 During this period 
the CSCE was not yet formally an institution. It did not yet have a structure and 
independent bodies. Instead, it was a periodic gathering of member nations working 
toward the goal of improving East -  West relations in Europe. It contained 
representatives from European nations as well as the United States and Canada. As 1989 
approached, on-going negotiations persisted among the two blocs to manage European 
force levels through a Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).7 While 
this was one of many positive signs in Europe, it was not until the words and actions of 
Mikhail Gorbachev became evident that change began to occur. Soviet President 
Gorbachev ended 1988 with the strong suggestion of positive change in his 7 December 
speech to the United Nations when he announced a unilateral reduction of five hundred 
thousand front line Soviet troops, while also declaring that other socialist countries
o
would be able to find their own path. To many however, the signs were not yet obvious.
1989- 1991: The End Of An Era
Events Set The Stage
As the year began, the United States was still defending its national interests 
around the world. On 4 January 1989, American aircraft supporting freedom of 
navigation rights engaged and destroyed Libyan aircraft in the Gulf of Sidra. At the
6 The CSCE was an entity that had as its genesis a Warsaw Pact initiative in March 1969 proposing 
a European security conference. The NAC decided to consider the possibility, and the Finnish government 
proposed Helsinki as a conference site. As a basis for the discussions, it was necessary that German 
borders be confirmed, that access between Berlin and West Germany be opened, and that the border 
between both Germanys be declared inviolate. In concert with these agreements, the opening phase o f  the 
Conference in Helsinki took place on 22 November 1972. John Fry, The Helsinki Process: Negotiating 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1993), 5-7.
7 OSCE, OSCE Handbook, Third Ed., Second Impression, (Vienna, June 2000): 127-130.
8 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study In 
Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 16.
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same time, on a more positive note, as part of a long-term process to improve East-West 
relations, CSCE members were completing the final chapter of the Helsinki Final Act. 
More explicitly than ever, signatories were declaring how they would protect human 
rights and provide for more effective security throughout Europe. It is said that, “.. .it 
contained the most comprehensive human rights commitments ever achieved in the 
history of East-West negotiations. New ones included respecting the rights of Helsinki 
monitors, allowing direct and normal reception of foreign radio broadcasts, ...expanding 
the rights of religious practice,.. .and creating a promising mechanism for resolving 
human rights concerns on a continuous basis.”9
The first tentative signs of major change in Europe began appearing in Hungary 
and Poland. On 11 January 1989, the Hungarian government authorized for the first 
time participation by multiple and non-communist political parties in elections. On 11 
February, discussions continued on how to best bring about reform in the nation. As part 
of an effort to break with the Communist past, some of the members of the Hungarian 
ruling party began questioning the labels that had been applied to the 1956 anti­
communist uprising.10 Based on the recommendation of a historical commission, the 
revolution in 1956 was now designated a “popular rising,” not a “counterrevolution.”11 
Another outcome of this revision was the eventual determination of a new national day in 
March, selecting a day from Hungary’s history rather than one in solidarity with the 
Soviet Communists as had previously been the case. In fact, by March, the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers Party had developed a new constitution that for the first time no longer
9 Fry, The Helsinki Process, 140.
10 Renee De Nevers, The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The End o f  an Era, Adelphi Papers 
249, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990), 30.
11 David Reynolds, One World Divisible: A G lobal History Since 1945 (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 2000), 554.
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guaranteed a leading role for the party. This was a major change in the way the
1 ^
Communist leadership of a country would tolerate change. On 12 April, the changes 
within Hungary seemed well entrenched. A shuffle of members within the Politburo was 
widely seen as a victory for reformers. At the same time, the Communist Youth Union 
was disbanded as an official organ of the state. By 25 April 1989, the Soviet troop 
withdrawal had begun.
While all of these changes were underway in Hungary, the government in Poland 
began considering talks with the Solidarity Trade Union. Though Solidarity had 
previously been banned, it was hoped that this dialogue might lead to its relegalization. 
This was envisioned to eventually lead to its participation in the electoral process, and 
finally a more open election system. Slow progress in these talks prompted a number of 
strikes and demonstrations in Poland that began on 6 February and continued until 9 
February, following which Solidarity was then allowed to participate. At the same time, 
while trying to fill in gaps in the country’s post-World War Two history, the Polish 
government developed information that they felt could assist in their on-going 
negotiations with Solidarity. They felt confident enough in their independence from 
Moscow to announce that new research proved that the Soviet Union had been 
responsible for the Katyn Massacre during the Second World War. In addition to 
updating national history, this could also be seen as an effort for the Party to bolster its 
own national credentials by attacking the Soviet Union.13 Unfortunately these efforts on 
the part of the Party did not have the desired effects of strengthening their position with 
the people. Despite these actions, there were remarkable changes in the 4 June 1989, and
12 Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: G erm any’s R oad to Unification (Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 1993), 85.
13 De Nevers, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 36.
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subsequent elections. Solidarity won all 35 percent of the seats it was allowed to 
compete for in the lower house, as well as 99 of 100 of the seats it was allowed to 
compete for in the upper house of parliament. In nearly all cases, communists were 
defeated, even when running unopposed.14 No one was yet certain how the Soviet Union 
would react to this, so communists were given the sensitive defense and interior ministry 
portfolios, while Solidarity leadership ensured that General Jaruzelski was elected 
president. None of these compromises could hide the fact that on 18 June, a 
noncommunist government had been legally elected in a communist state.15
In contrast to the government supported reform efforts taking place in Hungary 
and Poland, early government efforts in Czechoslovakia were designed to maintain 
control. On 16 January, a demonstration organized to commemorate the self-immolation 
of the demonstrator Jan Palach 20 years earlier was a clear sign that increased opposition 
was growing. The size of this demonstration surprised the Czechoslovakian government, 
causing the government to react forcefully and violently. Despite this, they were 
unsuccessful from keeping the dissident movement from spreading.16
On 14 February, the Czech Assembly enacted harsher penalties for 
demonstrations just prior to the trials of those arrested recently. As a result, the famous 
playwright and dissident Vaclav Havel17 was arrested for his role in the demonstrations 
and sentenced to nine months in prison. Though his appeal to overturn the conviction 
failed, his nine month sentence was reduced by a month, and then he was released four 
months early. These actions were seemingly in response to the strong condemnations
14 Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse o f  Communism in Eastern Europe 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 127.
15 William I. Hitchcock, The Struggle For Europe (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 362.
16 De Nevers, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 46.
17 Reynolds, One World Divisible, 553.
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against the government following the signing of the human rights documents included in 
the CSCE Vienna Concluding Document. Czechoslovakia continued to receive 
unwanted attention on 29 March, when two teens managed to hijack an airliner to West 
Germany in an attempt to turn themselves over to American authorities. Then, during 
May Day celebrations, unauthorized pro-democracy demonstrations broke out and were 
severely repressed.
Meanwhile, the Hungarian government precipitated more turmoil on 2 May with 
the removal of the fences along its portion of the Austrian border. At first it was 
presented as merely a practical matter since few individuals had ever escaped to the West 
by that route. Nevertheless, such a substantive change in the conditions between East 
and West could not help but be noted by all involved.
While these Eastern European events were holding the attention of the Soviet 
leadership, on-going changes were also evident in the Soviet Union. By 15 February, 
Soviet troops had completed a withdrawal from Afghanistan, thereby ending a long and 
unsuccessful effort to expand their influence in that region. At the same time, in 
response to some of President Gorbachev’s efforts at Glasnost, increasing reports of 
tension and uneasiness were heard in some of the outlying regions. In Georgia, 9 April 
riots calling for independence or greater autonomy had been quickly and violently put 
down.
The struggles within Czechoslovakia led to a government reshuffle in June.
These changes led other citizens to unsuccessfully petition the government for reform the 
next month. Major demonstrations broke out in the country on 21 August 1989, the 
anniversary of the 1969 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. While the Soviet 
Union, Poland, and Hungary all made statements expressing various levels of regret for
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the invasion, the East German government remained firmly convinced that the response
had been appropriate. On 28 October, additional demonstrations broke out led by the
opposition, despite earlier efforts to arrest dissidents. These conflicts continued for
several months on historically significant dates such as the anniversary of the Warsaw
Pact invasion on 21 August, and on 28 October, the anniversary of the establishment of
the Czechoslovak Republic. Throughout these events, the escalating conflict between the
1 8state and dissidents helped bring together dissidents throughout the country. On 17 
November, inspired by the rapidly changing situation in the GDR, a protest campaign 
began, with police forcefully breaking up demonstrations that had begun as sanctioned 
events. In reaction to this, a new umbrella opposition group known as Civic Forum was 
established by Havel. Massive demonstrations continued, followed by a substantial 
national work stoppage on 27 November. In panic, national leadership called for change 
and on 29 November, ended the leading role of the party. It eventually led to a non­
communist government being formed on 10 December with Alexander Dubcek, the 
former leader at the time of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, being made chairman 
of the Federal Assembly. By 29 December, Havel was unanimously elected as 
president.19
By September, the change in Hungary’s border security procedures evolved into a 
major change in the Hungarian approach to enforcing its relations with its East European 
neighbors. On 10 September the Hungarian government suspended the bilateral 
agreement with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) that had required Hungary to 
return citizens caught trying to escape through their country. Following this change,
18 Lonnie R. Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends (New  York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 280.
19 Reynolds, One World Divisible, 559.
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elections were held that for the first time were won by the opposition. By 23 October, 
the Hungarians had declared a republic and were restructuring their government. 
Significant changes seemed all but certain.
Nevertheless, with these many changes underway in all neighboring countries, 
the East German government was now faced with a number of unforeseen challenges, 
and did not seem prepared to respond effectively. As described by Elizabeth Pond, 
“Institutionally, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), like other communist parties throughout 
the Soviet bloc, occupied the leading role reserved for it in the country’s constitution, and 
stifled political competition far more successfully that its Polish and Hungarian 
counterparts. The state, the government, the economy, and social organizations were 
totally subordinate to the SED, and a ubiquitous secret police network supplemented 
hierarchical discipline.”20 As Hungary suspended its treaty with the GDR, the West 
German embassies in Prague and Warsaw, as well as the mission in Berlin became 
crowded with East German citizens attempting to leave the East. During this same 
period 30,000 East German citizens departed in addition to the 50,000 who had legally 
emigrated during the first eight months of the year. Inspired by the numerous departures 
from the country, the first nation-wide group of dissidents, previously only a discussion 
group, applied for status as an opposition party. Denied this right, it was subsequently
9 ilabeled as subversive and anti-state, and eventually banned.
These actions triggered responses from a number of other religious and political 
discussions groups as they also sought to become opposition parties. Organizations such 
as “the New Forum, the Social Democratic Initiative, Democracy Now, Democratic
20 Pond, Beyond the Wall, 76.
21 Ibid., 96.
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Awakening, and a variety of other newly formed and often miniscule groups, built on the 
experiences of the preceding years to network, organize, and pressurize for change.”22
91They were also denied and labeled subversive. During this same period, regular 
protests began to occur in Leipzig. The turning point in Leipzig seemed to be the 
beginning of the sustained movements in the GDR. This began on 25 September 1989, 
when the usual small gathering became more active. On this evening, the demonstrators 
peacefully moved into and through the streets of Leipzig, for a change, no longer calling 
for freedom to leave the GDR, but for the government to talk to them about reforming 
the GDR.24 On 4-5 October, serious demonstrations took place in Dresden. Firm and 
violent government responses were unable to quell the continuation of the activities. 
Throughout this process an increasing number of members of the GDR central committee 
grew concerned that the situation was getting out of control and that General Secretary 
Honecker was not capable of resolving the problem. A significant event took place on 7 
October when President Gorbachev visited East Germany and made it clear that there 
would not be support for continued repression of the East German citizens. Less than 
two weeks later, on 17 October, the dissatisfied members of the central committee 
engineered a change of power against Honecker. Convinced he had no choice but to 
leave, he resigned for health reasons. His replacement, Egon Krenz, had been State 
Secretary for Security, and Honeckers heir apparent, but had also been one of those who
9 Sled the move against Honecker.
22 Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy o f  a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-1989 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995): 249.
23 Pond, Beyond the Wall, 96.
24 Fulbrook, Anatomy o f  a Dictatorship, 249-250.
25 Angela E. Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, The Soviet Collapse, and the New  
Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 88.
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While the Party began making changes following Honeckers departure, they were 
intended only as a fa?ade to defuse the situation while not actually giving up any power 
from the SED. However, to the dissatisfied population, Krenz was not seen as a real 
change in government due to his life-long SED involvement. The changes offered by the 
new Central Committee were seen as too little, too late.
Therefore, despite these changes the demonstrations continued. On 9 November, 
the Party proposed changes to the travel laws, followed closely by the resignation of the 
Council of Ministers and the Politburo. Krenz was formally declared the new General
'yf tSecretary, and a new Politburo was formed with some additional reformers added. By 
now the flood of emigres increased into Czechoslovakia. Finally, on 9 November, it was 
announced that the borders were opened, in an attempt to relieve the pressure of citizens 
trying to leave. While this was never intended to be an all at once opening of the GDR, 
the confusion within the new GDR government meant that there was no effective 
management of change. The lack of guidance resulted in the sudden removal of all 
movement restrictions, culminating in the removal of the Berlin Wall. However, the 
citizens of East Germany did not have confidence that conditions would not change back 
again just as rapidly. Therefore, they continued departing in large numbers. With no 
ability to effect real change, Krenz resigned on 6 December. He was then replaced by 
Hans Modrow, the former SED State Secretary for Dresden. In his previous position, 
Modrow had been one of few SED officials who had met and dealt fairly with dissenters.
26 Fulbrook, Anatomy o f  a Dictatorship, 259.
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Known to be reform-minded, he was perceived to be someone who might be able to lead 
the GDR to a separate status from West Germany and a new form of socialism.27
Following the Bush -  Gorbachev Summit in Malta on 3 December, President 
Bush flew to Brussels where he updated NATO allies on the results. He also had the 
opportunity to discuss German reunification efforts and Kohl’s Ten-Point plan which had 
recently caused much concern among the allies. This series of meetings provided 
Chancellor Kohl with the assurance that he had the support of the US in his efforts, and 
also served to assure the allies that reunification would be handled considering the 
appropriate legal issues of borders and self-determination.
While these events were taking place in Europe, the attention of the United States 
was at the same time also increasingly drawn to its own regional problems. Ever since 
General Noriega in Panama had been indicted in the US on drug trafficking charges 4 
February 1988, the US had been increasingly drawn into conflict with him.29 These 
confrontations with General Noriega had resulted in the US seeking alternatives to 
reduce or remove the threat to the Panama Canal and US interests in that region. Finally, 
on 20 December 1989, President Bush launched an invasion that removed Noriega from 
power and installed president Guillermo Endara. He was widely felt to have won the 
election on 7 May 1989, but been kept out of power by Noriega, and with other
TOopposition leaders, sent into hiding or to seek asylum.
27 W.R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: The C old War Struggle Over Germany (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1999), 332.
28 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 
198-200.
29 John T. Fishel, The Fog o f  Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration o f  Panama (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 15, 1992), 2.
30 Ronald H. Cole, Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution o f  Joint Operations in 
Panama, February 1 9 8 8 - January 1990 (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 1995), 10.
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Concurrent with these US actions, the changes that began in Hungary and Poland
before spreading to Czechoslovakia and East Germany, now erupted with much greater
force in Romania. As part of an effort to control the Hungarian minority in Romania, the
government had implemented a plan of forced collectivization. At the same time
however, Romanians were following the rapid change taking place throughout Eastern
Europe. Following the arrest and ordered deportation of one of the Hungarian minority
leaders on 16 December, huge demonstrations began and developed with increasing
strength. Finally, On 21 December, a short but bloody revolution began following a
public speech by President Nicolae Ceausescu. President Ceausescu attempted to flee,
but was soon captured and held by members of his security who had quickly formed a
new government known as the National Salvation Front. The holdover members of the
government needed scapegoats, and desired to quickly conclude these changes. As a
result, there was a quick trial, ending on December 25 with the execution of Nicolae
1 1
Ceausescu and his wife, Elena.
Change continued in the region as 1990 began. On 11 March, Lithuania declared 
independence from the Soviet Union. This action was met forcefully by the Soviet 
Union. While Gorbachev had supported the departure of East European countries from 
the Soviet sphere of influence, it did not appear that countries part of the Soviet Union 
proper would have that same choice. Over the next several months, the Soviet Army 
arrested Lithuanian deserters and seized a number of communist Party buildings, while 
also establishing an economic blockade against the country. On 30 June 1990, the 
Lithuanian Supreme Council placed a moratorium on the declaration of independence
31 Reynolds, One World Divisible, 561.
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T9and the economic blockade was lifted. Despite this, Soviet President Gorbachev had 
been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October, and was presented it on 10 December.
While these actions were taking place in the Baltics, other nations were working 
to determine the final nature of German unification. In January, the West German 
foreign minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, proposed what came to be known as the 
Genscher plan. He offered to the Soviet Union that Germany would place no NATO 
forces in the part of Germany formerly the GDR, and that Soviet troops would be able to 
stay in the former GDR for a reasonable amount of time. The plan also seemed to 
suggest that NATO would not move any closer to the borders of the Soviet Union. It
was felt important that unification move as quickly as possible, while keeping the 
viability of NATO membership open. There were fears that offers by the Soviet Union 
to allow a speedier unification at the expense of Germany’s departure from NATO might 
well prove problematic to the Alliance.
Shortly after surfacing the Genscher plan, a group of US and German officials 
developed the framework that would eventually serve to unify Germany. On the one 
hand, the two Germanys could not take decisions regarding unification on their own. At 
the same time, it was not feasible for the four powers from the end of the Second World 
War to take actions without regard for German needs or opinions. As a result, the 
concept of “Two plus Four” evolved and was announced on 13 February 1990.34 
Within this framework, the four powers of the Soviet Union, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France joined with corresponding representatives of West
32 Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence 
(New  Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 240.
33 Stent, Russia and Germany Reborn, 115-118.
34 James A. Baker III with Thomas M. Defrank, Politics o f  Diplomacy, Revolution, War and Peace, 
1 9 8 9 -  1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 195-200.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
58
Germany and the GDR. As equals, they would solve the challenges of German 
unification and finally end the special four-power status. Within this framework, 
substantive discussions and negotiations were possible for the involved states to begin 
working towards eventual unification.
During this period, the new German Democratic Republic continued searching 
for a separate path to independence. The government wanted to maintain the best 
features of their socialist society through free elections that would allow them to remain 
an independent nation in Europe. In these first elections held on 18 March, Lothar de 
Maizere, the head of the East Germany Christian Democratic Union (CDU), was elected 
as the new GDR Prime Minister. Those GDR resistance groups that had been so 
involved with the demonstrations and change that ended with the election had little 
political success. They had sought to retain the GDR as a separate country, seeking a 
new form of socialism that would be better than the capitalism of West Germany. What 
they had not anticipated was that the expectations of their population was now for 
unification rather than governmental change.
Throughout this period, the Soviet Union sought to find ways to maintain 
influence over the two Germanys as they worked toward unification or accommodation.
It quickly became clear to Gorbachev that unification would take place, so the issue was 
to influence its final form. Initial Soviet desires were for Germany to either become 
neutral, or for it to belong to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, that position 
found no support from anyone else.37 Nevertheless, despite a lack of success in some 
areas, Germany attempted to facilitate Soviet support in a variety of ways. On 27 June,
35 Pond, Beyond the Wall, 178.
35 Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin, 363.
37 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 532.
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Germany approved $3 billion and twelve years of extended commercial credit in an 
effort to assist the Soviet Union’s expenses relating the Germany unification.38 At the 
same time, the Soviet Union was continuing to confront internal struggles over ethnic 
issues or potential secession. Since 8 January, demonstrations in Armenia, Georgia, and 
Uzbekistan had been met with force by Soviet troops and security forces. Efforts to
I Q
either resolve the dissension or end the struggles was proving unsuccessful.
Just prior to the outbreak of the crisis in the Middle East, Germany continued to 
experience major political uncertainty as the two Germanys orchestrated their next 
moves. On 2 July, the GDR coalition government agreed that national elections could 
be held on 2 December. It was then that they realized that their hopes for a separate, 
more socialist Germany would not be able to be established. A unification treaty was 
signed by the two Germanys on 31 August, confirming how the two states would be 
joined, while also identifying those aspects of the constitution that would be have to be 
changed or deleted to accommodate unification. After final maneuvering and 
negotiations by the other nations involved, the final Two Plus Four agreement was 
signed in Moscow by Bonn and Berlin, as well as the Soviet Union, France, Great 
Britain, and the United States on 12 September. On 1-2 October, CSCE foreign 
ministers met in New York and approved German reunification. As a result of this 
agreement the four-power rights were suspended. On 3 October, Germany was reunified 
and its Eastern Laender joined the EC.
While German reunification was taking place, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 
1990. This crisis proved to be a significant event in the evolution of European
38 Pond, Beyond the Wall, 219.
39 Brian Crozier, The Rise and Fall o f  the Soviet Empire (Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing, 1999), 
413-415.
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institutions and in the perception and expectations of their member states. This invasion 
prompted a quick and substantive response by the US in the form of condemnation, 
immediate deployment of forces to protect Saudi Arabia, and attempts to build a coalition 
to reverse the invasion. While NATO met at the request of the US in an emergency 
session on 3 August to consider possible responses, the EC had already issued a 
condemnation of Iraq and taken selective economic and trade actions. Within the 
authority of European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the ECs trade authority under 
Article 113 of the Rome Treaty, these types of responses could be made quickly.40 By 7 
August, US forces began deploying to the region. However, on 10 August, NATO 
decided that while individual members backed the US response, actions under the 
authority of the NATO Treaty were not allowed. For decades, NATO was perceived as 
an institution that focused on the well-defined North Atlantic area, and covered the topics 
of defense, deterrence, and arms control. The idea of authorizing NATO actions in an 
out of area mission was not yet considered acceptable, but the subject had now been 
broached. Meanwhile, the US continued building its coalition to challenge the Iraqi 
takeover of Kuwait and its oilfields. On 29 November, the United States announced that 
15 January 1991, would be the deadline for Iraq to leave Kuwait or be ejected.
During the several months leading up to the beginning of the air operations 
against Iraq in January, NATO members implemented a variety of political and defense 
responses continued outside of the Alliance. Following a 21 August, WEU ministerial, a 
decision was made that the WEU would act in response to UNSC resolutions. The 
WEU began serving as the forum for European nations to discuss potential responses, as
40 William C. Cromwell, “Europe, the United States, and the Pre-war G ulf Crisis,” International 
Journal 48 (Winter 1992-3): 126.
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well as a means for organizing military involvement without appearing to support NATO 
out of area missions under US authority. At the same time, the EC continued working a 
range of diplomatic options to peacefully resolve the crisis. Some European nations 
believed that a resolution of the Palestinian problem was a necessary first step towards a 
solution to other Middle East problems. As a result, there were a variety of efforts to 
directly or indirectly link these two issues. Since this linkage was unacceptable to the 
US, several internal disagreements developed during the period. France attempted to 
take charge of these efforts when President Mitterrand offered an extensive peace plan on 
24 September that explicitly linked the Palestinian problem and the Iraqi crisis, despite 
disagreements with his EC colleagues. The efforts of the EC and France to 
diplomatically resolve this crisis, with varying amounts of support from the US, 
continued right up to the start of the air campaign. A final demonstration of European 
independence from the US military response was the blocking of a NATO endorsement 
of the air campaign by France and Germany on 16 January, only two days prior to the 
initiation of operations.
On 19 November 1990, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) was finally 
signed in Paris, with NATO and Warsaw Pact member states jointly declaring that they 
were no longer adversaries. With the conclusion of the unification of Germany, this 
particular treaty took on the aspect of the peace treaty of the Second World War as well 
as the Cold War.41 At the 1 4 -15  December 1990, Rome European Council, Chancellor 
Kohl of Germany and President Mitterrand of France proposed that the EC establish two 
intergovernmental conferences (IGC). One would be to address developing support for 
European Monetary Union (EMU), the other to develop necessary steps toward political
41 Pond, Beyond the Wall, 224.
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union.42 This decision, later implemented as part of the Treaty on European Union, or 
Maastricht Treaty, resulted from substantial actions taken by members of the EC since 
mid 1989.
The first substantive act that led to the EMU and the initiatives towards political 
union began on 17 April 1989, when the EC Commission announced the Delors Plan. It 
was a three-step process to develop and implement a plan toward full monetary and 
currency union. A few months later, at the 27 June 1989, Madrid Council, the leaders of 
EC nations endorsed this plan. Unfortunately, the turmoil in Europe complicated these 
actions. France was concerned that some potential changes, most specifically the 
unification of Germany, would lessen the influence of French independent military 
power while increasing the influence of an enlarged Germany’s economic power. 
Therefore, it was important that actions such as an economic union be implemented in 
order to cement German power within the EC. To the United Kingdom, it was more 
important to widen the institution by quickly bringing the emerging nations of Eastern 
Europe into the EC. This would reinforce their emerging democracies and hopefully 
stabilize their new governments 43
During late 1989 and early 1990, French President Mitterrand tried 
unsuccessfully to slow down the process of German unification through meetings with 
Soviet President Gorbachev as well as a first ever visit to East Germany to meet with 
Eric Honecker. However, after the victory of Chancellor Kohl and the CDU in the 18 
March 1990, East Germany elections, France realized that it would be necessary to work
42 Anand Menon, Anthony Forster and William Wallace, “A Common European Defence?”
Survival 34, no. 3 (Autumn 1992): 105.
43 Michael J. Baun, “The Maastricht Treaty A s High Politics: Germany, France, and European 
Integration,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4 (1995-96): 610.
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with Germany to achieve some of their goals. Similarly, Chancellor Kohl understood 
that gaining more substantial support for unification from Germany’s neighbors would 
likewise require compromise. “As a result, after weeks of secretive bilateral bargaining, 
Kohl and Mitterrand sent a joint letter to the President of the European Council on 19 
April, in which they not only proposed an accelerated pace for monetary union but also 
called for a new initiative on political union. For this purpose, the letter suggested that a 
second intergovernmental conference on political union be held.. .”44 While issues of the 
economic IGC were well-established, it was a 7 December, joint proposal by Kohl and 
Mitterrand which formalized the issues of the developments in political union. There 
was to be more majority voting in the European Council, while also employing a 
revitalized West European Union and providing greater powers to the European Union.45 
The consideration of, and responses to, the substantial changes in security and other areas 
of vital national interests taking place throughout Europe were not strictly within the 
confines NATO. The increasing use of the EC during this time period as another means 
to address other than economic issues was the beginning of these institutions moving 
closer to one another.
The beginning of 1991 saw the continuation of volatile changes in Europe and 
around the world. While NATO deployed forces to Turkey for protection against Iraq, 
the Soviets began a crackdown in the Baltics in response to declarations of independence 
by the respective states. On 11 January 1991, Soviet paratroops begin seizing key 
facilities in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius. This action strongly influenced leadership 
within the Central and East European countries. While earlier there had only been
44 Ibid., 616.
45 Ibid., 618.
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support in working towards independence, the Soviet threat helped inspire an interest in 
NATO membership.46 The need for the international support of the Soviet Union against 
Iraq led to minimal Western condemnation of the Soviets early in this struggle. 
Nevertheless, during the first half of 1991, Soviet attempts at intimidation of the Baltic 
states were unsuccessful at precluding all three Baltic states from having large majorities 
support independence as part of national referendums 47 Significantly for the West, the 
Soviets began removing their forces from throughout Eastern Europe near the end of 
January, while the US coalition began major combat operations as part of Operation 
Desert Storm on 24 February 1991.
Despite the successful war in Iraq, and early positive efforts of NATO toward the 
emerging countries of Central and Eastern Europe, other crises began emerging. On 25 
June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. The next day, 
the Yugoslav National Army was ordered to take control of Slovenia. However, it was 
no match for the Slovenian territorial forces and other security forces that had been 
carefully preparing for this event. After a brief conflict, the EC negotiated a truce called 
the Brioni Agreement on 7 July 1991.48 However, it only served to delay actions, and 
following the three months suspension of independence called for in the agreement, 
Slovenia declared independence on 8 October.49 While Slovenia was allowed to depart 
at the end of the stipulated truce period, Croatia’s attempted departure triggered a war 
with Serbia and precipitated Yugoslavia’s slide into a state of civil war. The EC
46 Stuart Croft, John Redmond, G. Wyn Rees, and Mark Weber, The Enlargement o f  Europe, (New  
York: Manchester University Press, 1999), 26.
47 Lieven, The Baltic Revolution, 250.
48 Raimo Vayrynen, “Toward Effective Conflict Prevention: A Comparison o f  Different 
Instruments,” The International Journal o f  Peace Studies 21, no. 1 (January 1997).
49 Carole Rogel, The Breakup o f  Yugoslavia and the War in Bosniai (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1998), 25.
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unsuccessfully tried again to stop the fighting. It was only when UN special envoy 
Cyrus Vance became involved that a cease-fire was brokered. By 3 January 1992 the UN 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had established the truce, though in actuality, the truce 
protected Serb gains in Croatia and allowed Yugoslav President Milosevic to turn to 
other matters.50
The dissolution of the Soviet Union was taking place concurrent with these new 
dangers from the Balkans. On 19 August 1991, disgruntled Communist Party officials 
and military representatives attempted a power grab in the Kremlin by seizing control of 
General Secretary Gorbachev while he was away from Moscow. Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin helped to defeat the coup, and as a result, was widely seen as the hero.
Gorbachev returned to his position on 22 August, but both his credibility and that of the 
Soviet political system was greatly weakened. Over the next few months, great changes 
took place as a result, in large part due to this weakened Soviet presence. The three 
Baltic republics quickly seceded from the union and a number of other republics 
similarly declared their independence. The final act came on 1 December, when first 
Ukraine opted for independence, and then on 11 December, Byelorussia, Russia and 
Ukraine declared the Soviet Union no longer existed.5'it became apparent that the 
continued support of the Soviet Union for the positive changes in Europe could not be 
guaranteed. The breakup of the Soviet Union seemed dangerous to many individuals due 
to the potential similarities to the on-going crises in the Balkans.
During this same period, a coup in Haiti removed President Aristide from power 
on 30 September 1991, after only seven months in office. This event greatly influenced
50 Ibid., 26.
51 Lilia Shevtsova, “The August Coup and the Soviet Collapse,” Survival 34, no. 1 (Spring 1992):
5.
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the US, especially through the course of the presidential elections, as large numbers of 
Haitians began attempting to land in the US, severely straining relief efforts in Florida. 
Candidate Clinton’s claimed that he would change how the US handled refugees. 
President Clinton however, maintained the Bush policies of keeping refugees out when 
he learned that 100,000 refugees were prepared to flee to the US following his 
election.
NATO Responds
It was amidst this time of great upheavals in Europe that NATO held its 40th 
Anniversary in Brussels on 29-30 May 1989. The members recognized the implications 
of the recent events when they stated in the opening of the declaration that, “Our meeting 
takes place at a juncture of unprecedented change and opportunities. This is a time to 
look ahead, to chart the course of our Alliance and to set our agenda for the future.”53 
NATO leadership identified the major issues evident amongst the turmoil and clearly 
expressed their hopes, expectations, and intentions based on the many changes then 
underway. The Alliance reiterated that military strength and political solidarity provided 
the foundation of NATO’s strength, and that deterrence would remain the cornerstone of 
their defensive concepts. Nevertheless, they intended to support positive change within 
the region. A theme that became recurring was that Alliance decisions would be guided
52 Lester H. Brune, The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions (Claremont, CA: Regina 
Books, 1998), 48.
53 NATO, The Brussels Declaration from  the 40th Anniversary o f  the Alliance, Brussels, 29/30 May 
1989, http://www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b890529a.htm (accessed 4 November 2001).
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by the principles of the Harmel Report and its complementary approaches of adequate 
military strength and political solidarity.54
The Alliance long term objectives would be to continue to work toward 
prevention of war while also working to establish new relations between countries of the 
East and West. For example, it was in this declaration that specific suggestions were 
made to the Warsaw Treaty Organization as to how the two organizations could take 
substantive actions to enhance security and stability in Europe through reductions of 
conventional forces.
NATO welcomed reforms within the Soviet Union, as well as the significant 
progress observed in some Eastern European countries as they attempted to establish 
more democratic institutions and greater economic choice. At the same time, NATO also 
noted that some countries continued to demonstrate repressive tendencies to these 
changes. The declaration signaled that NATO would seek to improve the relationship 
with the Eastern European countries through dialogue and cooperation, a theme repeated 
and developed through later declarations. This statement highlighted the need for the 
policy changes that would enable this new dialogue to take place. In addition to obvious 
matters of security, there was also a call for additional support for those NATO partners 
requiring economic assistance, as well as a recognition that NATO could provide 
opportunities for additional commercial, monetary, and technological cooperation.
Under the umbrella of these ideas, there was a strong call for closing divisions within
54 Ibid., para. 7. The Harmel Report, or, The Future Tasks o f  the Alliance, was approved in Brussels 
on 14 December 1967. It discussed the role the Alliance had played in Europe up to that point, and also 
identified the two primary functions o f  the Alliance: to maintain adequate military strength and political 
solidarity, and to continue searching for progress to a stable and peaceful relationship in Europe. It also 
established the flexible response strategic concept that took NATO up to the 1991 Strategic Concept. 
NATO, The Future Tasks o f  the Alliance, www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b671213a.htm, (accessed 31 
January 2004).
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Europe. To do this, they turned to the continuing negotiations under the auspices of the 
CSCE and the ongoing efforts to reduce the number of forces deployed in Europe. In 
fact, building on the CSCE process, the Alliance invoked a number of mechanisms that 
had recently been adopted in the Vienna Concluding Document. As a result of the 
Concluding Document, human rights finally became a legitimate subject of international 
dialogue. This suggested that a variety of legal and societal changes could be 
implemented for the betterment of their respective citizens. 55
NATO also recognized the increasing global challenges these changes were 
bringing about and declared an interest to work with the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe to confront many of the legal, environmental, and security challenges that were 
emerging. In the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO promised to 
increase its own cooperation in a wide variety of areas.56 At the same time, the 
declaration made a variety of references to the positive improvement in the development 
of a European voice within the Alliance. Paragraph 13 specifically states that a, 
“(G)rowing European political unity can lead to a reinforced European component of our 
common security effort and its efficiency.” It noted the increasing European political 
cooperation, most evident in the EC, and also identified the increasing partnership 
within the Alliance. The increasing European identity, especially in the area of security,
55 The Vienna Concluding Document extensively covered the protection o f  human rights and the 
due process that all signatories agreed would be available to those citizens that felt their rights were being 
infringed upon in paragraphs 11-13. CSCE, Conference fo r  Security and Co-operation in Europe, Follow- 
up M eeting 1986-1989, (Vienna, 1989).
56 Article 2 states: The Parties will contribute toward the further development o f  peaceful and 
friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better 
understanding o f  the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions o f  
stability and well-being. The will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and 
will encourage economic collaboration between any or all o f  them. NATO, NATO Handbook, 527.
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could improve the technological and economic conditions and cooperation within the 
Alliance.
Barely a year after the previous declaration in Brussels, the NATO heads of state 
and government published the London Declaration on 6 July 1990, updating their earlier 
statements. In the second paragraph of this declaration, the members of NATO laid the 
foundation for the transformation that remains evident today. In it they stated, “This 
Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe.. ..Yet our Alliance must be even 
more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, 
supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the 
rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security 
and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the
cn
political component of our Alliance a provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty.”
While the Alliance continued emphasizing the importance of providing for the 
common defense, it also recognized the changes brought about by the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from the region and the soon to be signed CFE treaty. As a result, it 
declared that the NATO military strategy would be changed to lessen the reliance on 
nuclear weapons and that NATO would never be the first to use force. There would also 
be force structure changes that would fundamentally change NATO forces. NATO 
would now field smaller and restructured active forces and scale back the readiness of 
those active units. They would also rely more heavily on an ability to build up forces as 
needed in response to a crisis. NATO also continued emphasizing the importance of 
actions under the provisions of Article 2. They suggested that a wide range of contacts
57 NATO, The London Declaration, London, 6 July 1990, para. 22, 
www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b900706a.htm, (accessed 4 November 2001).
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and dealings with the Eastern European countries be established as part of their desire to 
reach out to the countries of the East. The declaration also included a call for the 
members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to join NATO in a joint declaration that 
would state that the two organizations were “..no longer adversaries and . ..to refrain 
from the threat or use of force.. .”58
The declaration spoke at length concerning the potential advantages from 
expanding the role of the CSCE in improving European security. In addition to 
supporting new standards to be established by the CSCE, they also proposed that “ .. .the 
CSCE Summit in Paris decide how the CSCE can be institutionalised to provide a forum 
for wider political dialogue in a more united Europe.”59 The declaration contained a 
variety of specific suggestions for the CSCE summit regarding structures that should be 
established in order to enable the CSCE to be more actively engaged in security matters 
throughout the region. Significantly, the declaration ends with the statement that,
“Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of 
Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent.”
On 2 August, shortly after the conclusion of the summit, NATO members were 
confronted by the outbreak of the Iraq war in the Middle East. At the same time, 
Germany was preparing for its first national elections on 2 December. The evolving 
developments in the Middle East did not however stop changes from taking place within 
the security framework of Europe. Only two days after the signing of the CFE Treaty on 
19 November 1990, the CSCE, seemingly influenced by its NATO members, published 
the Charter o f Paris for a New Europe. It was a significant action for the CSCE in a
58 Ibid., para 6.
59 Ibid.
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variety of ways. Similar to many of NATO’s recent declarations, it called for the 
support of democracy and market economies, as well as for the protection of minorities 
and individual rights. It also called for more enhanced political cooperation and a further 
development of the confidence building measures that had led up to the CFE treaty. 
Taking a lead from NATO’s recognition of the new, more broadly based threats, it called 
on the member states to defend democratic institutions against terrorism and illegal 
activities. It also called for increasing cooperation in economic matters as well as those 
of science and technology, just as NATO had continued to do. Finally, and most 
significantly, the Charter identified the need for a number of structural changes. No 
longer would CSCE be primarily a body that only met periodically. Now, it was to have 
regular meetings of their respective Foreign Ministers, supported by a Secretariat in 
Prague, and augmented by a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and an Office for Free 
Elections in Warsaw.60 These changes were suggested by NATO in the conclusion of the 
London Declaration, and implemented in the Charter of Paris almost exactly as written 
by NATO.61 It seemed that the members of NATO perceived the changing nature of the 
international environment and what was needed to improve the security framework in 
Europe. They were taking every step possible, not only within NATO, but in other 
institutions as well, in order to implement appropriate changes.
During the same time that individual European states were addressing a variety of 
options for diplomatic responses to the crisis, there were still a substantial number of 
actions related to NATO underway. NATO’s formal responses were limited to defense 
of the NATO territory in the southern region and support to activities in the
60 U. S. Department o f  State, Bureau o f  Arms Control, Charter o f  Paris fo r  a New Europe, Signed, 
21 November 1990, http://www.state.gOv/t/ac/trt/4721pf.htm (4 June 2004).
61 NATO, The London Declaration, para 22.
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Mediterranean Sea. These actions provided additional protection against terrorism and 
military threats and also freed up additional assets for those members that chose to 
participate in the coalition. Additionally, 12 NATO nations provided forces to the 
coalition and also supported offensive operations against Iraq from within Europe, often 
from NATO bases and installations.62
On 25 February 1991, the political decision was made to dissolve the Warsaw 
Pact, just prior to the Desert Storm ground campaign concluding on 28 February 1991. 
This was a precursor to the disbanding of the entire organization on 1 July. On 7 June, 
the NATO Copenhagen Ministerial issued a declaration that continued building on the 
earlier theme of support for East European reform, while also introducing an important 
new theme. Where the previous year’s statements had reconfirmed the well-defined 
collective defense role of the Alliance, now security was seen as requiring greater 
involvement. This began an on-going dialogue as part of a search for a greater security 
architecture in Europe. They stated that, “ ...common security can best be safeguarded 
through the further development of a network of interlocking institutions and 
relationships, constituting a comprehensive architecture in which the Alliance, the 
process of European integration and the CSCE are key elements.. .We seek an 
architecture for the new Europe that is firmly based on the principles and provisions of
/ i ' l
the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.” The Alliance continued supporting 
CSCE efforts as well as the developing reforms within the Central and East European 
countries. Under the provisions of Article 2, NATO continued expanding the theme of
62 Jonathan T. Howe, “NATO and the Gulf Crisis,” Survival 33, no. 3 (May/June 1991): 249.
63 NATO, Partnership with the countries o f  Central and Eastern Europe (statement issued by the 
North Atlantic Council meeting in Ministerial Session), (7 June 1991), para. 3 and 5, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b910607a.htm (accessed 13 November 2001).
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dialogue and cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This new 
effort with other nations and institutions provided the foundation for many of the later 
initiatives.
Additionally, the 7 June 1991, Copenhagen Ministerial also issued another 
statement, NATO’s Core Security Functions in the New Europe. This brief declaration 
provided an important foundation and background for much of the rhetoric during the 
next several years. It reaffirmed that the purpose of the Alliance was to safeguard the 
freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance 
with the principle of the UN Charter. It declared that NATO was critical as the means by 
which the transatlantic link permanently ties North America to the security of Europe.
As a result of this linkage and the solidarity within the Alliance, the security of the 
sovereign member states remains indivisible. Based on these characteristics, the 
members of the Alliance are able to join with other nations to pursue the development of 
other cooperative structures of security “for a Europe whole and free.”64
The statement went on to describe how the Alliance performs four fundamental 
security tasks: to provide one of the foundations for a stable security environment in 
Europe; to serve as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on issues that affect 
vital interests; to deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of 
any NATO member state; and to preserve the strategic balance within Europe. The 
fundamental tasks of the Alliance must be supported by an adequate military capability, a 
crisis management capability, and an ability to increase cooperation with other nations. 
The Declaration agreed that institutions such as the EC, WEU, and CSCE have roles to
64 NATO, NATO’s Core Security Functions in the New Europe, 7 June 1991, paras. 2-3, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/comm/49-95/c910607b.htm (accessed 10 March 2002).
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play, to include the creation of a European identity in security and defense. However, 
NATO asserted that its membership and capabilities, to include the transatlantic link, 
make it an essential actor and one that can perform all of these fundamental tasks.
As the end of 1991 approached, NATO made its first significant steps towards 
changing and adapting to the new international situation. On 2 October 1991, the US 
Secretary of State, James Baker, and German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, 
suggested the formation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council. This was seen as a 
way of positively engaging the former Soviet republics as well as Hungary, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia. It was hoped that the Council could be a positive influence on its 
transformation. 65 Additionally, there was an assumption that a structure like the NACC 
would satisfy the Central and East European countries by providing a forum short of 
membership.66
On 7 November 1991, NATO issued a new Strategic Concept, followed by the 
Rome Declaration on 8 November. The Strategic Concept was a major change from 
previous strategy documents. With this Strategic Concept, NATO summarized the 
changes of the past several years, but also examined and assessed the current and future 
international situation. There was no longer any attempt to use the old monolithic threat 
of the Soviet Union as a foundation for further actions. While the Concept recognized 
that the Soviet Union remained a threat, “the risks to Allied security that remain are 
multifaceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and 
assess....risks to Allied security...may arise from the serious economic, social and
65 Gerald B. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997: Blessings o f  Liberty (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1998), 13.
66 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening N A TO ’s Door: How the Alliance Remade I tse lf fo r  a New Era (New  
York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 17.
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political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by 
many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.”67 While acknowledging the changes in 
Europe, the concept confirmed the defensive nature of the Alliance. “The Alliance’s 
security policy is based on dialogue; co-operation; and effective collective defence as 
mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace.”68
The Rome Declaration further developed this concept as it discussed the 
decisions being taken to transform NATO following the Summit. Building on the 7 June 
1991, Copenhagen Ministerial, the Declaration reiterated that NATO had specific 
purposes and core security functions that make it a critical piece of a framework of 
interlocking institutions. The CSCE, the EC, the WEU, and the Council of Europe, along 
with NATO, were perceived as complementary organizations, critical to maintaining 
peace and stability in Europe. Gone from this discussion was any remaining effort to 
separate the economic institutions from the security institutions. The declaration 
discussed at length the need for closer interaction between NATO and the EC, as well as 
identifying the requirement for “ .. .practical arrangements to ensure the necessary 
transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as 
it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance.”69
During the previous two years of change in Eastern Europe, NATO had 
cautiously offered support and expressed the desire to open a dialogue with the 
individual nations that were so inclined. Substance was now brought to the dialogue 
NATO had called for these past two years. NATO now recognized that in addition to
67 NATO, 1991 Strategic Concept, 26.
68 Ibid., 32.
69 NATO, Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, 8 November 1991, 3, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm (accessed 3 January 2004).
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improving the European voice within the Alliance, they also had to attempt to formalize 
the relationship with those Central and Eastern European countries formerly of the 
Warsaw Pact. Therefore, following the Rome Declaration of 8 November, the Foreign 
Ministers of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union were invited to meet with NATO 
Foreign Ministers on 20 December, to launch the new partnership, the North Atlantic
70Cooperation Council (NACC). This new initiative was seen as a significant step 
toward contributing to peace within the region by serving as a forum for dialogue with 
NATO’s former Warsaw Pact adversaries.
It was also believed that bringing together NATO nations and the Eastern 
European states would support the objectives of the CSCE. This belief was reinforced by 
NATO’s strong declaration of support for the CSCE, along with a series of wide-ranging 
recommendations for improvements to the CSCE institutions. Considering how many 
NATO members are also influential members of the CSCE, such support may manifest 
itself in concrete actions.
Within weeks of the concluding of the NATO Rome Summit, European leaders 
met again on 10 December 1991, in Maastricht for the EC Council. While a wide variety 
of decisions resulted from this meeting, there were several that built upon the issues 
recently introduced at the NATO summit. For its part, the EC made a significant step 
forward toward enlargement and change as its members agreed to the Treaty on
71European Union (TEU) in Maastricht, and later approved on 7 February 1992. The
70 Ibid., 5.
71 Up until the Treaty on European Union, the term EC was used to signify European Communities, 
with the European Economic Community being the economic entity normally referenced. With the
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TEU was a significant milestone in the evolution of the European Community. While it 
changed the name to simply the European Community, it also added new forms of 
cooperation and areas of involvement. Where previously the EC was prohibited from 
direct involvement in security matters, the TEU added intergovernmental cooperation in 
the areas of defense and justice and home affairs. These new areas built upon the 
supranational nature of the current structure and led to the creation of a new structure 
with three pillars, adding political as well as economic.72 Upon approval of the Treaty, 
the overall extent of EU involvement would greatly expand. The first pillar, usually 
referred to as the European Community, incorporates those supranational aspects of the 
treaty. It is in these areas that selected areas of national sovereignty have been 
transferred to the EU in order to facilitate economic agreements. The second and third 
pillars are intergovernmental, in that decisions required unanimous agreement to be 
implemented. Pillar two continued those initial steps towards the development of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the area of foreign and security affairs.
It was in pillar three that Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) was established, in order to 
facilitate cooperation in the areas of legal cooperation as well as issues of political 
asylum and immigration. As part of the Maastricht summit that finalized the TEU, the 
WEU members who were also members of the EU issued a separate statement. This 
statement spoke briefly, yet directly about the role of the WEU within the EU and NATO 
when it stated that the, “WEU will be developed as the defence component of the 
European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
ratification o f  the TEU, the term EEC disappeared, the European Union now signified the new three pillar 
structure, and the EC representing the supranational pillar focusing on economic authority.
72 European Union, The EU at a Glance -  European Treaties, 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/treaties/index_en.html (accessed on 21 October 2003).
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Alliance.” It also addressed change to its operational role by saying that the, “WEU’s 
operational role will be strengthened by examining and defining appropriate missions, 
structures and means...” It also opened participation of the organization to other 
European members through a variety of levels of membership.73
This period began with NATO and the Warsaw Pact still confronting each other, 
but ended with NATO now alone. The former Warsaw Pact members were all in various 
stages of political and economic turmoil and reform, and were now seeking ways to join 
Western Europe, as nations as well as members of institutions such as NATO and the 
EU.
1992 -  1996: Regional Turmoil And Change 
The next five years were marked by change and uncertainty on the part of nations 
as well as institutions. Europe and the United States attempted unsuccessfully to change 
or transform their respective roles and involvement in international affairs. NATO and 
the EU attempted to adapt to the end of the Cold War and determine the new nature of 
their international role. Their efforts involved other institutions as they increasingly 
interacted with the WEU and OSCE.
The end of the Cold War and the success of US policy during the Gulf War led to 
a reexamination of US involvement in other crisis spots around the world. The United 
States under President Bush and then President Clinton became involved in relief, 
peacekeeping, and nation building operations in Somalia. Concurrent with many of the
73 Western European Union, WEU Related Texts A dopted at EC Summit M aastricht -  10 December 
1991, The Role o f  the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the 
Atlantic Alliance, http://www.EU.int (accessed 4 June 2004). (first quote, p. 1, second quote, p. 3. third 
note, p. 5.)
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actions in Somalia and continuing later, a crisis in Haiti also drew the attention of 
consecutive US administrations, leading them to leave European crises to the Europeans 
to solve. At the same time, the Europeans were confronted with the breakup of 
Yugoslavia, but some felt that the time for Europe and the EC to step up to crisis 
resolution was now at hand.74
As 1992 began, Yugoslavia continued disintegrating and Slovenia and Croatia 
sought international recognition as independent states, followed closely by Bosnia. The 
EU recognized Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January, which became a precursor to conflict 
breaking out between them and Bosnia with Yugoslavia in March. United Nations 
involvement was significant during the same period when the UN Protective Force 
(UNPROFOR) was deployed into Croatia on 7 April, and the UN Security Council 
approved Resolution 751 and a mission to Somalia (UNISOM I) on 24 April 1992. The 
UN then expanded the mission, then transferred it to UNITAF on 3 December 1992. The 
end of 1992 then saw significant issues throughout Europe, and involving the US and its 
European allies and institutions.
The United States and Europe entered 1993 not realizing that both were about to 
experience a year of failure in crisis management. Europe and the EU continued working 
to resolve the crisis in the Balkans, beginning in January with the Vance-Owens plan to 
divide Bosnia. While this offer was rejected on 26 April, NATO AW ACS began 
supporting the UN no-fly zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While Europe focused on the 
Balkans, the United States became more engaged in Somalia. The original limited,
74 R. Craig Nation, War in the Balkans, 1991-2002 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Army 
War College, 2003), 120.
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short-term deployment, became more extensive as the US began to attempt to reduce the 
influence of the Somali warlords, beginning with a hunt for Aideed.
In early October, it became clear that despite the hopes for improvements in the 
international situation, the members of the Alliance were still confronted and affected by 
significant problems, often outside their own areas. Europe and the US were also soon 
shocked by the confrontation between President Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament in 
Moscow that began on 21 September 1993. The successful effort by Yeltsin to
nc
restructure the Russian government was seen by some as a step towards a dictatorship. 
Such a threat to the weak Russian democracy demonstrated that the collective defense 
role of NATO could not yet be totally discounted, at least as far as many of the smaller 
members or potential applicants were concerned. On 3 October 1993, the US was 
stunned to learn that 18 Army Rangers had been killed in operations in Mogadishu. For 
the US, an additional foreign policy disaster was encountered in mid-October. On 10 
October, the USS Harlan County, containing a non-combat US-Canadian force arrived 
off Port au Prince, Haiti, but was kept from entering the port by a mob on shore and 
eventually returned to the US on 12 October.76 With the recent memory of the death of 
the Rangers in Mogadishu, the US had no interest in international confrontation.
On 7 April 1994, a massacre at a Rwandan refugee camp drew international 
attention and consideration for Western involvement. At the same time, turmoil 
continued in the Balkans, and the US remained involved in its own region. On 31 July, 
the UNSC approved a US-led invasion of Haiti, which resulted in the return of the 
lawfully elected Aristide government by mid-October. Before long, however, other
75 Michael McFaul, R ussia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from  Gorbachev to Putin 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 208.
76 Brune, The United States, 50.
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international crises began to draw attention. Within days, fighting in Bosnia again 
broke out and raised the concern of the US and European nations.
Over the next few months in early 1995, it became apparent that the Bosnian 
Serbs intended to end the war on their terms. “In the early morning hours of July 6,
1995, the attack on the UN “safe area” of Srebrenica began in earnest. After the UN 
turned down air strike requests from Dutch peacekeepers, the small UN force could do 
little to prevent a disaster. In ten days, the Bosnian Serbs, led by their commander, 
General Ratko Mladic, engaged in the worst war crimes in Europe since the end of World 
War II.”77 Real concern now existed that the situation was getting out of control. By 
early August, President Clinton and the US finally decided to become more involved and 
take the lead in addressing the situation. During this period of US involvement, as part 
of establishing a defensive situation for the city of Gorazde, NATO established the 
conditions for more effective use of air strikes. On 1 August, the NAC approved this
78coordination system. When Bosnian Serbs shelled a Sarajevo market place on 28 
August, the international community was finally driven to respond. On 11 August 1995, 
NATO began Operation Deliberate Force with the launching of air strikes to force the 
Serbs to respond to calls for negotiations. Air strikes continued sporadically until 21 
September, when Bosnian Serbs removed the heavy weapons from the exclusion zones 
around Sarajevo.
Meanwhile, a cease-fire was finally established in Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed 
shortly by the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords on 14 December. Recognizing that 
NATO support would also require US participation, President Clinton authorized the
77 Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making o f  Am erica's Bosnia Policy  (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 67.
78 Ibid., 75-77.
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deployment of US forces as part of the NATO force. Since it was part of a NATO 
mission, the administration determined that there was no requirement to notify Congress
7 Qof the deployment. The UN then immediately approved NATO’s Implementation 
Force (IFOR) on 15 December, the first NATO land operation outside their area. By 16 
December, NATO forces were on their way into Bosnia. By the beginning of 1996, 
operations in the Balkans made up NATO’s major activities.
The Alliance Response To Conflict
During this period, NATO began adapting to the new environment in earnest. 
Concerns existed about working with countries of Central and East Europe as opposed to 
those former Soviet regions part of the Transcaucus and Central Asia that had gained 
independence and were now seeking involvement in Europe. So, the former Soviet 
republics which had become members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on 
20 December 1991, were now invited to join the NACC. On 10 March 1992, the NACC 
held an extraordinary meeting where the membership was expanded in order to recognize 
the changing landscape of European nations. By June, Georgia and Albania had also 
become members.80 As a consultative body, the NACC served primarily as a forum for 
dialogue. With the addition of the former Soviet Republics, members such as Poland and 
Hungary felt that their security needs were no longer as easily or effectively
o 1
accommodated within the broader membership. By June, the United States was 
discussing the possibility that the NACC expand into peacekeeping by contributing to
79 Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 674.
80 NATO, NATO Handbook, 40.
81 Rob De Wijk, NATO on the Brink o f  the New Millennium: The Battle fo r  Consensus 
(Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1997), 66.
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CSCE operations.82 Countries such as France were concerned about this expanded role. 
They believed that any changes to the operational involvement of nations in Europe 
should either be done within the context of the CSCE or WEU, in order to provide them 
with a more distinctly European role. At the same time, while NACC was serving a role 
as a consultative body, it did not meet the need of those East European nations that 
sought membership in a security organization. Since NACC membership was strictly 
limited to NATO’s former adversaries, it did not meet the need of other non-NATO 
European nations that wished to be part of the new security architecture. It also did not 
offer an operational role that would enable the members of Europe, both East and West, 
to begin supporting the increasing need of regional peacekeeping operations. It provided 
a first step in NATO’s new dialogue with former adversaries, but it did not appear
o-5
adaptable to the evolving situation.
By 4 June, at the Oslo Ministerial, NATO began accepting non-Article 5 requests 
for assistance by agreeing to consider CSCE requests for peacekeeping support, while 
also reaffirming the Euro-Atlantic security framework. This was followed only a few 
weeks later by the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Bonn and their subsequent 
issuing of the Petersberg Declaration on 19 June. Most widely recognized for its 
identification of the military tasks for which the WEU would employ forces, it also 
offered other important details regarding European security. The Petersberg Declaration 
substantially expanded the topics that had been introduced at Maastricht the preceding 
December, making each more likely to be implemented. Specifically, it discussed the 
CSCE’s role in providing security in Europe and how the WEU could assist by providing
82 Solomon, NATO Enlargement Debate, 15.
83 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The A lliance’s New Roles in International Security 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1998), 96-97.
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military capabilities for such tasks. This Declaration also built upon the foreign policy 
initiatives of the recently signed TEU. One significant addition to the earlier 
Declaration was in the area of strengthening the WEU’s operational role. WEU members 
now stated that they were prepared to make forces available for military tasks to be 
conducted under the authority of the WEU. Such units of WEU member states, under the 
authority of the WEU could be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, to include 
peacemaking.84
The Petersberg Declaration marked the culmination of eight months of intense, 
yet subtle negotiation and cooperation in the area of security matters. First, during the 7- 
8 November 1991 NATO Rome Summit the Alliance discussed the possibilities of NATO 
expanding its role in the region. It established the NACC as a potential means of 
expanding dialogue with those former adversaries who were now its neighbors. There 
were hopes that the NACC would been seen by the partners as a substantial linkage to 
NATO. To American military leaders such as General McCarthy, the important thing 
was, “...to make the NACC a genuine forum for dialogue and cooperation on the 
foremost security concerns of its new partners. This means addressing difficult issues...If 
the NACC fulfills its potential, it will become the major forum of European security.”85 
The next month, many of the same leaders came together in Maastricht on 10 
December for an EU Council meeting. At this summit, the new Treaty on European 
Union opened the door to increased cooperation in security matters by the EU. 
Concurrently, those nations jointly members of the EU and WEU agreed that the WEU
84 WEU, Petersburg Declaration, (Bonn, 19 June 1992).
85 Janies P. McCarthy, “Opportunities for Strengthening Security in Central and Eastern Europe,” 
Vital Speeches o f  the Day, 59, no. 3 (1 5  November 1992).
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would work toward becoming the military arm of the EU and supporting the European 
voice within NATO, culminating in the Petersberg Declaration. The cold war tradition 
of economic and security institutions remaining at arms length from one another was 
completely gone.
As conflict in the Balkans worsened, NATO Defense Ministers determined on 11 
December 1992, that if the UN asked for assistance in the Balkans, it would be 
appropriate for NATO to support such a request. As a result, NATO’s primary political 
body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), finally agreed to a request from the UN 
Secretary General and the UNSC on 15 December, for resources to support the UN 
efforts in the Balkans.86 As a result of the worsening situation in the Balkans, NATO 
was agreeing to a wide variety of new duties.
During the 17 December 1992, Brussels Ministerial, NATO discussed at length 
the problems in the Balkans. The ministers agreed to assist in the implementation of the 
respective UNSC resolutions, as well as considering ways to assist the CSCE, and the EC 
in their regional peacekeeping efforts. They also called for continued support to CSCE 
as well as wishing for continued success with the NACC. They also declared their 
support the development of a European common foreign and security policy between the 
EU and WEU as adopted in Rome. Following this declaration, the NACC also agreed to 
consultations that might lead to further cooperation in support of regional peacekeeping. 
At the same time that NATO was examining its role in peacekeeping, American forces 
were entering Somalia under UN auspices to support distribution of relief supplies 
throughout the country.
86 NATO, NATO Handbook, 454.
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Amidst this uncertainty, the 21-22 June 1993, EU Copenhagen Council acted to 
open up the institution to other nations. Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Austria were 
confirmed as new members. More significantly, the Council agreed that . .the 
associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members
0 7  .
of the European Union.” Membership was now clearly opened with specific criteria 
established. It was determined that membership would be dependent on a candidate 
country having achieved democratic stability, to include rule of law and the support of 
human rights and protection of minorities. The candidate also had to have a functioning 
market economy and the ability to withstand competition and interaction within the 
Union. And finally, the candidate had to be able to take on the obligations of 
membership, which included their ability to adhere to the extensive body of Community 
law.88Those interested countries of Central and Eastern Europe were informed that they 
could become members when they met these criteria, which came to be known as the 
Copenhagen Criteria.
Throughout 1993, NACC activities increasingly related to efforts to provide the 
organization with some sort of operational capabilities. The role of the NACC as it 
related to other institutions was a central feature. “The United Sates in particular 
believed that the NACC could form the nucleus of a new security system. A structure 
needed to be developed which would enable the co-operative partners to take part in an 
operational ‘framework’.”89 France on the other hand, believed with the Russians that 
the CSCE would provide a better option for the development of a European security
87 European Commission, Enlargement Directorate-General, Enlargement o f  the European Union: 
An historic opportunity, (Brussels: European Communities, 2003), 7.
88 Ibid., 8.
89 de Wijk, NATO On the Brink, 69.
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framework. Nevertheless, by December 1993, it appeared that there was the possibility 
that consensus might be emerging on the development of this new security framework. 
Joint exercises were scheduled for the beginning of 1994, Sweden, Finland, and Austria 
were now attending meetings as observers, as well as a representative of the CSCE 
Chairman in Office.90
While during late 1993, the dialogue among members of the NACC was useful, 
it became apparent that the NACC was not the best solution for fully engaging the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. So, at the end of October, the US began to 
discuss internally how to more effectively engage these other nations. However, US 
desire to increase dialogue with East European nations did not translate to any desire to 
speed up the discussion of NATO membership. What was needed was a new plan to 
establish a more operational relationship with NACC members without the restrictions of 
the organization. By October, the White House had agreed in principle to something 
similar to the eventual Partnership for Peace (PfP). Politically, its genesis was 
multidimensional. It would improve operational capabilities, it seemed to signify a 
working but not certain path to NATO membership, and it provided the US 
administration with a new initiative they could take credit for.91 This new partnership 
was briefed to NATO Ministers of Defense during an informal meeting hosted by the 
German Defense Minister from 19-21 October. This proposal would change the nature 
of the relationship between NATO and the East European nations.
While PfP would fall under the general umbrella of the NACC, it would be 
structured much differently. In the case of PfP, partner nations would have an individual
90 de Wijk, NATO On the Brink, 71.
91 George W. Grayson, Strange Bedfellows, NATO M arches East, (Lanham, MD: University Press 
o f  America, 1999), 82-84.
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relationship with the 16 NATO members. This contrasted to group membership within 
the NACC. This personalized membership of PfP would facilitate a more substantive 
relationship. It would also enable NATO to begin a separate dialogue with those nations 
that desired membership different from those others that only desired a greater 
involvement with NATO activities. The actual announcement of this initiative came 
from Strobe Talbott during a meeting of the Defence Planning Committee on 20-21 
October. PfP would be open to any nation in the CSCE that desired direct engagement 
with NATO and an expansion of activities into many areas of crisis response and peace 
operations. Part of this expanded relationship would also open the possibility of a
Q9dialogue under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty if a partner felt threatened. The 
invitation to such a formal relationship clearly implied a measure on the way to eventual 
NATO membership.93 This was also the meeting which saw the US suggesting the 
development of the combined joint task force (CJTF). This new structure was to offer a 
means of conducting operations outside the formal structure of NATO. 94 95
The US continued building on the importance and potential of PfP when 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, described the five advantages of it on 3 December 1993. 
As an inclusive organization, it would not establish new lines in Europe. At the same 
time, however, important incentives would be established by providing a goal for 
interested countries to continue moving toward democracy and free-market economies in 
order to participate. It would also provide a rationale for interested countries to 
contribute to security issues. NATO would be kept center stage in security matters,
92 NATO, NATO Handbook, 527. Article 4 states, “The Parties will consult together whenever, in 
the opinion o f  any o f  them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security o f  any o f  the Parties 
is threatened.”
93 Solomon, NATO Enlargement Debate, 33.
94 de Wijk, NATO On the Brink, 75.
95 The CJTF concept will be extensively discussed in chapter 4.
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thereby ensuring that the US remain engaged. Finally, PfP would provide an important 
foundation for NATO enlargement by making it something that takes place at the end of 
an organized process.96
The 11 January 1994, NATO Brussels Summit, directly confronted the changing 
security situation in Europe. Its declaration offered a variety of potential changes and 
reforms in order to facilitate continued relevance of the Alliance. Recognizing that 
situations continued to change rapidly in Europe, NATO agreed that it must further adapt 
its political and military structures. Two important aspects of this would be through the 
development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and through the 
support for the CJTF concept. ESDI was seen as formalizing the link between the EU 
and the CFSP called for in the Treaty o f European Union at Maastricht, and would be 
implemented through the WEU. The CJTF would be the means by which this 
relationship was operationalized by providing NATO assets for those missions that the 
Alliance chose not to formally accept.
The Brussels Summit Declaration also opened NATO membership to other 
European states willing and able to contribute to security. This was seen as one way of 
enhancing security and stability throughout Europe, and a means by which NATO could 
reach the newly democratic nations of Europe. Linked to this initiative was the formal 
announcement of the Partnership for Peace, since active involvement in PfP was seen as 
important aspect of new members. At the same time, PfP was also opened to NACC and 
CSCE members, not limited as NACC membership had been. Concurrently, NATO 
continued supporting the UN in the Balkans, to the extent that on 28 February 1994, 
NATO aircraft shot down four aircraft over Bosnia, for the first combat action in NATO
96 Solomon, NATO Enlargement Debate, 35.
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history. It was also immediately following the Brussels Summit that President Clinton 
ended the discussion as to whether or not NATO would expand. As part of an interview 
he stated, “The question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but 
when and how.”97 This statement helped initiate the 1995 NATO Enlargement Study
QO
that identified the issues involved with the expansion of membership.
By 7 December 1994, the US agreed in principle to support the withdrawal of 
UNPROFOR from the Balkans, a significant expansion of US involvement in the region. 
While a surprising change in Administration policy, it was felt it was an important action 
to take in order to reassure European allies of US commitment and leadership. 
Nevertheless, the decision was made with several stipulations. “The Clinton 
administration conditioned the participation of U.S. forces in a withdrawal operation on 
the understanding that such an operation would be under the clear and sole command of 
NATO; there could be no dual-key arrangement, as existed for the use of NATO air 
power. The NATO extraction force would also have to have robust rules of 
engagement... .once underway, the command and control of this operation would be in 
NATO’s hands.”99 In early 1995, the UN and NATO agreed on how NATO could 
provide help for UNPROFOR if necessary.
NATO was not, however, dissuaded from its enlargement and reform initiatives 
despite its increasing involvement in the Balkans. On 1 December 1994, the Final 
Communique’ of the NAC Brussels Ministerial stated that they had, “ .. .decided to
97 Yost, NATO Transformed, 103.
98 NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement, September, 1995, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl- 
9501 .htm (accessed 31 January 2004). This study described the principles and purposes o f  enlargement in 
the future o f  NATO. It explains how applicants should prepare and what is expected o f  new members. 
Specifically, applicants are expected to: resolve any ethnic or border disputes, remain committed to 
economic liberty and social justice, establish democratic and civilian control o f  their defense forces, and 
ensure that they have the capability to contribute to alliance defense.
99 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 47.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
91
initiate a process of examination inside the Alliance to determine how NATO will 
enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership.”100 As 
NATO examined itself for enlargement and change, so did other institutions. Shortly 
after the Ministerial, CSCE members decided to transform their institution. At the 
Budapest Summit of 5-6 December 1994, the members agreed that this gathering of 
nations had grown from a series of conferences into a fully institutionalized security 
organization. Therefore, the CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and declared to be a regional security organization under 
chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and was therefore a security organization that might be 
employed by the UN.101 The European security framework began taking on additional 
structure and form.
The NATO Enlargement Study commissioned the previous December at the NAC 
Foreign Minister Brussels Ministerial on 1 December 1994, was published on 3 
September 1995. Not only did this study describe the situation within Europe and among 
the various institutions, but it also laid out the enlargement process. Details were 
provided in order to ensure that applicants understood how they had to prepare both 
politically as well as militarily. The expectations of them as new members were also 
provided.102 Shortly after, it was endorsed by the NAC and then briefed to PfP members. 
Based on the information contained in the study, the NAC issued enlargement guidelines 
in October. Those guidelines were summarized by US Secretary of Defense William
100 NATO, Final Communique, M inisterial Meeting o f  the North Atlantic Council, H eld a t NATO  
Headquarters on 1 Decem ber 1994, para. 8, http://www.NATO.int/docu/comm/49-95/c941201a.htm  
(accessed 11 June 2004).
101 P. Terrance Hopmann, Building Security in P ost-C old War Eurasia: The OSCE and U.S. 
Foreign Policy, Peaceworks no. 31, (Washington DC: United States Institute o f  Peace, September 1999), 
14.
102 NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement, chap. 5.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
92
Perry in a speech in Norfolk, Virginia on 27 June 1996. He stated that first, potential
members must be able to contribute to the defense of the Alliance with a professional
military force. Next, the must agree to work within the consensus principle of the
Alliance. Third, they must have an interoperable capability with NATO forces. Fourth,
they must uphold democratic and free market principles within their country, and respect
territorial rights within their countries and at their borders, and finally, their military must
1
be under a democratic, civilian control.
As 1996 began, NATO operations in Bosnia were the Alliance’s main effort. At 
the 3 June Berlin Ministerial, NATO ministers agreed on the continued adaptation of the 
NATO structure in support of increased effectiveness and the development of an 
improved European defense identity. The completion of the CJTF concept originally 
outlined in the 11 January 1994, Brussels Summit was seen as a critical element in the 
improvement of the development of the ESDI. Using CJTF as the vehicle for providing 
NATO expertise and resources, and an improved relationship with the WEU, it was 
believed that the European nations would finally have an ability to respond to non- 
Article 5 situations when NATO chose not to respond.104
Since September 1994, NATO had been conducting a Long-Term Study, with a 
goal of linking command and control and military capabilities with the 1991 Strategic 
Concept. These improvements would also include those necessary for the 
implementation of CJTF.105 During on-going reviews of NATO structure, September 
1996, saw France attempting to increase the role of European nations in the NATO
103 William J. Perry, Six Postulates fo r  a Future NATO, Prepared remarks by Defense Secretary 
William J. Perry to the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic Seminar, Norfolk, VA., June 27, 1996.
104 NATO, Final Communique, M inisterial Meeting o f  the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, 1996, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm (accessed 28 November 2003).
105 Thomas-Durell Young, Reforming N A TO ’s Military Structures: The Long-Term Study and Its 
Implications fo r  Land Forces (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998), 4.
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command structure, while also offering the possibility of the French return to the NATO 
military structure. Eventually, tensions began to rise following French efforts to place 
Allied Forces Southern Europe and Allied Forces Northern Europe under European 
command, with France being a key player. The US refusal to consider these 
realignments kept these particular changes from taking place.106
NATO’s continuing efforts to engage the nations of Eastern Europe began 
centering around the perception that the NACC was no longer proving adequate to 
address the expanded issues that were under consideration. It seemed that the NACC 
was an organization for dialogue, but that it lacked adequate opportunities for substantive 
interaction. While PfP provided more interaction, it was focused more on an individual 
nation’s involvement with NATO. A first sign of change came from US Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher in a speech in Stuttgart, Germany on 6 September 1996. A 
theme of the speech was the need for a New Atlantic Community. Within this 
community, there would be a new and changed NATO, with PfP and OSCE providing 
the tools for conflict prevention and security matters. However, in order to do this, 
NATO enlargement would have to take place and the mandate of PfP would need to be 
expanded. “Thanks to the Partnership for Peace, we can now form the first truly Europe- 
wide military coalitions.. .To this end, we should expand the Partnership’s mandate 
beyond its current missions. We should involve our Partners in the Partnership for Peace 
in the Planning as well as the execution of NATO’s missions. We should give them a
107stronger voice by forming an Atlantic Partnership Council.” The other NATO
106 Ibid., 15.
107 Warren Christopher, A New Atlantic Community fo r  the 21st Century, Speech delivered at the 
State Theater in Stuttgart, 6 September 1996, US Mission to NATO: DoD Statement, 
http://www.NATO.int/usa/state/sl9960906a.html (accessed 6 March 2004).
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governments agreed that if PfP were to become a more important part of the European
security scene, it would have to change. Part of that change was the need for non-NATO
members to have a greater voice. In December, the North Atlantic Council agreed to
1 08establish a new mechanism for partnership. This new mechanism, the Atlantic 
Partnership Council (APC), would serve “ .. .as a single new cooperative mechanism... 
which would form a framework for enhanced efforts in both practical cooperation under 
PfP and an expanded political dimension of Partnership.”109 This new body would not 
only serve to expand PfP missions to those of the Alliance, but would also enhance the 
partnership in a variety of political and military activities.110 So, as the NACC met for its 
five year anniversary later in December and preparations began for the next summit, 
plans began for this new structure that would consolidate the efforts of the PfP and 
NACC and move into new responsibilities.
1997 -  1998: Taking On New Members 
During the first half of the 1990s, major changes were taking place in and around 
Europe. The West European nations and institutions such as NATO and the EU were 
confronted with changes of governments and borders, and the outbreak of hostilities. 
They were forced to respond to those changes, not only for the interest of the institutions, 
but also of their member nations. As the second half of the decade began, the institutions 
became more central players and more directly involved in the changes. No longer were 
they strictly reacting to situations, but they were increasingly attempting to be proactive
108 Yost, NATO Transformed, 159
109 NATO, Final Communique, M inisterial M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 18 
D ecem ber 1996, para. 9, http:// www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1996/996-165e.htm (accessed 6 March 2004).
110 Solomon, NATO Enlargement Debate, 107.
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or influence those changes underway. Nevertheless, while the next few years saw 
NATO welcoming new members, political and economic uncertainty continued within 
Europe. In early 1997, Bulgaria was wracked by economic problems, which while 
serious, did not succeed in destabilizing the country.111 In Albania however, a much 
worse situation developed. A nation-wide pyramid scheme in January-February 1997, 
wiped out the savings of most citizens. Within a short period of time, widespread unrest 
and violence erupted. As initially in the Balkans, European leaders again saw an 
opportunity to act, but the EU chose not to respond. With a more direct interest in the 
crisis and its ensuing refugee problems, on 2 April 1997, the Italians launched Operation
117Alba, a European coalition of the willing, to stabilize the situation in Albania. While 
NATO forces maintained peace in Bosnia, operations by Yugoslav forces against the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) were causing additional unrest in Kosovo, and as a 
result, turmoil and uncertainty prevailed in the Balkans.
While the December 1996, NAC Communique had stated that NATO would begin 
to examine how to develop a better relationship with Russia and Ukraine, the increasing 
discussion on NATO enlargement made that even more important. In a variety of 
unilateral statements made in March 1997, NATO representatives first assured Russia 
that NATO had no interest in forward stationing any nuclear weapons, and likewise had 
no reason or plans to make any changes in its nuclear policies. NATO also reaffirmed 
that it envisioned that there would be no need for substantial changes in the stationing of
111 Zoltan Barany, The Future o f  NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 182.
112 Paolo Tripodi, “Alba: Italy’s Multinational Intervention in Albania,” Contemporary Review, 
(Oct 1997): 181.
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conventional forces.113 Despite a variety of NATO efforts to improve the situation, 
Russia still attempted to develop this new relationship based on certain principles. 
Specifically, in March, President Yeltsin summarized Russian’s position in part by first 
confirming that Russia was against enlargement that came eastward. Additionally, any 
NATO-Russia document would have to be binding with regards to NATO guarantees on 
forces and infrastructure. When presidents Yeltsin and Clinton met for a summit in 
Helsinki on 20-21 March 1997, they agreed that while they did not fully agree on all 
aspects of enlargement, they would nevertheless conclude a NATO-Russia document. 
Over the next several months, the lack of guarantees within the document and the nature 
of arms control aspects kept the uncertainty concerning its final form on-going. Finally, 
on 13-14 May, the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security 
between NATO and the Russian Federation was finalized. Despite Russian efforts up to 
the last moment, the document was not legally binding.114 The establishment of this 
special relationship with Russia was expected to bring additional stability to the region.
It was also hoped to add a greater sense of security, while also establishing conditions to 
simultaneously foster enlargement and the continued development of PfP. Within the 
Clinton administration as well as NATO, the agreements with Russia and Ukraine were 
seen as critical steps for domestic politics as well as in the enlargement process. “NATO 
(and the United States)hoped that this package to bring in selected Central and Eastern
113 Solomon, NATO Enlargement Debate, 104.
114 Ibid., 118.
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European countries while forging a new relationship with Russia would lay the 
foundations for a more secure Europe.”115
Upon completion, the discussion of the document in Russia was heated. Up until 
the signing of the document, some Russian officials were announcing that the document 
would give Russia veto over critical NATO actions, other politicians and commentators 
were calling it a Russian surrender and likening it to another Yalta agreement without the 
Russians being present.116
Shortly after an agreement was reached with Russia, a special relationship was 
also established with Ukraine. On 9 July 1997, during the Madrid Summit, NATO and 
Ukraine signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic
117Treaty Organization and Ukraine. This charter implicitly recognized the nature of the 
political situation in Central Europe and the potential turmoil that could evolve from an 
endangered Ukraine. This charter recognized the importance of Ukraine in the region 
and appreciated the efforts being made to improve the democratization and economic 
reform within the country. At the same time, NATO opened the possibility of Ukraine 
involvement in EAPC and PfP and the partnership activities available to it through these 
avenues.
The 9 July 1997, Madrid Summit also resulted in another expansion of dialogue 
as NATO formalized the Mediterranean Dialogue through the development of the 
Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG). The MCG was placed under the supervision
115 Gale A. Mattox, “NATO Enlargement and the United States: A  Deliberate and Necessary 
Decision?” in The Future o f  NATO, Enlargement, Russia, and European Security, ed. Charles-Philippe 
David and Jacques Levesque, (Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 89.
116 J.L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms? (New  York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 50-53.
117 NATO, Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
and Ukraine, 9 July 1997, http://www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm (accessed 13 November 
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of the NAC with the responsibility for maintaining the process of the Mediterranean
Dialogue. Taking a lesson from PfP, the MCG held its meetings in a “16 + 1” format
110
allowing the Alliance to focus issues on individual partners.
It had now become apparent that the NACC was no longer adequately 
accomplishing its goal of facilitating dialogue. So, rather than adopt the proposal to 
establish the Atlantic Partnership Council and to consolidate NACC and PfP into this 
new organization, NATO instead established a new body, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC) on 29 May 1997, and called for PfP to be enhanced. The international 
situation had changed greatly since the NACC had originally been developed, so the 
EAPC would serve a greatly expanded role, working with PfP, to serve as the focal point 
of NATO outreach.119
On 2 October 1997, the EU achieved significant change in the signing of the Treaty 
o f Amsterdam. This treaty had been under development for nearly two years. The 
overall intent for the treaty had been to update and modify the TEU in such a way as to 
ensure that the political and institutional conditions of the EU were capable of adapting 
to future requirements. While many wide-ranging changes resulted from the adoption of 
the Treaty o f Amsterdam, most fell into four areas. In the area of freedom, security, and 
justice and the Union and the citizen, there were a number of issues. The changes helped 
clarify fundamental rights of citizens and freedom of movement and a variety of other 
rights of citizens regarding their citizenship and work. In the area of an effective and 
coherent external policy, a number of reforms were addressed. There was the call for a 
common strategy, improved decision making through qualified majority voting in the
118 NATO, NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, para.l, http://www.NATO.int/med-dial/summary.htm  
(accessed 6 June 2004).
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Council, and the creation of a High Representative, to provide greater focus to Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) coherence. Additionally, the Treaty o f Amsterdam 
also called for the development of a planning and early warning cell, as well as the 
incorporation of the previously discussed Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP portion of the
1 90treaty. The EU members had now come full circle. The WEU members belonging to 
the EU had issued their declaration at Maastricht calling for the WEU to serve as the 
defense arm of the EU. A year later in Bonn they added the specifics of the Petersberg 
Declaration. Now, in the Treaty of Amsterdam, they formalized these features into the 
new structure of the EU by integrating most of the WEU into the EU.
Only a few weeks later on 8 July 1997, NATO held its Madrid Summit, significant 
for the invitation to membership for the countries of Hungary, Czech Republic, and 
Poland. The Alliance also declared that changes in the world had been substantial, so 
that it was necessary to revisit the 1991 Strategic Concept in order to ensure that the 
plans of the institution remained current and appropriate. The members also called for 
continued support to the OSCE, while also calling for more support and cooperation with 
the WEU. Days later, on 22 July 1997, the WEU ministers met and issued a declaration 
calling for its integration into the EU.121 With this development, the WEU would no 
longer serve as an intermediary between NATO and the EU. Now, it would be up to the 
two institutions to develop a more direct relationship.
While these efforts were underway in Europe, the US was undergoing the debate 
about NATO enlargement within Congress. There were concerns about the cost
120 European Commission, The Amsterdam Treaty: A Comprehensive Guide, (Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications o f  the European Communities, 1999), 8.
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involved, as well as how the new members would affect the traditional mission of 
NATO, and what the implications would be for the development of a 21st century 
security architecture that went beyond Cold War frameworks. Despite the apparent 
strength of the concerns, support for enlargement was surprisingly strong and bi- 
partisan.
The situation in Kosovo now confronted European nations and institutions with an 
emerging regional crisis. As Yugoslav forces continued attacking the KLA in Kosovo, 
Western calls for compromise increased. Concern on the part of many nations that there 
might be spillover of the conflict into Albania and Macedonia also served to draw the 
attention of the US and European nations. In the NAC Luxembourg Ministerial of 28 
May 1998, a range of concerns, advice, and responses were addressed in their Statement 
on Kosovo. These particular concerns saw NATO using PfP as a tool to attempt to assist 
in the security and stability of these particular nations. Specifically, they launched 
assistance programs to help both countries secure their borders, while also increasing 
exercise and training opportunities in the region. They also noted that they had requested 
military advice in the case that these preventive measures did not suffice. The statement 
closed by saying, “We are determined, through the ongoing activities of the Alliance 
through Partnership for Peace and the additional measures we have decided today, to 
contribute to the international efforts to solve the crisis in Kosovo and to promote 
regional security and stability.”123 The question of the support that might be expected
Mattox, Future o f  NATO, 91-3.
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from a Partner country when confronted with a security problem seemed to have been 
answered in this situation.
Increased Western pressures on Yugoslavia resulted in the OSCE sending 
observers to Kosovo on 16 June 1998. However, despite this seemingly positive action, 
the 150 observers of the OSCE Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM) 
accomplished little. By 23 September, the UNSC exhibited such concern that the 
situation in Kosovo was described as a threat to international peace in UNSC Resolution 
1199. Through this resolution and other statements of NATO and member governments, 
it appeared that the use of force in resolving this crisis was becoming more likely.124
During this same period, further NATO adaptation resulted in its more traditional 
missions evolving into others not normally seen as part of a defense structure. Based on 
a Russian proposal to create a disaster response capability, on 29 May 1998, the EAPC 
foreign ministers approved the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response 
Coordination Centre (EADRCC), located at NATO headquarters. This capability was 
based on the increasing interest of NATO in crisis response, which is often much 
different from military matters. This capability was quickly put into action as it almost 
immediately was contacted by the UN High Commission for Refugees on 3 June 1998 to 
help with the refugee movement from Kosovo into Albania.
1999 -  2001: Taking The Alliance To War 
January 1999 began with an event that brought the Kosovo crisis to a head. On 15 
January it was reported that there had been a massacre of villagers in the town of Racak. 
While details remained uncertain, it quickly drove NATO and its members to take action
124 Nation, War in the Balkans, 236-237.
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to resolve the crisis. By 29 January, members of the International Contact Group 
demanded that representatives of the Kosovar Albanians and Yugoslavia come together
• 10 Sat Rambouillet. NATO followed up this call by threatening the use of force if both 
sides did not agree.126 Discussions at Rambouillet did not have the same success of the 
Dayton Peace Accords a few years earlier. At first, both parties refused the Contact 
Group’s initial offer. Eventually, the parties to the discussion moved to Paris, where the 
Kosovo Albanians agreed, and signed the agreement on 18 March. However, the 
Yugoslav government continued to reject the offer, laying the groundwork for military 
action.127 NATO finally acted, and initiated Operation Allied Force on 23 March 1999. 
NATO Secretary General Solana directed General Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, 
Europe (SACEUR) to begin air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.128 
Only 11 days after formally joining the Alliance, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic found themselves at war. Having joined NATO to ensure their security and 
peace, they now found themselves at war with a country in the region and in some cases, 
one of their neighbors.
While the conflict continued, NATO met for its 50th Anniversary at the 23-24 
April, Washington Summit. Intended to be a celebration of Alliance success and a 
welcome to new members, it now served as a wartime summit of its members. 
Nevertheless, NATO made significant declarations as part of the summit, quite separate 
and distinct from the crisis in Kosovo. In a continued reexamination of its purpose, 
NATO released a new Strategic Concept, updating the one published in December 1991.
125 Ibid., 242. The International Contact Group was modeled on that employed to reach the Dayton 
Peace Accord. It consisted o f  representatives from the US, Russia, France, Germany, the UK, and Italy.
126 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: N A TO ’s War to Save Kosovo, 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 77.
127 Ibid., 84.
128 NATO, NATO Handbook, 495.
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In recognition of the need to develop the European role with NATO, there were decisions 
made to implement a stronger relationship with the European Union, while also 
launching a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) that would seek to coordinate the 
overall improvement of member capabilities. The value and importance of partnership 
was seen and supported through the establishment of a new Membership Action Plan 
(MAP) for those PfP countries that desired NATO membership, as well as the 
development of a more active PfP and EAPC program. The MAP was a significant 
development and one that resulted form the lessons learned during the membership 
process of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. While MAP was designed to 
facilitate the future membership of its participants, achieving the required actions did not 
guarantee membership. In that sense, it was a new tool that required careful 
implementation, but one with great potential to help provide positive support for reform 
within participating nations.129
Finally, the communique also proposed an enhanced Mediterranean dialogue 
between NATO and selected nations, as well as discussion concerning the need to 
increase the efforts of the Alliance against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
The new 1999 Strategic Concept marked a significant step forward in the evolution 
of the Alliance. Changes from the previous eight years were incorporated, but in areas 
where the situation was similar, much of the exact wording was reused. Where the 1991 
Strategic Concept recognized the changing world environment and proposed changes to 
Alliance structure and decisionmaking, the new Strategic Concept went even further. 
There was a recognition of the continuously evolving international situation as reflected
129 Mihaela Vasiu and Michael Schmitt, “NATO Enlargement on the Eve o f  the Second Round,” 
Connections: The Quarterly Journal, no. 1 (January 2002): 77.
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in a number of areas in which the new Concept grew. The 1991 Strategic Concept had 
recognized the changing nature of the world, and this continued with the new concept. In 
a discussion of security challenges and risks, the 1999 Strategic Concept states that,
“Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be 
covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must 
also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by 
other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, 
and by disruption of the flow of vital resources.”130 This recognition of the new and 
expanded threats now facing the Alliance and its members and neighbors helped clarify 
and explain the continuing evolution of institutional activities and relationships that are 
either initiated or formalized in the new Concept and can be seen to support the move 
towards out of area missions.
However, for all of the new information contained in the 1999 Strategic Concept, 
there remained a continuity throughout it. Where both Strategic Concepts use almost the 
same words to describe the purpose of NATO to safeguard the freedom and security of 
its members, the 1999 Strategic Concept adds an additional sentence: “The Alliance 
therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and 
stability in this region.”131 This explicit expansion of the collective defense role of 
NATO into a form of collective security is significant in its support to changes in the 
nature of the institution.
In an expansion of the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks, several changes were 
made in the new concept. The first three tasks from the 1991 Strategic Concept,
130 NATO, “ The 1999 Strategic Concept,” in The R eader’s Guide to the NATO Summit in 
Washington, 23-25 April 1999, (Brussels: 1999), para. 24.
131 Ibid., para 6.
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providing for a secure European environment, serving as a transatlantic forum for 
consultations, and providing deterrence and defense, remained. However, the task of 
providing a strategic balance of forces was removed. Significantly, the two categories 
where NATO was increasingly being involved were formalized into this new concept. 
Crisis management was added as a process to be implemented on a case by case basis in 
accordance with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty. Finally, partnership was also 
added, “(T)o promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other 
countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual 
confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.”132
While both Strategic Concepts spoke of NATO’s role in crisis management, the 
1999 Strategic Concept uses this role as a lead-in to a significant expansion of NATO’s 
role in dialogue and partnership. Partnership with other nations is institutionalized in 
three different ways: functionally, individually, and regionally. Functionally, the EAPC 
provides an opportunity for nations to meet on a political basis and provide a foundation 
of cooperation and transparency. Similarly, the PfP adds to the effort by establishing 
security links and facilitating interoperability among interested nations. By increasing 
the practical involvement of PfP members in decisionmaking as well as the respective 
operations and training, military interoperability and transparency is greatly improved. 
The partnership process is also the area where NATO is increasingly involved in 
scientific research. While NATO supported scientific research among members and 
selected other nations for a number of years, it was at the Washington Summit that
132 Ibid., para 10.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
106
partner participation, whether through PfP or Mediterranean Dialogue countries, was
1 ^ - 5
made mandatory for involvement in the funding of any programs.
Individual partnerships with Russia and Ukraine provide an equally important role. 
By crafting individual dialogues with major regional actors, NATO hoped to maintain an 
effective political relationship with the countries. At the same time, NATO wished to 
influence these nations in the relations with the Alliance and its members, while 
concurrently ensuring that those same nations do not gain too great an influence in the 
region.
Regionally, NATO expanded the depth of the Mediterranean Dialogue process 
with selected nations. As an important region to the Alliance and its members, this 
dialogue seeks to improve regional security by increasing openness, transparency and 
cooperation between Alliance members and the involved Mediterranean nations. NATO 
also launched the South East Europe Initiative (SEEI) during the Washington Summit. 
This was seen as a way of engaging those nations in the Balkans that do not belong in 
PfP or EAPC. By engaging the countries, the hope was that stability could be brought to 
the region in concert with the on-going peace operations.
The 1999 Strategic Concept also greatly expanded the perception and vision of 
other institutions involved in the region. Early on it states that, “Mutually reinforcing 
organisations have become a central feature of the security environment.”134 The UN, 
OSCE, EU, and WEU are discussed for the varied and mutually supportive roles they 
play. Additionally, when the concept later expands into the discussion of the increasing 
importance of the European Security and Defense Identify (ESDI), it returns to the EU
133 NATO. NATO Today. (Brussels: NATO Office o f  Information and Press, 2002), 33.
134 NATO, 1999 Strategic Concept, para 14.
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and WEU and the manner in which they contribute to the growth of the European role 
within NATO.
While EAPC and PfP were already active at the time of the 1999 Summit, both 
programs were expanded and emphasized as efforts to not only improve the cooperation 
among NATO and its neighbors, but to also improve the NATO enlargement process.
As part of the summit, the NAC approved a report by the Political Military Steering 
Committee on Partnership for Peace. This report, Towards a Partnership for the 21st 
Century: The Enhanced and more Operational Partnership, described a process by 
which NATO could establish an enhanced and more operational PfP by improvements in 
three areas: specifically, a political-military framework for NATO-led PfP operations; an 
expanded and adapted planning and review process (PARP); and enhanced practical 
military and defense-related cooperation. Within this enhanced cooperation is an 
initiative called the “Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led Operations.” This 
is an effort to make substantive improvements in the military capabilities of Partner 
nations and their to improve their ability to work with NATO and to respond to future
■ • • 135crisis operations.
Operation Allied Force continued during and following the Summit, but June 
proved to be a significant period. During the 3-4 June Cologne Council, the EU 
expanded on the development of a common European security and defense policy,
1 3 f t  1 37focusing on the need to improve European crisis management capabilities.
135 NATO. The R eader’s Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington, 23 -  25 April, 1999 (Brussels, 
1999), 94.
136 European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, 
150/99Rev 1, Brussels, annex 3.
137 Gerd Foehrenbach, “Security Through Engagement: The Worldview Underlying ESDP,” in The 
E U ’s Search fo r  a  Strategic Role, ed. Esther Brimmer, (Washington DC: Center for Transatlantic 
Relations, 2002), 7.
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Additionally, the EU also initiated the Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe just prior to 
NATO and Yugoslavia signing a Military Technical Agreement. This agreement 
signified the end of combat between NATO and Yugoslavia, and was closely followed 
by the NATO Kosovo Force, KFOR, entering Kosovo to provide security for the return 
of the Kosovars.
While the end of Operation Allied Force on 10 June 1999, brought some peace to 
the region, there were concerns throughout the Fall as Russia remained actively engaged 
in selected border regions. In August and September, Russia launched extensive 
counterinsurgency operations in Dagestan, followed closely by another large scale 
military intervention in Chechnya.
The European security framework continued evolving during the 18-19 November 
1999, OSCE Istanbul Summit. At this meeting, all 54 OSCE members signed the 
European Security Charter which looked to widen and improve the role of the 
organization in security matters. Specifically, it was tasked to increase efforts with other 
institutions while also improving its role and peacekeeping operations and to increase its 
potential role in police activities. It was also tasked to improve its crisis response
1 TRcapabilities, improve consultative process and to establish an operations center. An 
additional outcome of the summit was the 30 states who were NATO members or 
members of the now-defunct Warsaw Pact signed a revised CFE Treaty.
The end of this phase of NATO development saw the significant changes 
continuing. Following the 11 September 2001, attack on the United States, NATO took 
immediate actions. On 12 September, the NAC stated that, “The commitment to
138 OSCE. Charter fo r  European Security, Istanbul, November 1999. OSCE, 1, 
http://www.OSCE.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/istachart99e.htm (accessed 24 April 2004).
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collective self-defence embodied in the Washington Treaty was first entered into in 
circumstances very different from those that exist now, but it remains no less valid and
• • 13Qno less essential today, in a world subject to the scourge of international terrorism.” 
Stating that if it was determined that the attacks originated outside the US, Article 5 
would be invoked and appropriate support would be provided to the US as called for in 
the Washington Treaty. On 4 October 2001, the Alliance then agreed to take eight 
specific actions in response to the attack, to include improved intelligence sharing and 
blanket overflight clearances to those US and other allied countries involved in 
operations against terrorism. This declaration also laid the groundwork for Operation 
Eagle Assist, the deployment of NATO Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft 
to help protect the United States.140
2002 -  2004: From Prague To Istanbul 
While earlier NATO summits and declarations paved the way toward evolutionary 
change and adaptation, it was the decisions of, and actions following, the Prague Summit 
that truly signaled the beginning of NATO’s transformation. The Strategic Concepts of 
1991 and 1999 had redirected NATO’s efforts in light of world-wide and regional 
changes. NATO had primarily directed its adaptation to the new environment in Europe. 
The disappearance of the Soviet threat, and the new nations that desired membership, 
served as the focal point for this adaptation. Enlargement and partnership activities were
139 NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council Concerning September 11, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm (accessed 21 May 2004).
140 NATO, Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, on the North 
Atlantic Council Decision On Implementation O f Article 5 o f  the Washington Treaty follow ing the 11 
September Attacks against the United States, http://www.NATO.int/docu/seech/2001/s011004b.htm  
(accessed 6 June 2004). Information also from, NATO Issues: September 11 -  One year on, 
http://www.NATO.int/terrorism/index.htm (accessed 6 June 2004).
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the means by which this evolution took place. Following the attack on the United States 
of September 11, 2001, and the implementation of an Article 5 response, NATO’s view 
became more global, and therefore, substantively different than had previously been 
considered. In the opening statement to the Prague Summit Declaration, the Heads of 
State and Government state in part, “ .. .we commit ourselves to transforming NATO with 
new members, new capabilities and new relationships with our partners.”141 These 
themes of new members, new capabilities, and new partnership relations are the paths 
guiding NATO transformation.
Through new members, NATO continued the efforts to establish an effective 
membership and increase the secure environment within its region. Those seven 
countries invited at Prague would continue to have NATO assistance through their 
partnership activities and the activities identified in their membership action plan. At the 
same time, NATO complimented those nations that desired membership but had not yet 
achieved the necessary standards. By holding out the membership potential for nearby 
countries such as Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia, a positive influence was provided to 
support the changes within those countries and the Balkans.
The new capabilities were described in three major areas. First, NATO declared 
that a NATO Response Force (NRF) would be developed not later than October 2004, to 
provide a multinational and joint capability to quickly deploy wherever needed with a 
substantial force. Following previous research, NATO also moved quickly to modify 
and streamline it’s military command arrangements. Most significantly, the two strategic 
commands were reorganized into one operational and one functional. The Strategic
141 NATO, “Prague Summit Declaration,” in The Prague Summit and N A T O ’s Transformation: A 
R eader’s Guide (Brussels, 2004), 72.
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Command for Operations, stationed in Belgium, has subordinate Joint Force Commands 
that can serve as the basis of CJTFs. The functional command, Allied Command 
Transformation (ACT), headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, shares in the transformation 
efforts of the US Joint Forces Command. Finally, the Prague Capabilities Commitment 
(PCC) was a serious effort to effect change based on lessons learned from the past. 
During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, most NATO members had discovered that 
their military capabilities were wholly inadequate. The DCI from the Washington 
Summit had been an attempt to work on resolving some of these problems. However, 
over time it was apparent that adequate improvements were not being made. Without 
improvements in capabilities, new missions and roles could only be conceptual. The 
plan was that PCC would more effectively organize NATO needs and work with member 
states and the EU’s European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) to begin to resolve these 
shortfalls.142
The efforts to develop new capabilities provides a variety of advantages to NATO. 
The improvement of capabilities ensures that NATO’s viability as a premier collective 
defense organization remains apparent. At the same time, these new capabilities also 
provide NATO with the ability to increasingly assume new missions. These new 
missions enable members to see continuing value in NATO membership, and also enable 
other nearby countries and institutions to identify NATO with improvements to their 
overall security environment.
142 The ECAP is a response by the EU Council to address capability shortfalls that were identified 
as part o f  the effort to meet the headline goals from the Helsinki Council in December 1999. They have 
established ten groups with lead nation representation to work the particular shortfalls. Burkard Schmitt. 
European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). European Union Institute for Security Studies, (July 2004), 
http://www.iss-org/ESDP/06-bsecap.pdf (accessed 16 September 2005).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
112
New partnership relations began with an affirmation of the contributions made to 
European security and stability by PfP and EAPC activities. As a result, NATO declared 
the desire to upgrade relations with partner countries. Not only did it declare the desire 
to improve the political dialogue with these countries, but also the intention to increase 
involvement of Partners in all of these activities that they participate in or contribute to, 
in part by means of Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP). It also emphasized the 
desire for countries such as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to participate once improvements have been made. Finally, it was also 
suggested that partner activities could be of great value to countries in Central Asia and 
the Caucasus.
In other areas of partnership activities, NATO stressed the importance of the 
NATO-Russia Council as well as the need for strong NATO-Ukraine relations. The 
Mediterranean Dialogue likewise remained an important means by which NATO could 
partner with other nearby countries. Institutionally, NATO continued to call for 
increasing support with the EU and OSCE in areas of mutual interests. In other regional 
actions, NATO also continued to identify the importance of the Balkans and NATO’s 
role in restoring a security environment through its participation in SFOR and KFOR. 
While not in a direct role, NATO also identified the importance of the Alliance assisting 
those member nations who were choosing to provide assistance to the UNSC in assisting 
the Afghan government as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). 
Though in many cases partnership relations are less visible than those capabilities 
changes discussed earlier, they are potentially an area where NATO could well be most 
transformational due to their influence in adopting and executing new missions and 
operating outside the NATO area.
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As in all political declarations, the Prague Summit appeared to offer great 
opportunities for improvements, but as always, the proof is in what actions are taken and 
what resources are spent. On 16 December 2002, only a month after the Prague Summit, 
NATO and the EU released a joint declaration on ESDP. Significantly, this brief 
document provided the EU with assurance of access to NATO planning capabilities, as 
well as pledging both institutions to begin to work the challenges of capability shortfalls 
together. In discussing the increasing dialogue between the two institutions, it used the 
same language as NATO had all along used for its relations with partner countries, that 
of partnership, consisting of mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and
143transparency.
With the Prague Summit providing background, the US went into 2003 building a 
coalition to respond to the threat from Saddam Hussein and Iraq. While substantial 
support was received from Great Britain, most other NATO allies were at best non­
committal and some such as France and Germany strongly opposed US action without 
UNSC approval. While the US did not receive much direct support in the form of troops, 
the disunity within the Alliance could be perceived as overstated. “Many NATO 
members backed the United States outright. Setting aside a few regrettable episodes, 
such as the brief attempt to delay NATO defensive assistance to Turkey..., it is 
misleading to portray France and Germany as having attempted to balance American 
power. (Indeed, Germany and other countries informally aided the war effort.)144 In 
fact, while operations continued in Iraq, NATO initiated and maintained a wide range of
143 NATO, EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, (Brussels, 16 December 2002), 1. 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm (accessed 15 May 2004).
144 Andrew Moravcsik, “Striking a N ew  Transatlantic Bargain,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 
(July/August 2003): 78.
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activities involving members and partners that continued to highlight cooperation and 
dialogue.
As one example, later in 2003, NATO on-going actions provided substance to 
earlier words. With the new emphasis on combating terrorism, and in view of the Article 
5 declaration following the 11 September 2001 attack on the US, NATO began escorting 
Allied civilian ships through the Straits of Gibraltar on 6 October 2001. Known as 
Operation Active Endeavour, this operation, which continued and grew over the next 
year, served not only as a substantive response to the new international environment, but 
also had potential implications for the new NATO. These actions in the Mediterranean 
not only protect shipping, but also demonstrate to partner countries, either under PfP or 
the Mediterranean Dialogue, that NATO continues to offer security for the region and the 
partners of the Alliance.145 Partners continued their involvement through the operation
of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC). While 
originally designed to deal with national disasters, it has also served as a coordinator of 
assistance for humanitarian relief in a number of international crises. Manned by 
representatives from NATO as well as partner countries, the EADRCC has also 
increasingly been seen as one of the available options for first response to civil 
emergency planning for responding to terrorist attacks. It is increasingly involved with 
exercises helping countries learn to respond to natural disasters as well as potential 
terrorist attacks using various WMD.146 On 4 August 2003, the EADRCC provided 
assistance to Portugal when it requested aircraft and helicopters to assist in fighting forest 
fires in the country.
145 NATO, NATO Briefing: Active Endeavour, ( Brussels, December, 2003), 3.
146 NATO, Fifth Anniversary o f  the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/update/2003/06-june/e0603b.htm (accessed 24 April 2004).
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On 29 July 2003, the EU and NATO agreed to coordinate their approach to 
working toward security and stability in the Western Balkans.147 While much of the 
analysis focused on how the two institutions would work together and with other 
institutions in order to improve the regional security situation, NATO also outlined the 
approach it intended to take. Specifically, “NATO’s comprehensive outreach will 
continue to include, but need not be limited to, the Partnership for Peace Programme, the 
Membership Action Plan and the provision of assistance in the field of defence 
reforms.”148 Increasingly, partnership activities are the cornerstone of NATO approach to 
a wide variety of situations, and not just a path used by nations in an effort to join 
NATO.
Amidst the war in Iraq, a number of nations had been supporting the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, a UN-mandated force tasked to 
provide security in and around Kabul. In August however, this support went even 
further. On 11 August, NATO took over the ISAF role in what was the Alliance’s first 
mission well beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. While earlier missions had been near the 
boundary of the Washington Treaty, and some had been separate from Article 5 and 
collective defense, this was the first true out of area mission. From its inception, this 
mission had representatives from a variety of partner countries as well as countries from 
other regions of the world.149 The experience of PfP and operations in the Balkans and 
the opportunities for cooperation and dialogue within the EAPC were providing the 
background for a substantial growth in NATO missions as well as capabilities.
147 NATO, E U  and NATO Agree Concerted Approach fo r  the Western Balkans, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2003p03-089e.htm (accessed 24 April 2004).
148 Ibid., 2.
149 NATO, NATO Takes on Afghanistan Mission, NATO Update: 11 August 2003, 1, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/update/2003/080august/e081 la.htm (accessed 24 April 2004).
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The next several months saw NATO efforts in some widely different areas. On 
15 October, NATO launched the NATO Response Force (NRF). This force, called for 
only 11 months earlier at the Prague Summit, was designed to provide a new capability 
to NATO to address new threats. As expressed by its first commander, General Sir Jack 
Deverell, “. ..we have taken a major step forward in creating the expeditionary capability, 
essential to countering the globalisation of new threats to peace and security.”150 While 
this force is so far only under trial, the intent is that by Fall 2006, NATO could deploy a 
20,000 strong joint and combined force with support within 5-30 days, and that it could 
sustain itself for up to 30 days. The NRF will be made up of forces on a six month 
rotation from national militaries, and will be led by one of the NATO regional or Joint 
Force Command headquarters. The speed with which NATO established the NRF was 
noted as a positive sign, though there are issues that are causes for concern by some.
Since these forces will be located at their home station and are on alert for this duty, there 
could be the perception that they might not be actually ready. There is also the concern 
that these will be many of the same forces identified for use by the EU’s new Rapid 
Reaction Force (RRF), and as such, there could be times when the same force has been 
over committed. While these concerns are valid, they are no different from concerns of 
force employment in many countries and situations and as such, can be resolved.
While the NRF is a capability of NATO members, a variety of activities 
involving partner countries continued during this same period. During October and 
November, NATO and partner countries met to examine a wide variety of training and 
education issues. As part of the PfP Training and Education Enhancement Programme
150 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, NATO Launches Response Force -  15 October 
2003, (SHAPE News, Mons, BE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 2), 
http://www.NATO.int/shape/news/2003/10/i031015.htm (accessed 24 April 2004).
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(TEEP), a seminar was held from 21-23 October, that brought NATO members, partners, 
and representatives from Allied Command Transformation together to work at 
coordinating views on education and training with a view to how to make operational 
capabilities more effective.151 Within only a few weeks, a related meeting was held with 
representatives from NATO’s nine PfP Training Centres and other participants, again 
with a view to update education and training in the context of the transformation process. 
Several of the training centers are in nations that are not considered as potential members 
of NATO and as such, indicate the extent to which PfP and other partner activities are
1 m
increasingly serving a broader role within the Alliance. The growth of the program 
can be seen as a way in which PfP is being used to increase interoperability and 
cooperation between participating nations, while also helping them to prepare for and 
participate in the transformation of the Alliance.
Then, on 1 December, NATO Defense Ministers met to review progress that had 
been made since Prague. As stated by then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson at 
the meeting’s opening, “The picture is a good one. Prague produced a genuine NATO 
transformation. That transformed NATO is today delivering real security from Kosovo to 
Kabul.”153 Over the course of several days they discussed the status of a wide variety of 
current and on-going NATO actions. While the final communique summarized the on­
going actions, they also looked forward to the Istanbul Summit. Recognizing the changes 
in the environment, both from the new threats as well as the new members to NATO, it
151 NATO, PfP Education and Training Seminar 2003, 1, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/update/2003/10-october/el021a.htm (accessed 24 April 2004).
152 The current PfP training centers are located in Austria, Finland, Greece, Romania, Slovenia, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine. NATO, Training, Education and Interoperability, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/update/2003/11-november/el 11 lb.htm (accessed 24 April 2004).
153 NATO, Defence Ministers Review N ATO ’s Missions and Transformation, 1, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/update/2003/12-december/l 1201a.htm (accessed 24 April 2004).
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says that, “The Istanbul Summit should build on progress made at Prague to re-focus PfP 
to reflect its post-enlargement dimensions and the Alliance’s focus on new threats.”
While listing some of the ways in which partnership might be modified to better 
accommodate interested countries, it also says that they, . .agree to promote a special 
focus on the strategically important regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia.”154
Immediately following this meeting, the EAPC met in Foreign Ministers Session 
on 4-5 December. In large part, the report of the meeting confirmed the earlier 
communique’ and reinforced the role that they say PfP playing in the response to the new 
threats that confronted the international community. They also underlined the new PfP 
Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism and the actions that it called for.
Prior to Prague, PfP seemed primarily an approach to membership, despite the 
variety of partners. After Prague, it is increasingly clear that it is also an important 
means by which NATO formalizes a positive relationship with regional neighbors.
These actions continue despite the problems and rhetoric of the Iraq war, and seem to 
indicate a willingness on the part of those participants to continue improving their 
security situation.
When the Istanbul Summit was held less than two years later on 28 June 2004, the 
agenda indicated the extent to which NATO was transforming. In addition to welcoming 
seven new members, the Summit’s three agenda items were, operations, projecting 
stability through partnerships, and military transformation. At the same time, the 
fundamentals of the Alliance remained. From the beginning of the Communique they 
stated, “ ...we remain fully committed to the collective defence of our populations,
154 NATO, Final Communique o f  the M inisterial M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council held at 
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 2 December 2003, para. 16, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2003/p03- 
152e.htm (accessed 17 April 2004).
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territory and forces. Transatlantic cooperation is essential in defending our values and 
meeting common threats and challenges, from wherever they may come.”155 Through 
this statement and the Istanbul communique, the Heads of State continued to stress that 
while collective defense remained the cornerstone of the Alliance, threats from terrorism 
and weapons of mass destruction were their new focus, and they were not constrained by 
the limits of the North Atlantic Treaty.
In the areas of operations, the NATO-led IS AF mission was continuing in 
Afghanistan, with an expansion of the mission anticipated. At the same time, Operation 
Active Endeavour continued in the Mediterranean to monitor shipping and deter terrorist 
activity. Significantly, they announced that the Alliance was preparing to terminate its 
peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and transfer responsibilities to the EU under the 
provisions of the Berlin-Plus agreement.
In an effort to project stability through partnership, the NAC announced that they 
would continue working the wide variety of partnership activities, while attempting to 
strengthen the results. They announced a new Partnership Action Plan on Defence 
Institution Building with an attempt to assist partners in establishing and maintaining 
effective civilian control of the military. They also focused on an expansion of the 
Alliance areas of interest by identifying increasing efforts to improve relationships with 
the countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and closer countries such as Moldova. There 
was also a new effort to improve Alliance relations on a regional basis through the 
“Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.” This initiative was offered to middle East nations, 
initially those belonging to the Gulf Cooperation Council, with the intent of improving 
overall security and defense cooperation.
155 NATO, “Istanbul Summit Communique.”
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In the final agenda item of military transformation, the NAC emphasized 
continuation of earlier initiatives from the Prague Summit, as well as highlighting new 
measures. From Prague, they noted that the NRF would reach initial operational 
capability later in the year, while the updating of the command arrangements were also 
on track, to include the establishment of Allied Command Transformation replacing 
S ACLANT. They went into additional details on the Prague Capabilities Commitment 
and its progress, both in cooperation with EU efforts as well as in actual improvements to 
Alliance capabilities. On more detailed matters, there was also progress noted towards 
improvements in the NATO planning process, as well as efforts to design improvements 
in the political decisionmaking process as well as the force generation process necessary 
if the NRF was to truly be a responsive force.
Through this most recent Summit, NATO leadership continued the slow and steady 
transformation of the Alliance and its relations with others, whether on an individual, 
group, or regional basis. NATO operations and partnership activities highlighted in this 
Summit showed the increasing expansion of NATO activities, both military and political. 
The continuing efforts at military transformation indicate an effort to ensure that there 
are reasonable capabilities to support that dialogue.
Summary
This historical overview has demonstrated that NATO quickly recognized the 
changing international environment and adapted to it. NATO documentation that 
developed through internal consensus reflected the changing threat and the need for 
NATO to reconsider how it interacted with other nations, regions, and institutions. More
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importantly, the Alliance then took steps to implement external change in order to remain 
relevant.
Through a policy of dialogue and cooperation NATO developed first the NACC, 
then PfP, and eventually the EAPC to work with its neighbors while also preparing the 
conditions for eventual enlargement. Each action did not necessarily prove ideal from 
the beginning, as evidenced by the changeover of the NACC to the EAPC. Nevertheless, 
this adaptation demonstrates the adaptability of NATO. The Alliance was not so 
attached to each statement or action that it could not change with the situation.
Based on this examination of NATO external adaptation, the next two case studies 
will examine NATO internal adaptation. In chapter three, the development of a 
European voice will examined in order to see how the changes underway in Europe 
drove NATO members to reconsider their national relationships with the institution. 
Members of the EU developed one particular perspective, not necessarily the same as 
other non-EU NATO members as well as the North Atlantic members.
In the second case study, this examination of the European identity within NATO 
is expanded. The Combined Joint Task Force concept is the means by which the 
operationalization of ESDI is implemented within the Alliance. It is important to 
consider how this concept came into existence and what were the perspectives of NATO 
members that played roles into its implementation. These two case studies in concert 
with this overview provide the necessary substance to accurately consider and assess the 
extent and effectiveness of NATO transformation.
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CHAPTER III
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY: A VOICE FOR EUROPE
This chapter represents an examination of the second critical threshold, the 
development of a European identity within the Alliance following the end of the Cold 
War. This case study complements the previous chapter by providing examples of 
NATO documentation detailing Alliance efforts to adapt internal structures and 
procedures. These changes were in large part driven by the need to address the new 
international environment and the evolving conditions for the European members.
During the course of the Cold War, NATO was always an institution of the 
members plus one when considering the relationship of the United States within the 
organization. However, at the end of the Cold War, Europe began undergoing changes 
that constituted a significant transformation of the Transatlantic system. It now seemed 
important to some members to redefine that relationship. The disappearance of the 
Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany brought hopes for a better future to many 
in Europe. It now seemed that this might be the time to redefine the security architecture 
in Europe. Since the departure of the Soviet Union indicated the end of the bi-polar 
world, perhaps institutions could be used to reflect a greater level of equality among 
nations. The success of institutions in Europe provided an impetus to consider how the 
EC, WEU, CSCE, and even the UN could work together to improve regional security and 
prosperity while also helping NATO remain viable and relevant. There was little
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likelihood that the relationship between the US and the nations belonging to those 
institutions could remain unchanged.1
In the absence of a significant threat, it now seemed more appropriate for 
European nations to speak effectively with one voice, not only with the US, but also in 
other forums revolving around regional issues. Earlier attempts at European solidarity 
had focused on efforts such as those employing the WEU, or within the framework of 
NATO, the Eurogroup, and later, the Independent European Programme Group that had
'y
primarily served to coordinate armaments issues. These narrowly defined efforts were 
inadequate for what was now perceived as necessary in this new environment. 
Additionally, as NATO considered new missions and roles, some European members of 
the Alliance wanted the opportunity to represent their own interests.
NATO’s success was founded on the importance of the Washington Treaty’s 
Article 5 collective defense commitment that an attack on one member was an attack on 
all. While the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact faced Western Europe, the central role of 
the US was accepted, and was indeed even critical for the success of defense. The 
significant defense contributions of the US including its nuclear umbrella, made it the 
cornerstone of European defense. However, following the disappearance of the 
monolithic threat, this common perspective was no longer so universally perceived.
1 David P. Calleo, “Transatlantic Folly: NATO vs. the EU,” World Policy Journal, Fall 2003, 19.
2 Alyson J. K. Bailes. “NATO ’s European Pillar: The European Security and Defense Identity.” 
Defense Analysis 15, no. 3 (1999): 306.
3 The Eurogroup was established 13-14 November 1968 as a means o f  improving the European 
contribution to the Alliance and for the European members to better inform their North American allies o f  
these efforts. It came about following the Warsaw Pact invasion o f  Czechoslovakia and NATO concerns 
that overall efforts were not necessarily adequate. Its functions were transferred to NATO or the WEU on
1 January 1994. The Independent European Program Group (IEPG) was established on 2 February 1976 as 
a means o f  providing more effective conventional weapons cooperation among European member (less 
France) o f  the Alliance. It began working with the WEU and EC in 1991. On 4 December 1992 it was 
dissolved and its functions placed with the WEU.
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Without major security threats to place other national and regional issues in a secondary 
role, it seemed appropriate for the nations of Europe to have a greater role regarding their 
own concerns and interests.
As conflicts developed in the Balkans, and the countries of Eastern Europe began 
seeking membership in NATO and other European institutions, it seemed increasingly 
important that European members represent their own interests more independent of US 
interests. As NATO began considering new and expanded missions, and eventually 
became more involved in a wide variety of actions throughout Europe and neighboring 
regions, these efforts continued. In many of these situations, the needs and interests of 
European states were different from those of the US. At the same time, most individual 
European nations did not possess the capabilities necessary for independently managing 
crises. In such situations, it would be better if necessary capabilities could be 
coordinated and developed among themselves. The process by which NATO’s European 
members sought to internally develop a more unified voice and approach in their 
dealings with other regional and international institutions as well as the US is a major 
development of this period and one that speaks to the heart of institutional transformation 
and national perspectives.
This case study examines the development of a European defense identity within 
NATO following the end of the Cold War. The development of this concept was a 
unique and complex challenge from the very first discussions. As then NATO Secretary 
General Javier Solana said 4 May 1998, “To me, identity suggests first and foremost a 
common view. Common military structures are no guarantee for common
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views. ...identity cannot be decreed.”4 While there were earlier initiatives in this area 
during the Cold War, it is in the period of this study that sustained efforts to substantially 
implement this concept took place. The definition of what is considered a defense 
identity will be a critical element of the study. As a transatlantic institution, NATO 
primarily has European members, with the US and Canada completing the membership. 
So, one perspective is whether or not there is the development of a European caucus in 
NATO, within which all of its European members discuss Alliance issues separate from 
the North American partners.
Another perspective when considering European security might be the 
development of a new security actor arising from developments within the EU. From the 
beginning of the European integration movement there was a desire for matters beyond 
economics and trade to be organized and unified. The attempt to establish the European 
Defense Community in 1954 was an early example. Nevertheless, during the Cold War 
and in the shadow of NATO, the EU avoided a security role. In this post-cold war period 
such limitations were no longer as relevant and as a result, opened new possibilities.
How ESDI would develop in relation to the EU was in part a factor of nations such as the 
UK and France. While the UK saw ESDI as an element within NATO, France was more 
interested in a separate entity.5 Finally, through institutions such as the WEU, there 
existed the potential for a common framework for European nations to discuss security 
issues outside of NATO and the EU. The reality which evolved since 1989 is a 
combination of all three possibilities and provides the background for the analysis.
4 Javier Solana. “A European Security and Defence Identity within NATO.” Remarks at the WEU 
Colloquy, European Defence and Security Identity. (Madrid, 4 May 1998), 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/speech/1998/s980504a.htm (accessed 30 September 1999).
5 Gale A. Mattox and Daniel Whiteneck, “The ESDI, NATO and the N ew  European Security 
Environment,” in Europe in Change, Two Tiers or Two Speeds? ed. James Sperling, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999), 122.
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This examination can be considered from the standpoint of four time periods.
They do not represent periods of equal and sustained effort, but are instead bounded by 
the major NATO events that marked the development of a European identity. The first is 
that period immediately following the end of the Cold War. From 1989 until the 11 
January 1994, Brussels Summit, NATO examined how best to develop a security identity 
as part of an overall European security architecture that would improve NATO 
effectiveness throughout the region. The discussions of this new architecture also meant 
that NATO and the EC began to talk and interact more regularly, especially as the EC, 
then the EU, began to increasingly consider the importance of common views in a variety 
of security related issue areas.
Then, during the period from the 11 January 1994, Brussels Summit to the 3 June 
Berlin NAC Ministerial in 1996, NATO began focusing its efforts towards development 
of an ESDI. While support for EU initiatives continued, it was now a more concerted 
effort specifically to develop a European voice within NATO in order to more effectively 
represent those European members. From the 3 June 1996, Berlin NAC Ministerial until 
the Washington Summit of 23-24 April 1999, NATO’s situation was characterized by a 
great deal of discussion, but minimal improvements. At the Washington Summit a 
number of initiatives were agreed to that were intended to reinforce efforts at improving 
the European representation. Finally, from the Washington Summit until the Istanbul 
Summit of 28 June 2004, efforts to improve the ESDI and institutional effectiveness 
overall became more substantial. It is in the analysis of these most recent efforts that 
one can best see the expectations for eventual institutional transformation and the scope 
and nature of the changes that were underway.
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These periods will be examined by breaking each down into two segments. First, 
the words and actions of NATO are examined in order to see whether the institution 
described a vision and worked to implement it. Alliance documentation should indicate 
how accurate the institution was in examining and identifying the issues of the period. 
Does the institution clearly describe the international situation, threats as well as 
opportunities? At the same time, did the institution develop innovative and effective 
means by which it responded? These responses are at the heart of this analysis. It 
follows then that the actions taken by the Alliance in response to these situations is the 
best means of examining its ability to adapt. In the long run, what matters most are the 
actions the Alliance takes based on what it said and planned. NATO documentation and 
Alliance follow-through are significant to note, in that the nature of the implementation is 
a reliable measure of evolving institutional consensus on important issues.
The second segment of this analysis examines the variety of institutions and 
nations that interact with NATO. It goes beyond a simple examination of NATO efforts. 
As one of several major institutions with overlapping and sometimes competing 
memberships and responsibilities, NATO must not be examined in isolation. The 
specific actions and reactions of the EU, WEU, and other international institutions must 
be considered when they relate to NATO actions during this period. The interplay of 
these institutions is at the heart of this analysis of a developing ESDI within the Alliance.
Despite the added analytical depth provided by the examination of the regional 
institutions, they do not act independently. All are entities made up of member states 
with various levels of support and involvement from national governments. Therefore, 
the events of each time period must also be seen as reflections of the national interests of 
those member states. In those situations where significant national interests are not an
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
128
issue, a particular state might have little involvement. However, at the same time, 
regarding the same issue area, another state might have interests, and therefore, concerns 
for the topic. Therefore, it is important that those interests be considered. France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom are the three states in particular that will be 
considered when examining major developments within Europe.
It is important to consider how NATO, other institutions, and national perspectives, 
relate and interact with one another. It is only through an understanding of the 
interdependent relationships identified and developed that one can truly understand the 
full implications and possibilities of developing situations.
Responding To A Changing World (1989 -  1994)
NATO: From Brussels To Brussels
The initial formulation of NATO’s response to the end of the Cold War and the 
beginning of the development of ESDI begins and then takes form in Brussels. During 
the 29-30 May 1989, Brussels Summit, NATO first began to formally consider the 
changes underway throughout Europe, and it was in the next Brussels Summit on 11 
January 1994, that the shape and nature of the institutions response became evident.
At the time of the NATO 40th Anniversary Summit in Brussels on 29-30 May 1989, 
changes were underway in the Soviet Union under President Gorbachev, as well as in 
many of the countries of Eastern Europe. While the major upheavals in Germany,
Berlin, and elsewhere in Europe were still months away, no one could have predicted 
how quickly these changes would come, how widespread they would be, and in most 
countries, how peacefully they would develop. Despite the uncertainty, NATO’s 
carefully crafted summit declaration supported positive change while reminding all
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concerned about NATO’s role as a collective defense organization. Even this early in 
this tumultuous period, the NATO Heads of State and Government recognized, “That 
this is a time to look ahead, to chart the course of our Alliance and to set our agenda for 
the future.”6
While recognizing the importance of the North American contribution to 
European security, NATO leadership also recognized the importance of the continued 
development of Europe in political and economic ways as well as military. Paragraph 13 
of the declaration noted that, “Growing European political unity can lead to a reinforced 
European component of our common security effort and its efficiency.”7 The importance 
of effectively using European resources as part of defense programs, as well as the need 
to use trade and technology in order to most effectively maximize security were 
highlighted. Then, in paragraph 22, the discussion expanded from strictly NATO to also 
the recognition of the potential for adding to the strength of Europe through the 
“ .. .evolution of an increasingly strong and coherent European identity, including in the 
security area. The process....constitutes one of the foundations of Europe’s future 
structure.”8
Barely a year later during the London Summit of 6 July 1990, NATO continued 
discussing the on-going changes and how they would affect the Alliance. Major 
discussions were held concerning the role of the CSCE in Europe and how that 
institution could help stabilize the new situation with so many emerging nations. As an 
institution, CSCE was seen as critical to the development of continued peaceful 
coexistence between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Self-confident over the success of
6 NATO, The Brussels Declaration from  the 4(fh Anniversary o f  the Alliance, para 2.
7 Ibid., para 13.
8 Ibid., para 22.
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NATO in keeping the peace over the past forty years, the London Declaration also stated 
in paragraph two that . .the Alliance must be even more an agent of change.”9 While 
continuing its focus on collective defense, the same paragraph also emphasized the need 
for NATO to enhance its political component. The idea is expanded in the next 
paragraph when the European Community is noted for its efforts towards continued 
political union, with emphasis on the development of a European identity in the area of 
security. It is felt that these efforts within the EC will also serve to strengthen the 
Alliance.10
On 7 June 1991, the NAC held a Ministerial in Copenhagen that more clearly 
articulated Alliance issues and responses to the new environment. Now the scope of 
change throughout Europe was much more evident and NATO needed to respond. There 
was an immediate recognition that institutions had an important role to play in the 
continued evolution of these changes. While supporting earlier acts of the CSCE such as 
the 1 August 1975, Helsinki Final Act and the 21 November 1990, Paris Charter for a 
New Europe, for the first time NATO began to note that common security could best be 
obtained by the development “ .. .of a network of interlocking institutions and 
relations...5,11 NATO, the EC and political integration, and the CSCE were seen as the 
key elements to this new architecture for regional cooperation.
As part of the same Ministerial, the NAC also issued a Communique titled,
NATO ’.s' Core Security Functions in the New Europe. While brief, this communique 
stressed the importance of NATO in the defense of Europe. It identified four
9 NATO, London Declaration, para. 2.
10 Ibid., para 3.
11 NATO, Partnership with the countries o f  Central and Eastern Europe, para. 3.
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fundamental security tasks.12 The importance of the contributions of the EC, WEU, and 
CSCE are noted, but as an institution that can address all four tasks, NATO was seen as 
the essential forum for consultation among the Allies. It was noted that among these 
institutions and NATO, “The creation of a European identity in security and defence will 
underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for 
their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity.”13
Later that same year, many of the same comments and issues were part of the 
declarations and products of the 7-8 November 1991, Rome Summit. NATO published a 
new Strategic Concept that recognized the changing international framework and how 
the Alliance intended to fit in it. For its part, the Strategic Concept contained a great deal 
of the information that had earlier been published in the NAC Ministerial Communique 
titled, NATO’s Core Security Functions in the New Europe. NATO demonstrated 
consistency and a focus on the responsibilities and purposes of the various European 
institutions and the four functions of NATO based on the Washington Treaty.
They also issued the Rome Declaration, the summit declaration by the Heads of 
State and Government, which highlighted a number of specifics that relate to this study. 
In the Rome Declaration, NATO began using the phrase, “a framework of interlocking 
institutions,” tying together European and North American nations towards a new 
European security architecture. Paragraph six of the declaration states in part, “The
121. To provide one o f  the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, 
based on the growth o f  democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution o f  disputes, in 
which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European o f  force. II. To serve, as provided for 
in Article IV o f the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues 
that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members’ security, and for 
appropriate coordination o f  their efforts in fields o f  common concern. III. To deter and defend against any 
threat o f  aggression against the territory o f  any NATO member state. IV. To preserve the strategic balance 
within Europe, (para 6)
13 NATO, NATO ’s Core Security Functions in the New Europe, para. 7.
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development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the further 
strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and 
effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. The enhancement of the role and responsibility of 
the European members is an important basis for the transformation of the Alliance.”14 
While discussing the need for such an identity to be developed in concert with the 
development of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, they 
emphasized that there must be transparency between the two institutions in order to 
ensure that there is a, . .complementarity between the European security and defence 
identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance.”15 At this early 
point in the process, a defense identity and a pillar within NATO were broad concepts 
not yet explicitly related to specific institutions. It was also in this declaration where the 
Alliance began discussing the WEU as the defense component of European integration 
and representative of the European pillar of the Alliance. From the Cold War days of a 
clear separation between the institutions, they now began discussion and exploration of 
how the institutions could best operate together. In a sense, the WEU was seen as 
providing a bridge between the EC and NATO, “ .. .serving as the defence component of 
the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar 
of the Alliance.. .”16 To the US, this WEU link also provided a greater opportunity for 
burdensharing while also avoiding the development of an all-European caucus within 
NATO.17
14 NATO, Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, para. 6.
15 Ibid., para. 6.
16 Ibid., para. 7.
17 Emil J. Kirchner, “Second Pillar and Eastern Enlargement: The Prospects for a European Security 
and Defence Identity,” in Europe in Change, Two Tiers or Two Speeds?  ed. James Sperling, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999), 47.
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Only months later in the 4 June 1992, Oslo NAC Ministerial on support for 
Peacekeeping activities in support o f the OSCE, NATO continued emphasizing the 
importance of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions and a further 
development of a European pillar within NATO. In fact, the communique identified 
NATO, CSCE, the European Community, the WEU, and the Council of Europe as the 
institutions that must be considered when developing the new security architecture within 
Europe. By now, NATO explicitly recognized the efforts of the WEU and EU at 
Maastricht and reaffirmed its support for the developing role of the WEU. In an effort to 
bring substance to this relationship, the declaration called for the NAC in permanent 
session to begin working on potential arrangements to develop working relations 
between the two organizations, in part to ensure Allies not belonging to both institutions
i o
would have a role in decisions involving their own security.
These same discussions were still ongoing during the 17 December 1992,
Brussels NAC Ministerial on NATO support to UNSC Peacekeeping. Following closely 
on the Oslo discussions, NATO continued urging the development of a common 
European foreign and security policy and defense identity as called for not only by the 
Alliance, but also the EC and WEU at Maastricht. In fact, not only did this dialogue 
continue to address the development of a European voice, but now NATO also noted 
that, “ .. .the Alliance’s interests are best served by a more united Europe and that the 
maintenance of a strong Atlantic Alliance will be a fundamental element in any emerging 
European Defence Policy.”19 In an early recognition of some of the more substantive
18 NATO, Final Communique o f  the M inisterial M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council including the 
Oslo Decision on NATO Support fo r  Peacekeeping Activities under the Responsibility o f  the OSCE), (Oslo, 
4 June 1992), http://www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b920604a.htm (accessed 13 November 2001).
19 NATO, Final Communique o f  the M inisterial M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council
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actions taken to date, NATO also noted appreciation for France and Germany proposing 
to link the European Corps (EUROCORPS) to the Alliance.20 This was an important 
step since the EUROCORPS had served as an example of strong German and French 
defense cooperation during the past several decades, and had been opened to membership 
to all WEU nations in 1992.21 The linking of a unit with such strong ties to WEU nations 
to NATO was felt to be substantial improvement to both the idea of ESDI and the 
establishment of a European pillar within the Alliance.
The NATO Brussels Summit of 11 January 1994, marked the first significant 
change in direction of the Alliance since the end of the Cold War. While the declaration 
noted the lessening of confrontation in Europe, it also referred to the increasing 
instability in other portions of the continent. The first paragraph stated that the validity 
and indispensability of NATO was in part a reflection of, “ .. .a European Security and 
Defence Identity gradually emerging as the expression of a mature Europe.”23 Building 
on the previous Rome and London Declarations and NATO’s new Strategic Concept, 
Alliance members agreed to four significant milestones. First, they agreed to adapt the 
Alliance structures to accommodate the newly developing roles as well as the
in Brussels, (17 Dec 92), para 9, http://www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b921217a.htm (accessed 4 
November 2001).
20 The Eurocorps is a multinational force, initially established during the 59th Franco-German 
Summit in May 1992. It has since grown to over 50,000 troops with personnel from Belgium, Spain, and 
Luxembourg. It was significant for being the first force committed to the WEU. It has since worked with 
NATO and served once as a NATO headquarters o f  KFOR. Craig MacKinnon, “The Eurocorps, A  N ew  
Direction for European Defence?,” Peacekeeping & International Relations 26, (Jan-Apr 2000): 19.
21 Preben Bonnen, Towards a Common European Security and Defence Policy. The Ways and  
Means o f  Making it a Reality, (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 52.
22 NATO, Final Communique o f  the Ministerial M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 
17 December 1992, para. 12. Also, since the 1970s there have been a variety o f  multinational military 
formations between a wide variety o f  European nations. In most cases these are agreements where forces 
might come together as needed. In other cases, there are actually standing forces or headquarters. The 
relationship o f  these varied forces to the WEU or NATO has often been an issue through the years. See, 
Jean-Yves Haine, Force Structures, (European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004): 5-6, 
http://www.iss-EU.org/ESDP/10-jyhb%02B.pdf (accessed 23 January 2005).
23 NATO, The Brussels 1994 Summit Declaration, para. 1, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b964011 la.htm (accessed 14 November 2001).
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development of ESDI, while also endorsing the new concept of the Combined Joint Task 
Force (CJTF).24 These internal adaptations were critical if NATO was to operate 
effectively in other than Article 5 situations. Second, they noted that the Alliance would 
continue to remain open to membership of other European nations. Third, they 
announced the Partnership for Peace initiative as a means by which the Alliance might 
better reach out to other countries in the region. And finally, in a recognition of the 
increasing threat now facing NATO members, they vowed, “...to intensify and expand 
NATO’s political and defence efforts against proliferation...” and their means of
0 Sdelivery. Significantly, the Alliance was now seriously considering new threats that 
were increasingly other than those presented by other nations. While not stated so 
explicitly, this very public recognition of more non-traditional threats was an important 
aspect of NATO’s changing missions.
While the term ESDI now seemed established within the NATO lexicon, it was 
used when referring both to the emergence of defense cooperation within the EU as well 
as NATO. For example, in paragraph four they promised, “ .. .full support to the 
development of a European Security and Defence Identity which, as called for in the 
Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the 
European Union, might in time lead to a common defence compatible with that of the 
Atlantic Alliance. The emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity will 
strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and
24 See the next chapter, “Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) The Bridge Between Military 
Capability And Political Will,” for a detailed discussion o f  this concept.
25 NATO, The Brussels 1994 Summit Declaration, para. 1.
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will enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and 
defence.”26
Structurally, they noted the need to develop modifications in the Alliance 
command structure in order to better work with the WEU in strengthening the European 
pillar. Specifically, they began to consider how NATO capabilities might be used in 
support of these European and WEU operations, and how other non-NATO nations 
might also be able to participate in joint peacekeeping and other similar contingencies. 
During previous discussions, the CJTF concept had been discussed as a means of 
facilitating NATO operational effectiveness, but more importantly, also as a means of 
facilitating NATO support for operations outside formal Alliance involvement. This 
declaration endorsed the concept and directed the NAC to operationalize it and work
9 7with the WEU in order to implement it as quickly as possible.
So, by the Brussels Summit, the broad concept of a European identity within the 
Alliance had begun to take a more specific form. Rather than strictly a European 
identity, it was more accurately, an EU identity through the representation of the WEU as 
a pillar within NATO. This is significant, since as already noted, the memberships of 
NATO and the EU had significant differences as well as overlaps. The EUROGROUP 
which had represented all European members less France had been dissolved, and in its 
place, now stood for the time being, the WEU. The European Security and Defense 
Identity could more accurately be called, the European Union Security and Defense 
Identity, since these were the nations working within this context and this was to be the 
basis for several disagreements discussed later.
26 Ibid., para. 4.
27 Ibid., para. 9.
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Institutional Response (1989 -  1994)
While NATO met regularly and continued discussing and acting regarding the 
changes in Europe, the EC actions were fewer, but significant nevertheless. An earlier 
EC effort at foreign policy development known as European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
had proven over the past years to be nearly ineffective. In The Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), agreed to at the European Council meeting in Maastricht on 10 December 
1991 and signed on 7 February 1992, the EC stepped firmly into the areas of foreign 
policy and security issues. Two intergovernmental pillars were added to the EU, with the 
first being Justice and Home Affairs, the second being a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP).
By definition, CFSP can encompass all of the elements of national power. In this 
situation, defense and military matters are only one, very important but very challenging 
area to work in. While it was not expected that CFSP would immediately begin with the 
difficult area of defense, it was envisioned that there would eventually be some 
agreement in the field. In fact, the significance of this can be clearly seen from Article 
17 of the TEU. In it, a stated goal of the CFSP was for “ .. .the progressive framing of a 
common defence policy which might lead to a common defence.”28 In order to 
accomplish this, the treaty requested more involvement on the part of the WEU to 
implement decisions of the EC as part of their decisionmaking. In Maastricht during the 
same period, the WEU member nations also met and released a statement calling for their 
participation as part of the Atlantic Alliance. Specifically, they stated that the “WEU 
will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to
28 European Union, Treaty on European Union, Article 17. 
http://europa.eu.int/eur_lex/en/treaties/dat/EU_treaty.html (accessed 21 October 2003).
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strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.”29 This began the EU’s parallel 
effort towards a European perspective in security matters, which assumed two major 
roles for the WEU. As the EU’s defense component, the WEU would be forced to 
confront those challenges of differing memberships and attempt to organize defense 
issues with the institution. At the same time, it would also represent those issues within 
the Alliance. While in a sense serving as a bridge between the two institutions, it was a 
bridge not fully connected due to the only partially overlapping memberships. Therefore, 
it could not truly be speaking for all of the European members of NATO. Despite WEU 
efforts to open up its membership, the varying levels of membership and corresponding 
rights and responsibilities, presented further potential problems. (See Table 2 for 
institutional membership comparison.)
While NATO continued discussing the concept of ESDI, early EU efforts were 
focused on the completion of the Treaty of European Union (TEU). The call for CFSP as 
part of the treaty early on was new, but the implementation was not as significant since 
specific goals were not set. However, the WEU operationalized its involvement with 
European security matters through a significant announcement. During their Petersberg 
meeting on 19 June 1992, WEU Council of Ministers released a major document that
A
came to be known as the Petersberg Declaration. For the first time, the members
identified the particular missions in which WEU member states might offer units to be 
employed. These crisis management categories were identified as humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking. This listing describes a wide spectrum of potential missions,
29 WEU, WEU Related Texts Adopted at Maastricht, para 2.
30 WEU, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992.
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with the one obvious absence being that of high intensity conflict, usually perceived as 
national defense. This resulted from the understanding that NATO continued to be the 
provider of self defense for all its member nations, which included all WEU members. 
These two perspectives of types of military operations are fundamental to any analysis of 
European security. Crisis management is the phase that has come to be referred to when 
discussing the various Petersberg tasks. As such, these are tasks potentially within the 
capabilities of individual nations or institutions such as the WEU and EU to resolve. 
Collective defense on the other hand has remained a fundamental task of NATO 
throughout the period under analysis.
However, there was another important aspect of the Petersberg Declaration not as 
often noted. Recognizing the challenges brought about by the differing memberships of 
NATO and the EU, the WEU extended invitations to those countries interested in 
developing a relationship with the WEU. Member states of the EU were invited to join 
the WEU and participate in its operation, as well as receiving the benefits of being a 
signatory of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and its Article V self-defense privileges and 
responsibilities. Other members of the EU not desiring the full participation in the 
defense related activities could accede to being an Observer. Finally, European states 
belonging to NATO, but not members of the EU, could agree to become associate 
members. They would be able to participate fully in meetings and provide forces and 
representation to WEU operations, but would not be able to stop or block the actions of 
the WEU members.31
31 Ibid., section III.
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Table 2. Institutional Membership
COUNTRY EU WEU NATO
Belgium X -  52 X X - 4 9
Netherlands X -  52 X X - 4 9
Luxembourg X -  52 X X - 4 9
France X -  52 X X - 4 9
United Kingdom X - 7 3 X X - 4 9
Germany X -  52 X X - 55
Italy X -  52 X X - 4 9
Spain X -  86 X X -  82
Portugal X -  86 X X - 4 9
Greece X -  81 X X -  52
Denmark X - 7 3 Observer X - 4 9
Poland X -  04 Associate Mem X - 9 9
Czech Republic X -  04 Associate Mem X - 9 9
Estonia X -  04 Associate Ptnr X - 0 4
Latvia X -  04 Associate Ptnr X - 0 4
Lithuania X -  04 Associate Ptnr X - 0 4
Slovakia X - 0 4 Associate Ptnr X - 0 4
Hungary X -  04 Associate Mem X - 9 9
Slovenia X - 0 4 Associate Ptnr X - 0 4
Malta* X - 0 4
Cyprus X - 0 4
Austria* X -  95 Observer PfP
Finland* X -  95 Observer PfP
Ireland* X - 7 3 Observer PfP
Sweden* X -  95 Observer PfP
Norway Associate Mem X - 4 9
Romania Associate Ptnr X - 0 4
Turkey Associate Mem X -  52
Bulgaria Associate Ptnr X - 0 4
Iceland Associate Mem X - 4 9
United States X - 4 9
Canada X - 4 9
Column number represents year of first membership. 
PfP = member of Partnership for Peace 
* = Neutral Foreign Policy
WEU Membership Categories:
Observer = observer status 
Associate Mem = Associate Member 
Associate Ptnr = Associate Partner
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If the WEU was to become a bridge from the EU to NATO, these membership 
changes were a critical step. As already noted, the differing memberships of the two 
institutions held the potential for serious conflicts based on the collective defense 
responsibilities inherent in Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington and the WEU’s similar 
self-defense treaty. There was a concern that with the varied memberships and different 
self-defense relationships, a more militarily engaged EU/WEU could potentially result in 
NATO being dragged into a conflict.
Building A Security Framework (1994 -  1996)
NATO: From Brussels To The Berlin Ministerial
The 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement did not explicitly discuss the development 
of ESDI. It did however, continue building on the themes of the ongoing security 
architecture in Europe, the roles of other institutions in this process, and the continuing 
support for defense developments within the EU and the evolving relationship with the 
WEU. Paragraph 19 of the study stated that, “In its dual role as defence component of 
the EU and European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, the WEU brings an important 
additional dimension to European security.”
A key feature of the development of ESDI, the European pillar within NATO, 
and the defense aspects of the EU was discussed in detail in paragraph 20. It is there that 
the varied memberships of the organizations were addressed. NATO used this 
opportunity to build a strong case for development of complementary memberships 
between NATO, EU, and WEU. Since full members of the WEU were also members of 
NATO, and the effect of the security guarantees of Article V of the modified Brussels
32 NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement, para. 19.
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Treaty and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty are complementary, this relationship 
should be supported. So, since the WEU was becoming the defense arm of the EU, it 
would be increasingly important for the memberships of the EU and NATO to be as 
similar as possible in order to provide the strongest and most unified approach on 
security matters. Since the EU has non-NATO members, including neutral and non- 
aligned states, there are inherent difficulties in achieving consensus on security-related 
matters.
While this specific membership issue had not been addressed in previous 
declarations and communiques, it is implicit in discussion of parallel developments of 
European security formulation between NATO and the EU. NATO’s recognition of the 
dangers of this disconnect was an important step in the development of ESDI. With this 
new and more detailed examination of the membership issue, NATO appeared prepared 
to substantively improve the development of ESDI within the Alliance by working 
through these difficult problems.
The end of the first stage of NATO developments towards ESDI came about from 
the Berlin NAC Ministerial on 3 June 1996. The ideas and concepts of ESDI first 
suggested in the Brussels Summit, were now going to be given form by the declarations 
of this ministerial. With the Alliance firmly engaged in the Balkans and the enlargement 
process underway, the NAC took the opportunity to restate the purpose of the Alliance, 
the work that remained to be done, and the accomplishments to date.
While recognizing that much had been achieved to date, the NAC declared that it 
was now the time to decisively move forward in making the Alliance more effective for 
the future. NATO announced three priorities in these efforts: first, to adapt Alliance
33 Ibid., para 20.
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structures, second, to develop the Alliance’s abilities to carry out new missions, and 
third, to enhance the Alliance contribution to security and stability throughout its
34region.
Successful adaptation of Alliance structures was critical to its ability to carry out 
the new missions and roles. Therefore, NATO focused on three objectives in order to 
ensure that the adaptation was done as effectively as possible. First, they declared that 
they needed to ensure the Alliance’s military effectiveness was maintained in the 
changing European security environment. With the new operations in the Balkans, the 
NAC understood the issues and challenges of this objective. If NATO was unable to 
maintain its operational effectiveness, then any other hopes for change or enlargement 
might well be at risk.
Recognizing the critical contributions of all Alliance members, the second 
objective was to preserve the transatlantic link. Fundamental to this was ensuring that 
NATO remained as the central forum for its members in all security matters in the 
broadest sense. At the same time, it was recognized there had to be full transparency 
between NATO and the WEU if they were to work together in the field of crisis 
management.
The third objective was the explicit development of the ESDI within the Alliance. 
This was a critical step following years of referring to ESDI primarily as a concept 
broadly applicable to NATO and the EU. Now, it was discussed as a specific 
development within NATO. As long as ESDI remained only a function of political 
discussion, the likelihood and nature of its implementation would be uncertain.
34 NATO, Berlin Ministerial Final Communique, 1996, para 5, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm (accessed 28 November 2003).
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However, with this communique the military aspect of this concept began to take form 
within NATO. As they stated, . .this identity will be grounded on sound military 
principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permit the creation of 
military coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and 
strategic direction of the WEU.”35
For any sort of successful military operation there are issues of forces, command 
relationships, readiness, and political will. With this communique NATO finally 
demonstrated the potential for developing an ESDI based capability by beginning work 
in these four areas. Preparation within NATO for this new relationship with the WEU 
was to identify “separable” but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets as 
well as separate headquarters, support staffs and command positions that could be made 
available to the WEU upon approval of the NAC.
The details of these preparations are important aspects of the decision. Separable 
but not separate capabilities are significant on two levels. Militarily, this indicated that 
there would not be specific assets set aside solely for WEU operations. Instead, assets 
already part of NATO planning and operations would be used for these potential new 
missions. At the same time, to say they are separable signifies that these assets would 
possess adequate support and structure to operate away from the larger NATO support 
system. To say that a force is separable in this context implies that it is expeditionary, or 
that it can be moved from one location to another for a new mission. This simple 
statement implies greater complexity than is readily apparent. In many cases this means 
that conscripts cannot be used, since they might be legally limited to territorial defense, 
or might not have adequate time in service to deploy. The countries involved must have
35 Ibid., para 7.
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the capability to move and deploy their forces where needed. It also means that forces 
being considered must be of a more robust and self-sustaining structure and readiness in 
order to maintain themselves for extended periods.
The command relationships for such an endeavor are similarly more complex 
upon examination. A national chain of command is always most effective since this 
provides the greatest opportunity for unity of command and clear and effective command 
relationships. Multinational command structures are always more complex, though 
NATO had done much to improve this based on standardization agreements, standing 
relationships, and regular training. Now, with the concept of ESDI calling for new 
arrangements, there was the potential for significant difficulties. The communique called 
for in part, “ .. .appropriate multinational European command arrangements within 
NATO, consistent with and taking full advantage of the CJTF concept.. .”36 They 
specifically noted that this would require the identification of specific individuals within 
the NATO command structure who could be dual-hatted, or identified to perform both 
NATO duties as well as European duties when CJTF was employed. By noting in the 
same section that these arrangements should be detailed enough to support rapid 
employment of an effective force, NATO placed substantial importance on detailed 
planning. They rightfully noted that such a force may be of value, and that assets must 
be available, but perhaps even more importantly, an effective command structure must 
lead it.
An additional challenge of these developments centered around the WEU and the 
support to be provided through ESDI. Resources were to be for missions that NATO had 
previously not considered as primary missions, or even within its authority. The
36 Ibid.
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expansion of the collective defense mission to the wider variety of crisis management 
was potentially somewhat problematic. Therefore, it was important that there be 
adequate planning, preparation, and training for the specific missions identified by the 
Europeans and the WEU. To that end, it was noted that the NAC would work with the 
WEU Council to provide political guidance in order to support planning for missions, as 
well as the necessary information to design and implement appropriate training for the 
command elements and forces for potential WEU-led missions.
Very few NATO assets truly belong to the Alliance. In most cases they are forces 
or capabilities provided by the member states. Therefore, the NAC made it clear that any 
implementation of these arrangements would be only on NAC release of such assets. 
Furthermore, the NAC would have to be kept informed of their use and would maintain 
regular consultation with the WEU Council during any such deployment. Based on the 
discussion of the above needs, the NAC in permanent session was tasked to work with 
NATO military authorities and develop actual implementation plans for these 
requirements. These potential arrangements with the WEU eventually came to be known 
as Berlin Plus, based on their concept formulation during this Ministerial and their final 
implementation following the final agreements reached in the 1999 Washington Summit. 
They eventually formed the framework of the current cooperative relationship with the 
EU.
The recommendations of this communique provided some of the most significant 
efforts to date in the development of an ESDI with the potential to have an important role 
to play both within the Alliance and as a separate forum. For all of the carefully crafted 
communiques, the results in truth were still in large part the outcomes of negotiations 
with the other institutions involved, and more importantly, negotiations among the
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members of the Alliance as well as the other institutions. It is only as the agreement is 
reached among these varied actors that actual progress is possible. It was a matter of 
years before these ideas and concepts came to fruition.
This time period from the 1994 Summit in Brussels to the 1996 Berlin Ministerial 
saw the ESDI concept continue to solidify within the Alliance. NATO began the period 
by conceptually agreeing to provide the EU with resources in selected situations. Over 
the next two years, the CJTF concept was formed to provide a means for such support. 
Then, as part of the Berlin Ministerial, NATO finally identified more specifics of how 
the support would be provided, as well as specifically linking the ESDI concept to the 
Alliance.
Institutional Responses (1994 -  1996)
While the earlier efforts from the Treaty on European Union in general and the 
Petersberg Declaration in particular showed promise, progress towards the development 
of a common foreign and security policy in general was still inadequate. Additionally, a 
consolidated European perspective in defense matters in particular was lacking. The 
growing crisis in the Balkans highlighted the difficulties in developing common political 
goals for the EU. At the same time, it was also clear that the enlargement of the 
European Union was a major issue on the agenda. Therefore, these new challenges 
became goals for actions during the next few years. It was during the EU 
Intergovernmental Conference of 1996-97 leading up to the Treaty o f Amsterdam that 
efforts to provide substance to the development of the EU’s portion of ESDI began to be 
seen.
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Negotiating The Shape Of ESDI (1997 -  1999)
NATO: From Berlin To The Washington Summit
Over the next several years, the consistent theme of actions relating to NATO 
adaptation and the development of ESDI continued in the same three areas. The 
development of a new Alliance command structure, the implementation of CJTF, and the 
development of ESDI within the Alliance, all remained as the topics to be reviewed and 
discussed by nearly every meeting of the NAC or the Defense Committee.
Beginning with the communique from the Brussels NAC Defence Ministers 
Ministerial of 12 June 1997, the discussion was expanded to include other related 
aspects. First, a review of the Alliance defense planning process was presented and 
approved. This new process facilitated the development and employment of forces and 
capabilities not only for Article 5 and non-Article 5 NATO missions, but also those 
missions supporting WEU-led operations. In order to ensure that these planning efforts 
were as complete as possible, the WEU was also offered the opportunity to participate in 
the Ministerial Guidance process that leads to the identification of NATO force 
capabilities.
Additionally, paragraph 9 noted that ESDI was improved by an agreement within 
the WEU to allow all European Allies who were not members of the EU, to participate if
'i'j
they so desired. With the disconnects in membership already identified, this agreement 
was an important step in order to ensure that NATO members had the full opportunity to 
participate in operations when they believed it in their best interest. However, the 
government of Turkey was concerned that this new capability might be used in their
37 NATO, Final Communique M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session 
in Brussels, 12 June 1997, www.nato.int/docu/pr/p97-071e.htm (accessed 1 October 2005).
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region and that they would not have a say in its use or employment, so they continued to
Q
block approval of the Berlin Plus agreement within the NAC.
The NAC Meeting o f Defence Ministers held on 2 December 1997, continued 
considering the status of the same objectives. However, by this time the NATO Long 
Term Study had been completed and general agreements had been reached concerning the 
new command structure. So, while most ESDI issues remained working, there was 
discussion concerning how the new command structure would eventually work with the 
adaptations called for by CJTF and ESDI. There were also additional details provided 
concerning how NATO and WEU would work together, to include additional discussion 
on how WEU would be incorporated into the NATO planning process. Finally, on a 
related matter the NAC welcomed the fact that the German-Netherlands Corps and the 
Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force were identified as being available for employment by 
either NATO or the WEU.
Communiques during the next year continued the status reports on the NATO 
adaptation efforts, with a slight expansion of the issues suggested by the NAC on 28 May 
1998. During this particular session, it was stated that they attached, “.. .great 
importance to an early and successful completion of the process of the Alliance’s internal 
adaptation.” This led to the comment that the Alliance’s effectiveness was necessary
• 39 •now to give it an, “ .. .ability to react to a wide range of contingencies...” This 
perspective, while alluded to earlier, became more specific following this communique. 
The Alliance directly addressed this topic in the next Brussels ministerial on 11 June 
1998, when they stated the following. “The Alliance’s forces, structures and procedures
38 Jean-Yves Haine, Berlin Plus, (European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004).
39 NATO, Final Communique Ministerial M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council in Luxembourg on 
28 M ay 1998, para. 9, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-059.htm (accessed 4 December 2004).
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will underpin its continued commitment to collective defence, ensure its preparedness for 
new missions, and support the development of the European Security and Defence 
Identity (ESDI) within NATO.”40 The adaptation of the Alliance was seen as 
encompassing nearly all areas in order for the institution to remain viable.
The Washington Summit on 23-24 April 1999, was the next major milestone in the 
development of ESDI. Through the Summit Communique and the new Strategic 
Concept, the Alliance identified the status of current efforts, the direction NATO 
intended to head, and the desired goals. The Brussels Summit on 11 January 1994, and 
the Berlin Ministerial on 3 June 1996 were highlighted as the major events leading up to 
Washington regarding ESDI. Brussels first formalized the CJTF concept by offering 
European nations a means to operate outside of NATO. Berlin was the first suggestion 
that NATO and the WEU might share resources to allow European nations to respond to 
a situation when NATO as a whole chose not to respond. They also noted that the EU 
was recently making substantial efforts toward a common European security and defense 
policy through the Amsterdam Treaty, the St. Malo Declaration (discussed in the next 
section), and the Vienna European Council. Based on the strength of these efforts, the 
Alliance suggested there was an opportunity to build on the Berlin decision and work 
towards further defining how the institutions could more effectively work together.41
While much of the Washington Summit Declaration is similar to the discussions in 
the new Strategic Concept, a section specifically addressing ESDI was included. 
Summarizing the reasons for ESDI, it says in part, “The European Allies have taken
40 NATO, Final Communique, M inisterial M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council held a t NATO  
Headquarters, Brussels, 11 Jun 98, para 2, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-071e.htm (accessed 4 
December 2004).
41 NATO, “Washington Summit Communique," in The Readers Guide to the NATO Summit in 
Washington, 23 -  25 April 1999, (Brussels, 1999), 13.
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decisions to enable them to assume greater responsibilities in the security and defence 
field in order to enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and thus the 
security of the Allies.. .This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the 
WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union.”42 In earlier discussions, ESDI 
was often a phrase encountered in general discussions of a European voice. It now was 
clearly a NATO initiative.
Institutional Responses (1997 -  1999)
While the first period under consideration saw the EU and WEU beginning to 
develop the concept of a European pillar within NATO and a discussion of security 
issues within the EU in the form of either ESDI or ESDP, it was in this third period that 
substance was brought to the discussions. Following the conclusion of the preceding 
intergovernmental conference, the Treaty o f Amsterdam was signed on 2 October 1997, 
and substantial changes were made to the CFSP Pillar. First, under Article 17 (J7)(4), 
the Petersberg Declaration was incorporated into the treaty. With this important 
decision, these specific missions and crisis management tasks were accepted as potential 
missions by the EU and its members. The way in which this would take place would be 
through the WEU and the operational capability it would provide. While these additions 
provided additional details to the CFSP framework, lacking still was enough support for 
actions that would drive members to implement them.
The growing conflict in Kosovo and the election of Labor Prime Minister Tony 
Blair in Great Britain led to a landmark change in the European efforts. As part of a 
French/UK summit in St Malo on 3-4 December 1998, Prime Minister Blair and
42 NATO, The 1999 Strategic Concept, 52.
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President Chirac signed a Joint Declaration on European Defence. While brief, the 
importance of such a declaration coming from the two major European powers is hard to 
overstate. Politically, it states that the European Union must, “...decide on the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP.” It also 
states that the, “Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the 
European Union.”43 The call for a more effective European voice as a pillar within the 
Alliance had been augmented by a recognition that the European nations must develop a 
separate military competency within the EU. This signified an important break with 
earlier discussions with NATO. No longer were the EU members just attempting to 
implement the CFSP actions of the Treaty of European Union. Now they were also 
beginning to expand their common perspectives and vision to more detailed areas within 
a security context.
Militarily, they declared that, “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous 
action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.”44 In addition to calling for 
this autonomous capacity, they also declared that, “the union must be given appropriate 
structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a 
capability for relevant strategic planning.. .supported by a strong and competitive 
European defence industry and technology.”45 So, while continuing to declare that the 
collective defense of Europe remained with the treaty arrangements found in NATO and 
the WEU, they called for wide ranging improvements among the countries of Europe.
43 Joint Declaration on European Defence, U K -F ren ch  Summit, 3-4 December 1998, as contained 
in From St-Malo to Nice European Defence: Core Documents, compiled by Maartje Rutten, Chaillot 
Paper 47, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, May 2001), 21-22.
44 Ibid., para 2.
45 Ibid., para 3-4.
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Operating within the framework of the EU, European nations needed new capabilities 
and structures to not only monitor crisis situations and plan for contingencies, but also to 
respond to crises, with or without the support of NATO.
This declaration is the first and most significant expansion of the CFSP into the 
realm of security and defense policy. It marked the United Kingdom’s unblocking of 
discussion of defense matters within the EU, as well as their accepting the importance 
and legitimacy of the EU developing its own policies. The call for the progressive 
development of a defense policy indicated their desire for the EU to work towards a 
significantly more unified approach in one of the most important realms of national 
policies. The specific military capabilities called for could only result from significant 
efforts and improvements on the part of member nations.46 The significance of this 
declaration marks this as the beginning of the development of the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP). Now, CFSP serves as the overarching policy umbrella, but in 
matters more directly related to military and security issues, ESDP is primarily the focus.
However, despite the apparent progress due to the interest of France and Great 
Britain, a fundamental problem remained. As discussions of ESDP began, the question 
only quietly spoken was what exactly ESDP signified. To Britain, ESDP was a means by 
which the European pillar within NATO could be strengthened. This was to be the way 
in which the nations could more effectively use their resources to develop effective 
capabilities as part of the Alliance. France’s position was that ESDP should not be so 
closely linked to NATO, and should eventually provide a foundation for a more effective 
and independent European military presence. As a third alternative, some neutral EU
46 Jolyon Howarth, “European Defence and the Changing Politics o f  the European Union: Hanging 
Together or Hanging Separately,” Journal o f  Common Market Studies 39, no. 4 (November 2001): 769.
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members felt that the institutions should focus on the lower level Petersberg tasks, and 
that ESDP should be the means by which they could effectively do so.47
Establishing New Relationships (1999 -  2004)
NATO: From Washington To Istanbul
Following the Washington Summit, some of the new initiatives became identified 
as important aspects of ESDI. In both the Defence Planning Committee Final 
Communique and NAC Defence Ministers Final Communique of 2 December 1999, the 
Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was discussed in depth. A primary purpose of the 
DCI was the strengthening of European capabilities and the European pillar of NATO.
In addition, DCI was seen as a means by which NATO and the EU could jointly examine 
and determine the capabilities needed for EU-led missions. There were expectations that 
the approaching 10-11 December 1999, EU Helsinki Council might result in similar 
initiatives, while working to ensure that unnecessary duplication be avoided and that any 
such initiatives would complement DCI. Such assumptions would allow NATO and the 
EU to build a closer relationship. At the same time, the US was also concerned that these 
EU efforts not be allowed to adversely affect NATO operations or future developments. 
In particular, the Clinton administration wanted to ensure that these efforts did not 
“decouple” European efforts from NATO, which they did not “duplicate” already
47 Asloe Toje, “The First Casualty in the War against Terror: The Fall o f  NATO and Europe’s 
Reluctant Coming o f Age,” European Security 12, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 66.
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existing NATO institutions, and they did not “discriminate” against any NATO members
48not in the WEU by excluding them from participation in European operations.
Weeks later, these discussions were expanded on in the NAC Brussels Ministerial 
Final Communique of 15 December 1999. Again, DCI was addressed as a critical 
element of an effective ESDI, especially based on the lessons learned from capability 
shortfalls identified during the Kosovo campaign. At the same time, based on the 
outcome of the recent 10-11 December 1999, EU Helsinki Council, the efforts 
increasingly focused on EU/NATO relations. “We acknowledge the resolve of the 
European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions 
and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. We note that 
this process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a 
European Army.”49 This introduction supported a more in-depth discussion of the EU 
efforts to develop the Headline Goals, and how the EU and NATO might more 
effectively work together. Significantly, while noting the improvements underway, 
NATO continued to identify the importance of finding some process satisfactory to 
everyone to ensure that non-EU European Allies would be able to participate in future 
EU operations when appropriate and desired.50 To NATO, the successful resolution of 
this question was not only a matter of optimal effectiveness of an EU-led operation, but 
was also fundamental to overall ESDI effectiveness. Implicit in this is the recognition 
that those European nations belonging to both institutions could not exclude those NATO
48 Karen Donfried and Paul Gallis. European Security: The D ebate in NATO and the European 
Union. CRS Report to Congress, (25 April 2000), 1, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/crseu.htm (accessed 23 
October 2003).
49 NATO, Final Communique, Ministerial M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council held at NATO  
Headquarters, Brussels, on 19 Decem ber 1999, para. 20, http://www.natoint/docu/pr/1999/p99-166e.htm  
(accessed 4 December 2004).
50 The specifics o f  the Helsinki Headline Goals are discussed at length in the next section o f  this 
case study.
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European members who are not EU members from operations of mutual interests without 
putting the effectiveness of the European pillar and perhaps even the Alliance itself at 
risk. NATO was insisting on protecting the interests of all of its members.
In the year following the Washington Summit, the dialogue within NATO 
concerning ESDI and related issues remained surprisingly consistent. Through a series 
of NAC Ministerials in May, June, and December of 2000, emphasis continued on DCI 
and its importance not only to members and the Alliance, but also to the ability of ESDI 
to support EU-led operations. NATO took every opportunity to note that DCI and the 
EU Headline Goals were complementary endeavors, and that through dialogue and 
transparency between the EU and NATO, the security situation would be better served. 
However, throughout the period NATO regularly repeated the importance of resolving 
the difficulties of non-EU NATO members participating in EU-led operations. This 
problem continued from the inconsistent institutional memberships and became more 
explicitly discussed through the various Ministerials. Beginning with the 24 May 2000, 
NAC Ministerial, NATO discussed the difficulties inherent in the participation of these 
non-EU members and the necessary EU decisions that would allow the problem to be 
resolved. While in previous Ministerials the problem had been noted, it was now 
addressed in detail as to not only what NATO’s expectations were for the issue, but how 
they anticipated the EU would work with these nations in a crisis situation. They 
explicitly noted, “ .. .the importance of finding solutions satisfactory to all Allies, for the 
necessary involvement of non-EU European Allies in the structures which the EU is 
setting up to ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation and co-operation with European
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NATO members which are not members of the EU on issues related to European security 
and defence policy and crisis management”51
No longer only referring conceptually to ESDI, the 15 December 2000, NAC 
Brussels Ministerial report discussed the efforts of the European Allies to improve their 
military contributions and reinforce the Alliance European pillar. This of course also 
contributed to their ability to not only carry out Alliance missions, but also support those 
missions accepted as EU-led tasks where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. While 
NATO stressed the importance of these improved capabilities, they continued to likewise 
note that such improved capabilities did not constitute a desire to develop a separate 
European army. As with the separable but not separate design for forces called for 
earlier, discussions continued concerning the attempts to develop additional capabilities 
without spreading resources out too thinly.
While discussing ESDI within the Alliance and how it would also support EU 
requirements, NATO also continued to stress that a solution must be found to represent 
the interests of European non-EU members in EU operations. More forcefully, they now 
noted that efforts with the EU would continue to proceed, “ .. .on the principle that 
nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed -  the participation issue is also relevant 
in this context.”52 Most of the discussion concerning the need for the improvement of 
the participation of the European Allies and the need to agree to the new procedures 
between NATO and the EU was repeated verbatim in the 15 December 2000, Ministerial 
and the 29 May 2001, Ministerial communiques.
51 NATO, Final Communique, Ministerial meeting o f  the North Atlantic Council held in Florence 
on 24 M ay 2000 para. 29, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2000/00-052.htm (accessed 2 October 2004).
52 NATO, Final Communique, Ministerial M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council held a t NATO 
Headquarters, Brussels on 14 and 15 December 2000, para. 33, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2000/p00- 
124e.htm (accessed 2 October 2004).
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11 September 2001 changed the relationships, but perhaps less than might have 
been expected. Almost immediately, NATO invoked Article 5 on 12 September 2001, 
for the very first time. “Article 5 of the Washington Treaty stipulates that in the event of 
attacks falling within its purview, each Ally will assist the Party that has been attacked 
by taking such action as it deems necessary. Accordingly, the United States NATO 
Allies stand ready to provide the assistance that may be required as a consequence of 
these acts of barbarism. The surprise was that it was not the US coming to the aid of 
Europe as had been expected throughout the Cold War, but instead, Europe was offering 
its assistance. Both NATO and the EU expressed strong support for the US against these 
terrorist acts. In NATO, the members all agreed that terrorism was probably the new 
adversary against which the Alliance would need to protect itself. A number of nations 
quickly offered individual assistance to the US in its response to the attack. At the same 
time, NATO offered a wide variety of support including intelligence sharing, security for 
US facilities abroad, clearance for US flights and forces, and actual support for US 
defense from the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft.54
While NATO did invoke Article 5 following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the 
NATO response has not universally been seen as positive. To some, the assistance 
provided the US was not positive and appropriate, but rather the demonstration of the 
minimal level possible. “Now, the Afghanistan operation has shown that NATO could 
not respond as a military alliance to a savage attack on one of its members, owing to the
53 NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council Concerning September 11.
54 Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution o f  an Alliance, (Westford, Ct: 
Praeger, 2004), 135.
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inability of the Europeans and the reluctance of the United States to conduct 
expeditionary warfare together.”55
Over the course of the Ministerials held during the next year, the discussions 
remained the same. DCI remained an important goal for the Alliance, and was seen as 
complementary to the EU’s Headline Goals. Increasing dialogue with the EU continued, 
but the problem of managing the participation of non-EU member NATO nations when 
NATO was providing assets to the EU mission remained unresolved.
At the Reykjavik NAC Ministerial on 14-15 May 2002, the discussions continued in 
the area of solving the coordination issues with the EU, but also new discussions 
surfaced on how to examine capabilities and requirements in advance of the Prague 
Summit scheduled for that Fall. They stated in part, “ ... we have today given guidance on 
the development of vital new capabilities, .. .and to the development of close and 
effective relations between NATO and the European Union.”56
Carrying the agenda of improving capabilities forward, the NAC Defense Ministers 
session in Brussels only a month later on 6 June 2002, issued a Statement on Capabilities 
that continued the preparations for Prague. It provided an assessment of where the 
Alliance was in developing capabilities, and also defined additional steps to take for 
improvements. After several years of statements declaring the importance of DCI, the 
Alliance finally, “ .. .agreed that a greater and more focused effort is now necessary.”57
55 David C. Gompert and Uwe Nerlich, Shoulder to Shoulder, The R oad to U.S.-European M ilitary 
Cooperatbility, A German-American Analysis, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 9.
56 NATO, Final Communique, M inisterial M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council held in Reykjavik 
on 14 M ay 2002  para 2, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/02/p02-059e.htm (accessed 2 October 2004).
57 NATO, Statement on Defense Capabilities Issued a t the M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council in 
Defence Ministers Session, 6 June 2002, para. 5, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-074e.htm  
(accessed 2 October 2004).
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This was seen as something that would not only improve capabilities, but must be done 
in concert with the EU in order to ensure that it achieved mutually advantageous results.
Decisions from the Prague Summit in November slightly adjusted the processes 
that had begun in the Washington Summit on 23-24 April 1999. As has been discussed at 
length, the question of capabilities was one NATO had struggled with over the past 
number of years. Not only did they consider what capabilities were needed and 
available, but they also considered how those capabilities might be transformed based on 
the enlargement of the Alliance and changes based on the broader membership. In this 
vein, the Summit announced several related decisions. First, NATO decided to create a 
NATO Response Force (NRF). This force, directed to be fully operational by October 
2006, was seen as an effort related and mutually reinforcing to the EU Headline Goal. 
Second, there was a decision to streamline NATO’s military command arrangements.
One aspect was to identify those commands that would serve as CJTFs and to ensure that 
they would have the capabilities necessary for their missions. Third, a decision was 
made to replace the DCI with the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). Since the 
DCI had never progressed beyond generalities, the PCC was designed to identify specific 
needs and produce plans for the development of specific capabilities. This was perceived 
as a plan that would work in concert with the EU’s European Capabilities Action Plan 
(ECAP) in order to ensure that the efforts of the European members would be mutually 
reinforcing.58 Table 3 highlights that the minimal defense expenditures of a number of 
European states demands that research and procurement be as efficient as possible.
58 NATO, Prague Summit Declaration, para. 4.
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Table 3. 2004 NATO And European Defense Expenditures59
Nation US $ Million US $ Per Capita % of GDP
US 404,920 1,391 3.7
Canada 10,118 320 1.2
Belgium 3,923 379 1.3
Czech Republic 1,871 183 2.2
Denmark 3,334 619 1.6
France 45,695 765 2.6
Germany 35,145 426 1.5
Greece 7,169 671 4.1
Hungary 1,589 157 1.9
Iceland n.a n.a n.a
Italy 27,751 481 1.9
Luxembourg 233 520 0.9
Netherlands 8,256 509 1.6
Norway 4,387 962 2.0
Poland 4,095 107 2.0
Portugal 3,173 311 2.1
Spain 9,944 242 1.2
Turkey 11,649 165 4.9
United Kingdom 42,782 722 2.4
Total NATO 626,033 773 2.8
Non-NATO EU
Austria 2,488 309 1.0
Finland 2,300 441 1.4
Ireland 803 204 0.5
Sweden 5,532 618 1.8
The Prague Summit also saw decisions made concerning the military concept for 
defense against terrorism; a plan to implement five nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons defense initiatives; and plans to strengthen capabilities to defend against cyber 
attacks. Among a variety of statements concerning enlargement, PfP, and other bilateral
59 Christopher Langton, ed., The Military Balance, 2004 -  2005, (London: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 353.
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and regional arrangements, NATO also discussed the need to continue working to 
enhance the relationship between themselves and the EU.
While the Prague Summit resulted in substantive decisions on improving Alliance 
capabilities, the next major developments concerning ESDI evolved during the 
December 2002 to March 2003 period. On 13 December 2002, NATO and the EU 
finally agreed to formalizing a closer relationship by NATO’s support for EU-led 
operations when the Alliance as a whole was not engaged militarily.60 This decision was 
finally reached when Turkey dropped its objection in the NAC following clarification of 
issues relating to Cyprus, and the European Council agreed to procedures to implement 
provisions of the Nice Summit that clarified the relationship of non-EU European Allies 
in EU-led operations using NATO resources.61
Three days later, on 16 December 2002, the EU and NATO issued the EU-NATO 
Declaration on ESDP as a statement to clarify the current conditions of their mutual 
relations as well as their plans for further cooperation. The statement welcomed the 
important role of NATO in crisis management; in other words, those non-collective 
defense missions previously referred to as the Petersberg Tasks. It also welcomed the 
opportunity for ESDP to add to the options available in crisis situations. At the same 
time, it also stated, “ ... that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of 
the Alliance, specifically in the field of crisis management.” The declaration provided 
the principles by which the two institutions declared they would base this newly 
formalized relationship. More importantly however, they also announced certain
60 NATO, Statement by the Secretary General, 13 December 2002, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-140e.htm (accessed 11 December 2004).
61 Jolyon Howorth, “ESDP and NATO: Wedlock or Deadlock?,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal 
o f  the Nordic International Studies Association  38, no. 3 (2003): 248.
62 NATO, EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
163
decisions. First, the EU would ensure the fullest possible involvement of non-EU 
European members of NATO within ESDP. The lack of this assurance had been the 
basis for the several year delay in NATO promising to provide the EU with assets in time 
of crisis. Second, NATO would support ESDP, and in particular, provide the EU assured 
access to NATO’s planning capabilities. Finally, both institutions agreed that these new 
arrangements would require “coherent, transparent, and mutually reinforcing 
development of the capability requirements common to the two organisations, with a
/ r ' l
spirit of openness.”
Ultimately, an agreement was reached between NATO and the EU on 14 March 
2003, on the handling of classified information. This provided the final piece in the plan 
to more fully implement the relationship between NATO and the EU. On 17 March 
2003 the two institutions agreed that the EU would take over NATO’s mission in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 31 March 2003.64 The Berlin Plus 
agreement between the institutions was now fully in place and the potential for increased 
cooperation both between the institutions as well as by the European members was now 
possible.
The Madrid NAC Ministerial held 3 June 2003, brought together the pending 
changes that had been evolving since the Prague Summit. While welcoming the new 
members of NATO, and as usual discussing a variety of partner and regional activities, 
the description of the role of the Alliance substantively changed. The communique 
stated that NATO would assume the command and control of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2003. They noted that, “The decision
63 Ibid.
64 NATO, NATO-EU Cooperation Taken to a New Level, 17 March 2003, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/update/2003/03-march/e0317a.htm (accessed 12 November 2004).
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to use NATO’s assets and capabilities to ensure ISAF’s continuity also demonstrates our 
readiness to support or lead operations and deploy forces, wherever the Alliance decides, 
to ensure our common security.”65 (italics added.) While the Prague Summit Declaration 
spoke in general of NATO’s need for an ability to deploy forces where needed, NATO 
was now officially and unequivocally out of area and beyond its original collective 
defense mission. This was further expanded by the agreement to assist Poland in its role 
contributing to the stabilization operations in Iraq. Despite the substantial discord and 
discussions concerning the justification and purpose of operations in Iraq, the Alliance 
prepared to assist a member who was working as part of the US coalition in Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.
The Ministerials up until the Istanbul Summit continued focusing on the same 
issues as first discussed in the 3 June 2003, NAC Madrid Ministerial. NATO support to 
ISAF and Poland in Iraq were seen as important new roles. There continued to be a 
recognition that the Berlin Plus arrangement with the EU was the foundation for a newer 
and closer relationship with that institution. During the period, NATO and the EU 
concluded an agreement for the mission transfer of SFOR in the Balkans to EU under the 
Berlin Plus agreement by the end of 2004.
The most substantial discussion of the evolving capabilities of NATO within the 
context of the European members resides in the 12 June 2003, NAC Defense Ministers 
Statement on Capabilities. In it, they added to the Prague Summit discussion and 
expanded their blueprint for the transformation of NATO capabilities by identifying its
65 NATO, Final Communique, M inisterial Meeting o f  the North Atlantic Council held in M adrid on 
3 June 2003, para. 3, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-059e.htm (accessed 17 April 2004).
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three pillars.66 First, they confirmed the importance of the NRF as an essential element 
of NATO transformation. This is also a critical element that must be part of the evolving 
relationship of the EU and their Headline Goal. Second, they stressed that the new 
command arrangement for NATO remains critical to its future. The establishment of the 
two new strategic commands and the continued improvements to the operational 
commands are important for the success of future employment of NATO forces. Third, 
they reviewed the Prague Capabilities Commitment for its role in improving overall 
capabilities. As of the statement date, they felt that the implementation of the PCC 
national commitments was progressing significantly. Based in part on the recognized 
need for improving capabilities in as efficient and effective manner as possible, they also 
announced the immediate establishment of the NATO-EU Capability Group. The 
intent of this organization would be to maximize and improve overall European 
capabilities through a cooperative effort with the EU’s European Capabilities Action 
Plan. It was envisioned that this cooperation would more effectively coordinate actions 
of the two institutions and their member states.
As the closing event of this study, the Istanbul Summit primarily solidified and 
consolidated NATO efforts in a variety of areas. The theme of this summit was 
“Projecting Stability,” and, as such, focused on three specific areas, in addition to 
welcoming seven new members. Those focus areas were: strengthening relations with 
partners; operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the Mediterranean; and 
modernizing member armed forces for out-of-area missions. All three of these efforts
66 NATO, Statement on Capabilities Issued at the M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council in Defence 
M inisters Session held in Brussels, 12 June 2003, para 2, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2003/p03- 
066e.htm (accessed 10 February 2004).
67 Ibid., para 2.
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were linked substantially to the EU, but in line with recent Ministerials, NATO no longer 
referenced ESDI. Instead, when discussing and considering the new roles and 
involvements with the nations of Europe, it now specifically discussed acting with the 
EU. The EU became the important partner, and one that now could more effectively 
work in concert with NATO following the implementation of the Berlin Plus agreement. 
This more effective partnership led to greater cooperation with the EU in the area of 
operations. NATO operations in Kosovo transitioned to an EU force and plans were 
initiated for an EU force to assume the NATO responsibilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Improvements to NATO capabilities were and are in part a major goal of the Prague 
Capabilities Commitment as agreed on during the previous summit in November 2002.
In this case, a cooperative effort was bom between the EU and its European Capabilities 
Action Plan and its subject groups and the categories of the PCC. As such, the hope is 
that more substantial overall improvement in national capabilities will be available to
/ o
both institutions following this cooperative effort.
Institutional Responses (1999 -  2004)
The details of the St Malo Declaration provided the foundation for the Cologne 
Council that met only months later on 3-4 June 1999, shortly after NATO’s Washington 
Summit. Coming so soon after the Kosovo conflict and the wide disparities seen between 
US and European forces, EU members saw this Council as an opportunity to make 
substantive changes. Two major actions were taken with the intention of substantially 
improving the defense capabilities of the EU. First, there was an agreement to explicitly 
add defense issues to the EU by transferring most WEU functions to the EU. Second,
68 NATO, Istanbul Summit Communique.
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they appointed Javier Solana, former NATO Secretary General to be the EU’s first High 
Representative for foreign and security policy.69 The appointment of such a well-known 
statesman to this position indicated the desire of the EU to put substance to the 
development of its CFSP.
Additionally, when committing the EU member governments to this new 
security policy, the Presidency Conclusions called for, “ .. .the capacity for autonomous 
action backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to
70NATO.” The will and influence of France and Great Britain are seen in these words, 
repeated nearly verbatim from the St Malo Joint Declaration. Similarly, the Presidency 
Conclusions also called for improvements to the planning and coordination of defense 
issues within the EU in the absence of the WEU. There were also encouragements to the 
member states to improve those capabilities needed for these autonomous actions, as well 
as the need for more cooperation and collaboration within their respective defense 
industries.
The announcements from this Council were also important for the signal they 
sent concerning the agreement of the EU member states. This was the first time that all 
EU members, including the neutrals, agreed to the EU having an available military 
capability. Up to this time, the previous agreements had only been based on the civilian 
power of the institution.71 At the same time however, this decision also laid the 
foundation for the increasingly difficult resolution of problems resulting from the
69 Mark Oakes. “European Defence: From Portschach to Helsinki.” International Affairs and  
Defence Section, House o f  Commons Library, Research Paper 00/20, (21 February 2000): 23.
70 Annex III o f  Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council 3-4 June 1999. As quoted in 
Oakes, From Portschach to Helsinki, 23.
71 Alistair J.K. Shepherd, “The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy: A Policy without 
Substance?” European Security 12, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 40.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
168
overlapping yet disconnected institutional memberships. “The assumption by the EU of 
a defence and security remit involved significant changes against WEU membership: out 
went core NATO members Turkey, Norway and Iceland; in came neutral Austria, 
Finland, Ireland and Sweden. Waiting in the wings were the EU accession candidates. 
Denmark, which had severe reservations about the EU assuming a security remit, secured 
an opt-out from the defence dimensions of the CFSP policy area under the terms of the
79Treaty of Amsterdam.”
1999 continued as a significant year in the development of a European presence 
outside of NATO. In November, a WEU Ministerial meeting was held where Javier 
Solana, EU Head of Common Foreign and Security Policy, was also appointed 
Secretary-General of the WEU, effectively beginning the merging of WEU capabilities 
within the EU. The next week, the French and British again held a summit to consider 
the additional changes that would be necessary for the development of a European 
defense force. In their final declaration, Prime Minister Blair and President Chirac called 
for the establishment of a European rapid reaction corps with specific requirements for 
the size, deployability, and sustainability of the force. They made it clear that this call 
was not a call for a European army, and that NATO remained the cornerstone of 
collective defense, but that they hoped NATO and the EU would develop a stronger
7Trelationship.
Only weeks later, the influence of France and Great Britain was again obvious in 
the 10-11 December 1999, Helsinki European Council and its Presidency Conclusions.
72 Jolyon Howorth, Saint-Malo Plus Five: An Interim Assessment o f  ESDP, Policy papers no. 7, 
(Paris: Notre Europe, November 2003): 8.
73 Joint Declaration by the British and French Governments on European Defence, 25 November 
1999, as quoted in Oakes, From Portschach to Helsinki, 30.
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Recognizing the primary responsibility of the UN Charter to govern international 
relations, the Council agreed that the new efforts at defence cooperation would focus on 
the Petersberg Tasks and they would not constitute a European army. Nevertheless, the 
Council made three important decisions. First, they established Headline Goals for the 
development of a substantial force. This goal was to by 2003, establish a joint and 
multinational corps-level force of 50,000 -  60,000 personnel capable of mounting an 
independent operation in situations where NATO chose not to intervene. They also 
called for this force to be able to serve as a European rapid reaction force, and with the 
appropriate capabilities to carry out such a role. Finally, they also called for the 
establishment of new bodies that could provide political and strategic guidance to such 
operations.
While 1999 saw the EU making dramatic declarations concerning the 
development of ESDP, it was in the next several years that these pronouncements were 
followed by a variety of efforts to further develop those ideas. Only a few months after 
the 10-11 December 1999, Helsinki Council, the military structures that had been called 
for were established. The CFSP Political committee was to become the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC, or COPS, as it is usually known by its French acronym), and 
an EU military committee (EUMC) was made constituted from the representatives of 
national Chiefs of Staff. Finally, an EU Military Staff (EUMS) was also formed to carry 
out support to the EU for military assessment and planning.74 By late February 2000, the 
PSC, the EU military committee, and the EU military staff had all begun meeting. Only 
a few weeks later, the EU defense ministers met to discuss how to implement the
74 Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings o f  a 
European Strategic Culture.” International Affairs 77, no. 3 (2001): 594.
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Helsinki Headline Goals. A primary outcome of this meeting was the establishment of a 
Headline Task Force to work on the capabilities the EU would need to be able to respond 
to the full range of the Petersberg Tasks.75 Just as importantly, discussions also 
continued concerning the manner in which the EU might most effectively develop its 
military capability.
On 19-20 June 2000, the Feira Council further developed these ideas as well as 
new ideas in the coordination of EU and NATO nations not belonging to the EU. In an 
effort to maintain progress towards achieving the Headline Goals, a Capabilities 
Commitment Conference was scheduled for late 2000. This Council also established 
four joint working groups with NATO. These groups, discussing security, capability 
goals, EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, and permanent arrangement for EU- 
NATO relations, provided a critical foundation for the further development of relations
7 ( \between the two institutions.
Following extensive coordination between national defense ministries, a 
Capabilities Commitment Conference was held in Brussels on 20 November 2000. With 
all states save Denmark contributing, over 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft, and 100 naval 
vessels were committed.77 This conference resulted in a listing of available assets to 
operationally meet the Headline Goals. It also made it possible for the EU to begin to
7Ridentify areas needing a variety of improvements. At the conclusion, more forces than 
required had been offered. In fact, in the case of a number of nations, more forces had
75 Trevor C. Salmon and Alistair J. K. Shepherd, Toward a European Army. A M ilitary Power in 
the Making? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 73.
76 Ibid., 74.
77 Denmark had previously been allowed to opt-out o f  participation o f  defense policy matters as 
they related to the CFSP within the EU. They are not against involvement in the Petersberg Tasks as long 
as participation remains a decision o f  the individual nation. Salmon and Shepherd, Toward a European 
Army, 58.
78 Gustav Lindstrom, The Headline Goal, European Union Institute for Security Studies, (2004): 3.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
171
been promised to the EU than to NATO. However, this situation does not necessarily 
indicate a substantial problem. In most situations, forces remain under national control
1Qand are already promised to both institutions.
While attempting to jointly identify the required forces for the new European 
Rapid Reaction Force, this conference also attempted to bridge the different 
understanding between some key EU members concerning the intent of this Headline 
Goal process. The intent was for the nations to identify forces to be made available to 
the EU in situations of crisis management, “ .. .where NATO as a whole is not engaged.” 
The question from this statement is whether or not NATO has a veto over EU operations. 
The EU says no, highlighting the importance of the desired autonomous decision making 
of the institution. On the other hand, due to the significant overlap of membership 
between NATO and the EU, it would appear very unlikely that an EU operation could 
proceed against the wishes of NATO and those nations belonging to both institutions.80
Only a month later, the 7-9 December 2000, the Nice European Council focused 
on the institutional reform needed prior to further enlargement of the EU. Nevertheless, 
important ESDP related decisions were made. They confirmed that the EU would absorb 
the majority of the WEU functions as well as its crisis management functions, and would 
now itself be responsible for decisions and actions with defense implications instead of 
the WEU.81 It was however agreed that the collective defense aspect of the WEU would 
remain with that institution. This was an important decision, since the WEU membership 
was smaller than that of the EU. The adoption of the WEU collective defense agreement
79 Hans-Christian Hagman. European Crisis Management and Defence: The Search fo r  
Capabilities. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 22.
80 Shepherd, “ A  Policy without Substance?,” 43.
81 Ramses A. W essel, “The State o f Affairs in EU Security and Defense Policies: The Breakthrough 
in the Treaty o f  N ice,” Journal o f  Conflict and Security Law  8, no. 2 (2003): 274.
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by the EU would have immediately opened many new difficulties regarding the neutral 
members of the EU and their desire to remain out of such explicit defensive 
relationships.
This council also continued the discussions concerning the involvement of non- 
EU NATO members in operations when NATO chose not to be involved, but NATO 
assets were to be made available. These discussions, falling under the umbrella of the 
Berlin Plus discussions with NATO, remained unresolved. Within NATO, Turkey was 
concerned that NATO assets could be involved in security operations in their area and 
without their having a veto or adequate input in the decisionmaking process. Therefore, 
within the NAC, Turkey continued to veto the agreement. Within the EU, members 
could not agree to a non-EU member having a veto over EU security operations. This 
resulted in a continuing stalemate.
While the previous two years efforts had resulted in significant improvements in 
the efforts to design and operationalize ESDP within the EU, the next year saw progress 
slow significantly. The new EU military organizations were meeting and making some 
initial planning progress. While not well-publicized topics, the continued development 
of coordination and discussions with NATO, which were critical if the two institutions 
were to eventually develop a more effective cooperative relationship, dominated. There 
was also discussion during the 15-16 June 2001, Gothenburg European Council to work 
on identifying ways of paying for operations relating to military or defense issues. While 
important, it remained only a detailed matter and was far overshadowed by the 
Capabilities Commitment and the arrangements to make use of NATO assets.
Late in the year another conference was held in an effort to further refine the 
requirements identified over the past year. On 19 November 2001, a Capability
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Improvement Conference was held to consider identified issues, and a plan could be 
developed to address them. Areas such as force protection, logistics, and operational 
mobility were seen as especially critical. There were significant shortfalls in strategic lift 
and tactical transport, surveillance, command, control, communications and intelligence 
and selected sophisticated combat capabilities.82 Only five of 55 shortfalls were 
identified as being resolved by the end of 2001. Therefore, it was left to the European 
Council to take action to address those remaining 50 deficiencies. At least 20 of the 
unresolved shortages were considered serious, and it was believed that at least some 
would not be resolved prior to 2008.84
To the surprise of no one, the EU declared that the European Rapid Reaction 
Force (ERRF) was operational for the lower end Petersberg Tasks at the 14-15 December 
2001, Laeken European Council. Politically, this announcement was important in order 
to show continued progress for the development of this European capability. However, 
since these lower end tasks are those that in most cases can be accomplished by a single 
nations’ forces, or with a lead nation instead of a multinational lead, its actual 
significance was marginal. Additionally, while a tentative agreement had been reached 
with Turkey for the use of NATO assets, a veto by Greece within the EU kept the 
agreement from being announced at the Laeken Council. One ESDP initiative 
announced at Laeken was the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). Its purpose was 
to move forward from the shortfalls in capabilities that had already been identified post-
82 Antonio Missiroli, “Counting Capabilities: What For?,” in The E U ’s Search fo r  a Strategic Role, 
ESDP and Its Implications fo r  Transatlantic Relations, ed. Esther Brimmer, (Washington DC: Center for 
Transatlantic Relations, 2002), 47.
83 Lindstrom, “The Headline Goal,” 3.
84 ISIS Europe, “The Rapid Reaction Force: The EU Takes Stock,” European Security Review, no. 9 
(December 2001): 1. A  more in-depth examination o f  the shortfalls is provided by the EU report o f  the 
conference. It is contained in, EU, Statement on Improving European M ilitary Capabilities, 13802/01 
(Presse 414) General Affairs 2386th Council meeting, Brussels, 19-20 November 2001 ,14 .
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Helsinki Council, and make suggestions as to how they could be resolved. It hoped to 
accomplish this by more effective and efficient European defense efforts, as well as an 
approach where additional capabilities might be voluntarily developed on a national 
basis. Unfortunately, there is a tendency for member states to focus on projects that they 
have a direct interest in developing, or to participate in order to minimize the potential
O f
damage to other national projects. A call for coordination among EU states, as well as 
with NATO was also indicated.86
The 21-22 June 2002, Seville European Council, worked to further develop the 
capabilities of ESDP, and in the post-September 11 period, also worked to consider the 
capabilities necessary to combat terrorism. It was this Council that finally achieved 
agreement on the plans for how to account for the financing of EU crisis management 
operations between those costs that would be common to all and those that would be 
individual costs. Recognizing the shortfalls of the Helsinki Headline Goals system, this 
Council also announced that the ECAP was fully under way in an effort to resolve some 
of the identified shortfalls.
Significantly, this Council also announced that the EU would finally be in a 
position to take over a crisis management operation in January 2003. At this time, it was 
anticipated that the EU would take over the UN police mission in Bosnia, turning it into 
the EU Police Mission (EUPM). They also confirmed the willingness of the EU to take 
over the NATO mission in Macedonia at the end of the NATO mandate.87 However, the 
continuing disagreement over the Berlin Plus arrangement made this uncertain.
85 Hagman, European Crisis Management, 25.
86 Schmitt, “European Capabilities Action Plan,” 2. See also, Gerrard Quille. “Making European 
Defence Work: Copenhagen, Berlin Plus and ECAP.” European Security Review, no. 16, (February 2003).
87 Salmon and Shepherd, Toward A European Army, 80.
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While Denmark had excluded itself from security matters as part of its acceptance 
of the Treaty o f Amsterdam, the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002, still 
held the potential for substantial improvements in the security and defense fields.
Shortly after this Council, NATO and the EU finally reached an agreement that set aside 
the concerns of both Greece and Turkey and allowed the Berlin Plus arrangements to 
come into effect. Now the EU would be guaranteed access to NATO planning structures 
and selected capabilities. The Council immediately confirmed, “...the Union’s readiness 
to take over the military operation in FYROM as soon as possible in consultation with
o o
NATO.” Additionally, this Council also stated its desire to assume a role in Bosnia 
following the end of the NATO SFOR mission there. While the EU had for a number of 
years demonstrated an ability to display the elements of soft power in regions of the 
world, it now appeared that it would also soon demonstrate an ability to employ military 
force in selected situations.
With these agreements in place, 2003 then became the year for significant events 
as the EU entered crisis management operations in a substantial way. On 1 January 
2003, it assumed the police mission in FYROM as a first ever civilian crisis management 
operation under ESDP. Following the 17 March 2003 agreement between the EU and 
NATO regarding the Berlin Plus arrangement, the EU launched Operation Concordia in 
FYROM, relieving NATO Operation Allied Harmony. This operation employed the 
Berlin Plus agreement and saw the use of NATO assets under the CJTF concept as had
88 Council o f  the European Union, Presidency Conclusions: Copenhagen European Council, 
Bulletin o f  the European Union 12-2002, quoted in Salmon and Shepherd, Toward A European Army, 81.
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been considered for a number of years. Operation Concordia was then succeeded by a 
police operation, also run by the EU.89
Only a few months after launching this operation, the UN asked the EU for 
assistance regarding a developing crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On 30 
May 2003, the EU under French leadership launched Operation Artemis to stabilize the 
situation in Bunia. While the 1,800 troops were mostly French, involvement included 
not only other EU nations but also a number of non-EU nations. The operation ended on 
1 September 2003, with full responsibility being returned to a UN force at that time.90 
These early EU activities were not major operations, nevertheless, they were significant. 
At the same time that widespread discord was being perceived between the nations of 
“Old” and “New” Europe over the US operations in Iraq, the EU members were 
continuing to agree on the implementation and execution of entirely new missions and 
requirements, both alone and in concert with NATO.91 Attempting to resolve some of 
the more difficult problems of capabilities, the Thessaloniki European Council of 19-20 
June 2003, directed the EU to, “...undertake the necessary actions towards creating, in the 
course of 2004, an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities 
development, research, acquisition and armaments.”
In the aftermath of these successful yet limited operations, the influence of the 
Franco-British relationship continued to be felt. In a November 2003 meeting, the two 
countries referred to the need for a more expeditionary and rapidly deployable combat
89 Dov Lynch and Antonio Missiroli, ESDP Operations, European Union Institute for Security 
Studies, 4.
90 Ibid., 4-5.
91 Sten Rynning, “The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture,” Security Dialogue 34, no. 4 
(2003): 484.
92 European Union, Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003 Presidency Conclusions, 
(Brussels, 1 October 2003), 11638/03, 19.
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force. This proposal, now usually referred to by the British term Battle Groups, was 
envisioned as a force of a reinforced combat battalion, or about 1,500 personnel. 
Conceptually, these formations would include all combat and service support 
requirements, would be available with 15 days notice, and would be sustainable for at 
least 30 days.
The proposal was then submitted to the EU ESDP institutions, where the PSC and 
EUMC both supported it. A target date of 2007 was set for the first operational groups, 
with an eventual target between six and ten available groups. This force would not be 
expected to contain a crisis situation, but rather provide the EU with an immediate 
reaction capability that could quickly intervene in a distant location and prepare the 
situation for a larger UN or EU force.
During this same period, the EU was also confronting the problems of security 
policy. Following the dissension among the European states during the early stages of 
the American invasion of Iraq, the EU was commissioned to develop a security strategy 
that might somehow repair the rift between its members. This European Security 
Strategy (ESS) was written in a fairly short period of time, and survived review by EU 
member states without major revisions. It appeared that, “...the EU community was 
starting to realize how important it could be (for European credibility and impact) not 
just to produce the right message but to be able to get it across, in the right words and at 
the right time, with the right intellectual allies.”94 It was adopted by the Heads of State 
attending the Brussels European Council on 12 December 2003. Coming only months
93 Gerrard Quille. “Battle Groups to Strengthen EU military crisis management?” European 
Security Review, no. 22 (April 2004).
94 Alyson J.K. Bailes, The European Security Strategy, An Evolutionary History, SIPRI Policy 
Paper No. 10, (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, February 2005), 12.
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after the initiation of the Iraq War and its resulting great divide among EU member 
states, the strategy contained a vision for member states to consider as the EU works to 
establish more common views. It does not yet provide enough detail to be seen as 
providing Europe with a strategic concept. Nevertheless, it provides a starting point for a 
common vision for EU members to work towards in developing policy.95 It is quite 
possible that without the desire of the EU members to improve relations after the internal 
conflicts over Iraq, such an agreement might not have been possible. It can be seen as a 
success that was truly bom of the difficult times that preceded it.96
Building on the success of the ESS, a movement arose to consider the Petersberg 
Tasks as currently understood and to reconsider the status of available capabilities as 
already identified in the Headline Goals. In the statement on Headline Goal 2010 
approved by the European Council on 18 June 2004, they stated in part, “ ...Member 
states have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and 
decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectmm of crisis
Q7management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union.”
This declaration was more than an update of the previous Headline Goals. As 
part of it, they announced that there were a wide variety of goals to be accomplished 
prior to the target date of 2010. Among others goals, they called for the development of 
a European Defence Agency in 2004, as first directed by the 19-20 June 2003 
Thessaloniki European Council, the implementation of EU strategic lift joint
95 Julian Lindley-French, “The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security Dynamics in 
the 21st Century,” European Security 13, (2004): 4-5.
96 Klaus Becher, “Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World After the 2003 
European Security Strategy,” European Security 13 no. 4 (2004): 347.
97 European Union. Headline Goal 2010. Statement approved by General Affairs and External 
Relations council on 17 May 2004 endorsed by the European Council o f  17 and 18 June 2004, para 2. See 
also, Gerrard Quille. “Implementing the defence aspects o f  the European Security Strategy: The Headline 
Goal 2010.” European Security Review, No. 23, July 2004.
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coordination by 2005, the development of rapidly deployable battlegroups by 2007, and
98 •the availability of an aircraft carrier and associated air wing and escort by 2008. While 
the importance of the EU -  NATO relationship is mentioned in this declaration, the 
greater focus is on EU -  UN operations and how the EU can more effectively support 
UN requirements. This is of course not surprising, since the ESS focuses much more on 
multilateral involvement and the support of the UN for EU military operations. The ESS 
and the Headline Goal 2010 note that the current threats to security require a much more 
well-rounded approach with both civilian and military responses, and such, the EU is 
particularly well suited to address them." A danger exists in equating the ESDP with 
what was previously known as ESDI. The vision of ESDI within NATO was logically 
focused on military and hard security matters. However, when European nations and the 
EU discuss ESDP, or security and defense policy, they have a much broader concept. 
Their perception, as clearly outlined in the ESS sees all elements of national power as 
playing a role in security, and to a lesser extent, defense matters. “The European Union 
is pre-eminent in the coordination of multilateral, multifunctional civilian aspects of the 
security management cycle and rightfully moving ever more effectively into the military 
side at several levels of operational intensity.”100 So, as ESDP matures, it will need to 
include far more than just matters of traditional military and security matters. In 
addition, it will also have to include these broader categories of all the elements of 
national power if it is to meet the needs of the EU member nations.
98 European Union, Headline Goal 2010, para 5.
99 Fraser Cameron and Gerrard Quille, ESDP: The State o f  Play, European Policy Centre, EPC 
Working Paper No. 11, (September 2004), 11.
100 Julian Lindley-French, “The ties that bind,” NATO Review On-Line, (Autumn 2003): 7.
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Summary
Since the founding of NATO, there have been extensive discussions concerning the 
relationship between the United States and the European members of the Alliance. 
Whether the discussions relate to burdensharing, and the US interest in having Europeans 
pay more of the costs for collective defense, or the desire of some of members to have a 
greater say in Alliance developments and operations, the results are similar. In 
decisionmaking, members attempt to reach some sort of consensus on the issues, 
ensuring each member can best look out for his own national interests, while hopefully at 
the same time saving costs and maintaining an adequate defense. It is clear that an 
optimum solution is not yet present.
As the Cold War came to an end and NATO attempted to find its new niche, the 
need for a more substantive voice for the European members seemed obvious to 
everyone. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, and the desire of the EU to 
continue deepening its authority and involvement in more areas of society as well as 
widening its membership, the potential for the institution to enter the foreign policy and 
security field seemed more likely. So, for the next several years, the two institutions 
examined how best to create a European voice or presence without fundamentally 
changing either institution. The WEU was the means during this time, seeming to 
provide a potential bridge between the two diverse organizations.
In truth, the question that arose was significant. At one extreme, was the 
perspective that the Europeans would coordinate their activities within NATO after final 
decisions. This would ensure that the contributions of members and the development of 
national capabilities be done in an as effective manner as possible. While minimizing 
dissension within NATO, this path did not provide the Europeans an independent voice,
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but only offered them a way in which to more efficiently contribute to Alliance 
operations.
A very different view was that there was to have a European caucus within 
NATO, coordinating the view of all European members separate from the US and 
Canada before decisions. However, what if this caucus included not all of the European 
members, but rather only those who belonged to the EC or EU, thereby providing a third 
voice between the North American members and the non-EU members? This option 
could easily lay the ground for dissension within the Alliance. If EU members are 
planning and acting outside the Alliance, then it might be more difficult to achieve 
NATO’s required consensus if the EU members had already gone through their own 
negotiations over an issue prior to the meeting with other members.
At the other extreme is the case of the EU formally serving as a European defense 
entity, with the members operating within NATO when appropriate, but separate from 
those non-EU members. The danger in this is obvious. Depending on how this 
develops, the potential exists for NATO and the EU to become security competitors, 
despite their claimed aversion to that and their desire to continue to operate in tandem 
based on their respective needs and interests.
NATO, the EU, and their respective members, both those alone or in common, 
have continued working this evolution of a European identity throughout the period 
under discussion. They have over the past 15 years gone from the first example to the 
uncertain conditions at present. The current parallel actions of NATO and the EU in the 
development of new capabilities and structures might yet prove to be the solution. The 
end result might yet evolve into a symbiotic relationship with greater security for all, and 
more effective use of resources by everyone. A new relationship between the US,
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European nations, NATO and the EU could yet offer mutual appreciation by all involved 
for respective contributions to the common defense, and effective coordination in support 
of solutions to their mutual challenges. This might be the end result, however it is by no 
means yet certain.
This case study has shown the importance of the internal changes within the 
Alliance and their very direct linkage to those policy changes that have enabled NATO to 
work more closely with other institutions. However, these changes must be capable of 
implementation. That is the foundation for the next chapter and the case study 
examining the evolution of the Combined Joint Task Force.
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CHAPTER 4 
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE (CJTF):
THE BRIDGE BETWEEN MILITARY CAPABILITY AND POLITICAL WILL
The background chapter provided a historical context and an examination of 
NATO policy changes and the first case study examined how structure and procedures 
changed through the development of ESDI. Now however, it is important to consider 
how these policies and structures can be made practical. An examination of ESDI 
addresses the subject of burdensharing in general, but the specifics of capabilities and 
how the Alliance can implement aspects of its transformed nature are the subject of this 
next case study.
Throughout the Cold War, the command and control of NATO forces was 
established through standing multinational headquarters and commands, and regularly 
practiced through a wide range of exercises and training. It was this very structure, 
complemented by the standardization agreements and on-going multinational training 
that provided the structural underpinning of the Alliance and gave credibility to its 
potential for defending Western interests. While Alliance members might on occasion 
discuss issues outside the NATO areas of responsibility, there was no reason for the 
employment of forces out of area. As a result, there was no apparent need for the 
development of any type of a more flexible or adaptable command structure.
The political change in Europe post-1989 substantially changed this defensive 
concept. Early on, while the Soviet presence still existed, the Article 5 collective defense 
foundation of the Alliance remained as its cornerstone. As the Soviet Union and Warsaw 
Pact disappeared from the scene, NATO reconsidered its role. As discussed in previous
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chapters, NATO reacted to these changes in a variety of ways, from the policy changes 
supporting the evolving external relations with other nations and institutions, to the 
structure of the Alliance, to the internal transformation to meet the developing needs of 
the members as well as the Alliance.
Changes in how NATO worked with other nations and institutions, and how the 
members related with other institutions might have provided a new foundation for the 
continued existence of the organization. Nevertheless, as an institution that had existed 
for 40 years as a collective defense organization with an established command and 
control system as well as force structure, more significant changes would be necessary if 
NATO was to serve as something other than another version of the OSCE.
The emergence of a European pillar or defense identity within NATO following 
the end of the Cold War was a process that required substantive action on the part of the 
Alliance and its members. If there was to be a true European representation, some sort of 
implementation also had to be in place, or ESDI would never be more than a discussion 
forum. Ingrained within the concept of the development of a European voice were a 
variety of complex implications. There were difficult issues regarding the political 
representation of European nations within the Alliance. At the same time, there were 
also important questions on how decisions or actions could be implemented in those 
situations where European interests did not necessarily match those of the Alliance as a 
whole or the United States in particular.
Collective defense remained the primary goal of the Alliance, but all members 
now recognized that the more likely threats were smaller missions of peace operations or 
humanitarian assistance. These crisis management requirements were not only located in 
the European area, but also in many other regions that had implications for Western
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interests. If NATO was to continue to serve as more than just a political forum, it had to 
have a means of applying force in other than the old cumbersome collective defense 
model. The Alliance had to somehow provide itself with a more flexible and adaptable 
capability for its new evolving roles. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was 
offered as a potential solution for these varied needs.1
The CJTF and its evolving role within NATO and the EU must be examined from 
a variety of perspectives. First, the concept must be carefully defined. The CJTF has not 
only a military definition, but also a political implication that must be understood. At the 
same time, CJTF has a meaning not only within NATO, but also within the US. While 
these definitions are similar, they are different enough, and it is important to ensure that 
one is cognizant of the implications of each.
Required next is an examination of the evolution of CJTF within NATO, which 
can provide a foundation for its current status. How did the concept first come to the 
attention of NATO, and when did the Alliance recognize its potential? As part of this 
evolution, the involvement of other institutions must also be considered. Also, how 
nations chose to support or hinder such developments as CJTF also provides important 
perspectives. The formal evolution of the concept within the Alliance parallels the 
timeline of institutional change. It also parallels a corresponding development of 
evolving military capabilities between the US, NATO, and its European members.
While understanding the evolution of CJTF is important, it is also important to 
consider what the concept has developed into. International institutions and nations 
make pronouncements and declarations of new achievements and capabilities. However,
1 Paul Cornish, “NATO at the Millennium: N ew  M issions, N ew  M em bers.. .New Strategy?” NATO  
Review  45, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 1997): 21.
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in many cases there is little or no substance behind those words. Therefore, the current 
form of CJTF, and the nature and extent of its accomplishments are critical to a realistic 
assessment of the overall program. It is important to examine what a CJTF is and is not, 
coupled with its conceptual evolution during the past ten plus years. This can be linked 
to its current shape and capability, enabling one to measure in part the structural 
adaptation of NATO that complements its conceptual adaptation.
CJTF: What It Is And Is Not
For years, the US military has used the term, Joint Task Force (JTF), to describe a 
military force composed of elements from the different military departments (Army, 
Navy, Air Force) and the Services (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force). The 
designation, “combined,” denotes an operation involving two or more forces or agencies 
of two or more allies. Logically, then, a combined joint task force is a military force 
brought together, normally in a short-term setting, that represents a variety of Service 
capabilities and at least two different nations. As an acronym within the US military 
lexicon, CJTF is also on occasion used to stand for, Commander, Joint Task Force. This 
particular definition is not germane to this analysis, and so, it will not be discussed 
further.2
On one level, the term CJTF, while currently understood as new, describes a 
situation that has been seen other times in history. Many Allied operations in the Second 
World War involved forces from several nations for a selected period of time. Had the 
terminology been in use, CJTF would have been appropriate at that time. The important
2 US Department o f  Defense, Joint Electronic Library, DOD Dictionary, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/s_index.html (accessed 20 February 2005).
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issue is that conceptually, the CJTF is not new. On its most basic level, it is primarily a 
force structure and command and control framework that describes a particular type of 
force, usually brought together for a limited time.3 An examination of many current US 
operations shows that CJTF is the doctrinal term used whenever multiple nations are 
involved.
In most NATO contexts, the CJTF concept is more than a simple force 
description. Instead, it is a description of a specific force and command and control 
structure that has been specifically designed for several purposes. Those purposes are 
military as well as political, and are critical elements in the successful transformation of 
NATO to date. When the term CJTF is currently used within NATO, it can have three 
different meanings. First, it can mean a temporary formation of NATO forces, brought 
together for a particular missions, and usually led by a headquarters identified as a CJTF 
headquarters from one of the standing organizations. In a second definition, a CJTF is a 
NATO force, augmented by forces from non-NATO nations, and probably again led by 
an identified CJTF headquarters. These two types are significant indicators of the change 
taking place within NATO. During the Cold War, the collective defense mission of 
NATO assumed that all members would come to the aid of one another in time of crisis. 
Now that NATO was entering a world of humanitarian and peace operations, such total 
agreement is unnecessary, and probably in most cases, unlikely. Instead, the CJTF 
becomes a means by which a coalition of the willing can effectively come together for a
3 Paul Cornish, “European Security: The End o f Architecture and the N ew  NATO,” International 
Affairs 72, no. 4 (1996): 762.
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particular crisis situation, while not adversely affecting the overall consensus of the 
institution regarding other issues.4
The third definition is the most unique, and is the one that must be examined in 
detail to better understand the dynamics of NATO transformation. In the context of this 
analysis, this variant is the development of the CJTF serving as the European pillar 
within NATO, more specifically, that CJTF developed in concert with the Berlin Plus 
agreement. This CJTF supports an EU multinational force, potentially augmented by 
other nations, making use of selected NATO assets, as generally allowed under the 
Berlin Plus agreement.5 In this case, the force commander would be the NATO Deputy 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe, (DSACEUR) in a dual-hatted role, or one where he 
would serve as the senior European NATO officer as well as the European commander of 
the EU force. As the strategic commander/EU commander, the DSACEUR would have 
access to the capabilities of the NATO CJTF headquarters element, as well as those 
critical, yet low density capabilities that are present in NATO and usually needed for any 
operation. Capabilities such as communications, intelligence collection, and deployment 
assets are ones that NATO usually has in adequate quantities, particularly through the US 
contribution, but are not usually available in sufficient quantities outside of NATO. It is 
these capabilities, in part those previously identified as separable but not separate, that 
NATO would provide the EU in those situations where NATO as a whole chose not to 
participate. It is the evolution of this particular concept that requires careful 
examination.
4 NATO, Intervention by the Netherlands Minister fo r  Foreign Affairs, Hans van Mierlo, Meeting 
o f  the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session, 10 December 1996, 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/speech/1996/s961210p.htm (accessed 14 February 2005).
5 NATO, NATO Handbook, 253-254.
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CJTF: From Concept To Substance 
The CJTF concept evolved in several stages, taking slightly more than nine years 
to fully mature within NATO. To some, this seems to be an overly long and slow 
process to modify a capability within NATO. However, a closer examination reveals 
that a very complex network of change was taking place within NATO that related to 
CJTF. While CJTF possessed a certain life of its own, it was also a major element of the 
on-going development of ESDI and ESDP. During this nine-year time period, CJTF 
transformed itself from a military concept for developing more adaptable and flexible 
forces, to one that was part of the transformation of the NATO headquarters structure, 
designed to facilitate an Allied response to non-collective defense missions. It also 
developed as a concept acceptable to both NATO and the EU, which was envisioned to 
operationalize the European pillar within NATO, and finally a concept that solidified a 
substantive partnership between both institutions.
The CJTF concept was first discussed at an informal conference of US and 
Alliance officials on 11 September 1993. It was not only seen as a means of 
implementing a more responsive command and control structure within NATO, but also 
a way to allow for the participation of other nations in operational missions rather than 
only while training. As a means of supporting the idea of “Coalitions of the Willing,” 
CJTF was seen by the Clinton administration as ideally suited to support the European 
NATO members in resolving regional problems.6 It was developed further during a 
meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee in Travemuende on 20-21 October 
1993, when US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin suggested that this concept might well fit
6 Gustav Schmidt, “Getting the Balance Right: NATO and the Evolution o f  EC/EU Integration, 
Security and Defence Policy,” in A History o f  NATO -  The First Fifty Years, Volume 2, ed. Gustav 
Schmidt, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 22.
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in with NATO’s need to have a system to organize candidate countries not only in 
training and peacetime issues, but also in operations.7
It was at the 11 January 1994, Brussels Summit that the CJTF concept first received 
official note as a potential change to the Alliance structure. In fact, in paragraphs 8 and 9 
of the Summit Communique, NATO concisely tied CJTF to the issues of PfP and the 
need for the development of a European pillar with the Alliance.
8. .. .NATO must continue the adaptation of its command and force structure in 
line with requirements for flexible and timely responses.. .We also will need to 
strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance by facilitating the use of our 
military capabilities for NATO and European/WEU operations, and assist 
participation of non-NATO partners in joint peacekeeping operations and other 
contingencies as envisaged under the partnership for peace.
9. .. .As part of this process, we endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task 
Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with 
participating nations outside the Alliance... .The Council, with the advice of the 
NATO Military Authorities, and in coordination with the WEU, will work on 
implementation in a manner that provides separable but not separate military 
capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU....
The need for “flexible and timely response” as called for in paragraph 8 was a
recognition that while the standing structure of NATO had been appropriate for the Cold
War, the new international environment, and the perceived need for NATO to become
involved in other than collective defense missions meant that a new, more flexible and
adaptable command structure was necessary. Shortly after the Summit, the Supreme
Allied Commander, Atlantic, Admiral Paul David Miller, reinforced this when he stated
that, “ .. .CJTF is a concept enabling NATO’s member nations to deal effectively with
issues that fall outside of the alliance’s traditional boundaries; moreover, it provides a
mechanism through which both NATO and non-NATO nations can participate in
7 Solomon, NATO Enlargement Debate, 32.
8 NATO, The Brussels 1994 Summit Declaration, para. 8-9.
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expanded coalition activities.”9 The very same paragraph also addressed the 
strengthening of the European pillar and providing assets for WEU-led operations, both 
significant institutional issues.
During the preceding few years, the EU had begun to speak of a common foreign 
and security policy. As already discussed, many European nations, France in particular, 
were interested in having a greater European voice in defense issues. NATO’s offer of 
such support for ESDI and WEU-led operations could be seen as in part an effort to 
control the development of a European presence by maintaining control of it within the 
Alliance. This way, the US would maintain a greater level of influence than if the 
European presence was outside of NATO and solely within a separate institution such as 
the EU.10 If the WEU could be seen as the EU’s bridge to NATO, the CJTF was the 
bridge between NATO and the WEU. As such, this political role of the CJTF concept 
was a critical aspect of NATO transformation.
Another issue concerning US control and influence of this changing situation 
was in the paragraph 9 statement concerning separable but not separate capabilities. The 
issue of burdensharing, the equivalent contributions to the common defense within 
NATO, had always been a concern for the US. In a variety of capability areas such as 
intelligence, command and control, and transportation, the most significant resources are 
American. As European nations spoke of the development of new military capabilities, 
the US wanted to ensure that any such effort would not improve some separate European 
capability at the expense of needed improvements within NATO. So, from the US
9 Paul David Miller, Retaining Alliance Relevancy: NATO and the Com bined Joint Task Force 
Concept, (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1994), 6.
10 Nora Bensahel, “Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO ’s Developm ent o f  the Combined 
Joint Task Force,” European Security 8, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 58.
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perspective, this new CJTF concept was not only a new tool to support Alliance non- 
Article 5 missions. It was also the first salvo in an internal battle with other member 
nations and institutions to redefine European security issues on terms satisfactory to the 
US. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the Summit it seemed to many, France included, 
that the US was strongly supporting a European defense identity, though some 
disagreements remained over details, especially over some CJTF issues.11
While it was significant that such new concepts were surfacing, a great deal of 
detail was still not behind them. First, from the perspective of many European nations, 
the need for these improvements had become obvious following their experiences during 
the 1990-91 Iraq war. The problems had become even more apparent following the 
disturbing turn of events in the Balkans the past three years since Yugoslavia had begun 
to disintegrate. The continued failure of the EU to provide a European solution to the
i ^
Balkans crisis was fresh in everyone’s mind. In particular, France had been calling for 
improvements in the areas of European defense during the first several years of the 
1990s. Their experience during the Gulf War had shown them that France lacked the 
well-rounded capabilities that they felt were important to possess. Additionally, not 
having routinely trained with NATO, French forces were unable to smoothly interoperate 
with other NATO nations. These concerns led to calls within France for improvements 
to their defense system. The financial burden as well as the political and military 
difficulties involved in developing a more comprehensive national and European defense
11 Anand Menon, “From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO and European Security,” 
International Affairs 71, no. I (January, 1995): 31.
12 Stefan Froehlich, “Needed: A Framework for European Security,” SAIS Review  14, no. 1 
(Winter-Spring 1994): 39.
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led France to support the concept of CJTF when it surfaced at the Brussels Summit.
• 1 TDespite this, their vision for CJTF was not necessarily the same as that of the US.
France’s vision of CJTF was more of a resource to provide guaranteed access to 
NATO capabilities when deemed important for European nations outside of a NATO 
role. The questions of how to define guaranteed access and to what capabilities, as well 
as which nations are involved in this process, and to what extent these different nations 
were involved were all topics that had to be resolved before this concept could be 
successfully completed. France also had serious concerns about the role of the Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) as commander over the CJTF. Their belief was 
that since the SACEUR is always a US officer, that provided the US with too great an 
influence over the CJTF as envisioned.14
Several years of examination and discussion followed the 11 January 1994, 
Brussels Summit before NATO felt comfortable that the CJTF concept was sufficiently 
developed. To many observers, the recent experiences in the Balkans lent emphasis to 
the new concept. As NATO eventually assumed a role in Bosnia-Herzegovina through 
its deployment of the Implementation Force, or IFOR ON 16 December 1995, the need 
for arrangements for non-Article 5 missions and the continuing involvement of the US 
through NATO was reinforced and documented.15 Additionally, as France assumed a 
role within IFOR, it discovered that its interoperability with NATO and other European 
nations was lacking due to the long-term separation of French military forces from the
13 Anne-Marie Le Gloannec,” Europe by Other Means,” International Affairs 73, no. 1 (January 
1997): 89.
14 Robert P. Grant, “France’s N ew  Relationship with NATO,” in NATO's Transformation, The 
Changing Shape o f  the Atlantic Alliance, ed. Philip H. Gordon, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 1997), 57.
15 Kori Schake, Constructive Duplication: Reducing E U  reliance on US m ilitary assets, (London: 
Centre for European Reform, 2002), 31.
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military structure of NATO. Therefore, the need to strengthen the ties among these 
nations became paramount.16 Based on these needs, France saw the implementation of 
CJTF in the approaching Berlin NAC Ministerial as a significant improvement in the
1 7European representation in the Alliance.
In the 3 June 1996, Berlin NAC Ministerial, NATO noted the progress achieved 
in the adaptation within the Alliance since the 11 January 1994, Brussels Summit, with 
particular emphasis on the completion of the CJTF concept. Again, they concisely 
summarized all of the important issues when they noted that, “ .. .by permitting a more 
flexible and mobile deployment of forces, including for new missions, this concept will 
facilitate the mounting of NATO contingency operations, the use of separable but not 
separate military capabilities in operations led by the WEU, and the participation of
1 Rnations outside the Alliance in operations such as IFOR.” In the next paragraph,
NATO then noted that the CJTF concept would be a critical element in developing a 
European Security and Defense Identity in the Alliance based on sound military 
principles. NATO laid out the specific issues involved with the employment of this type 
of CJTF, thereby setting the stage for the next several years of often contentious dialogue 
with many of the member nations and the EU.
The NAC again discussed the need within the Alliance for the identification of 
the various separable but not separate capabilities, assets, support assets, as well as HQs 
and HQ elements. They also introduced the issue of clarifying the involvement of 
interested nations within this particular context. As NATO called for the development of
16 Jacquelyn K. Davis, Reluctant Allies & Com petitive Partners: U.S. -  French Relations a t the 
Breaking Point? (Herndon, VA: Brassey’s, 2003), 97.
1 Michael Brenner and Guillame Parmentier, Reconcilable Differences: US -  French Relations in 
the New Europe, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 59.
18 NATO, Berlin M inisterial Final Communique, para. 6.
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this European identity, it noted that these arrangements should include specific European 
command arrangements to account for the participation of any European allies who 
desired. In other words, while this evolving European pillar might make use of the 
WEU, it should not be a limiting arrangement that excludes those European members 
who are not either EU members or full members of the WEU.
This simple declaration concerning the importance of not excluding European 
Allies who do not belong to the EU was at the root of the problem of implementing CJTF 
for the next several years. As already noted, NATO and the EU had been discussing 
each others’ involvement in related matters since the end of the Cold War. The two 
institutions were now seeking to establish the shape of this developing relationship. In 
this situation, the use of the WEU as a bridge to NATO seemed a reasonable response. 
Superficially, since the full WEU members were also NATO members, the WEU seemed 
ideal to serve as the European pillar. However, due to the different memberships of 
NATO, the EU, and the WEU when considering all of their members, this meant that no 
clearly defined or symmetrical relationship could be established. All full members of the 
WEU are members of both NATO and the EU. They have agreed that the collective 
defense responsibility of their Brussels Treaty commitment is implemented through their 
NATO membership. In this manner, they are committed to one another as NATO 
members. At the same time however, as EU members, they have a less firm commitment 
to collective defense matters to their EU partners, but a growing security responsibility to 
one another through the development of CFSP. So, if this WEU pillar within NATO 
leaned too far towards NATO, those members would run the risk of alienating their EU 
partners. If they are too insistent on support for EU members at the expense of their
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other NATO partners, then the potential exists regarding whether this European Pillar 
would be ineffective or disruptive to the Alliance.
While there are a variety of challenges that relate to these differing memberships, 
two critical elements were central to the evolution of the CJTF concept. The first was 
that of the US role among the institutions. As the largest military power in NATO and 
the member that owned most of the assets that were under consideration as part of the 
developing concept, its interests were critical. The EU and member nations such as 
France believed that there must be an avenue to the use of NATO assets that did not 
restrict their decisionmaking. If the use of CJTF was dependent on NATO making a 
conscious decision not to intervene in a particular situation, then this “right of first 
refusal” would be a situation action where NATO and its members had significant power 
over whether or not the EU intervened. If the US was not prepared to allow its assets to 
be part of a potential CJTF, then it would probably not be of value to any WEU-led 
operation. Additionally, concerns also surfaced that the US might feel it had the right to 
supervise or interject into those European operations which employed NATO or US 
assets as part of CJTF. 19
The other membership-related issue concerned those European nations either not 
belonging to the EU or not full WEU members. While several nations were included in 
this category, Turkey had the greatest concerns. For years it had been unsuccessful in 
joining the EU. Meanwhile, other nations succeeded in applying and joining.
Perceptions on the part of Turkish government officials that their application for EU 
membership was not receiving reasonable consideration could be seen as driving them
19 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, CJTF and the Reform o f  NATO, Committee Report, Mr. Rafael 
Estrella (Spain) General Rapporteur, 24 October 1996, DSC (96) 8 rev. 1, para. 32, http://www.NATO- 
pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/1996/an230dsc.asp (accessed 12 February 2005).
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towards a hard response on the use of NATO assets by the EU.20 Turkey perceived a 
problem with neighbors such as Greece, with whom they did not usually have smooth 
relations, being able to conduct operations in their region, potentially with their assets, 
and without their involvement in the process. Based on this concern, Turkey chose to 
hold up the development of the CJTF concept in the NAC.21
NATO also noted that the development of an effective command and control for 
WEU-led operations had to somehow optimize the use of NATO personnel. Therefore, 
NATO suggested that certain key personnel within the NATO command structure be 
dual-hatted, just as the DSACEUR was in his position. They would primarily serve as 
part of a NATO headquarters, but also have a secondary role as part of a potential WEU- 
led force during a European operation. These dual-hatted members would provide the 
nucleus for the CJTF staff, and just as importantly, would eliminate the need for the 
WEU or EU to each or individually establish their own planning capability.
At the Madrid Summit on 8 July 1997, the NAC continued recognizing progress 
made in Alliance internal adaptation, specifically in the ability to develop ESDI and work 
to implement the CJTF concept. Now, an additional step was noted in that potential 
parent headquarters for the CJTF had been designated, and trials were scheduled in order 
to evaluate the potential for the CJTF concept in practice. While also building on the 
progress made since the 3 June 1996, Berlin Ministerial, they continued to endorse 
progress made to date, to include the tentative identification of the DSACEUR to serve
20 Sunniva Tofte, “Non-EU NATO Members and the Issue o f  Discrimination,” in Defending 
Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest fo r  European Autonomy, ed. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 143.
21 Salmon and Shepherd, Toward a European Army, 176.
22 NATO, Berlin Ministerial Final Communique, para. 7.
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as the EU commander of CJTF for a WEU-led operations.23 Not only did this new 
command relationship provide a significant contribution for the development of CJTF, 
but it also ensured that for the first time European NATO members had a senior military 
officer directly in the NATO chain of command. The modification to the command and 
control structure was seen as a major concession to ESDI and French concerns by the 
US.24
NATO defense ministers continued building on these issues when they met in 
December. They reinforced the importance and use of CJTF, not only to improve NATO 
effectiveness, but also for the effective development of ESDI within the Alliance, 
especially in the ability of CJTF to provide a deployable headquarters for the WEU-led 
operations. A successful trial of the concept was held in November 1997, and was seen 
as providing initial information to assist in later trials and exercises as part of the CJTF 
implementation.25
At the same time, actions on the part of France and the United Kingdom 
transformed the evolutionary process of CJTF. Following a UK -  French Summit in St. 
Malo on 3-4 December 1998, the two nations agreed on the importance that the EU must 
hold, “ .. .the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces...” 
From now on, the role of the European pillar would be served by the EU instead of the 
WEU. While that reduced by one the institutions directly involved in this on-going 
process, it did not resolve the membership inconsistencies. Furthermore, they also
23 NATO, M adrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation Issued by the H eads o f  
State and Government, 8 July 1997, para. 14,17-18, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm  
(accessed 19 February 2005).
24 Institute for National Strategic Studies, A llied  Command Structure in the New NATO, 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), 12.
25 NATO, Final Communique, M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers Session 
held in Brussels,( 2  December 1997), para. 16, 18, 20, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-149e.htm  
(accessed 4 December 2004).
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agreed that, . .the European union will also need to have recourse to suitable military 
means (European capabilities predesignated within NATO’s European pillar or national 
or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).”26 Not only were 
European nations now looking to represent their interests through CJTF, but they also 
wanted to have a separate capability to act independently outside of NATO.
The Concept Waits For Acceptance 
It was not until the Washington Summit on 23-24 April 1999, that NATO began 
to add more specificity to the arrangements being developed to support CJTF.
Throughout the Summit Communique, NATO noted its desire to implement the Berlin 
decisions regarding the providing of separable but not separate capabilities to then the 
WEU, and now the EU. In paragraph 10, NATO says that the members, “ .. .stand ready 
to define and adopt the necessary arrangements for ready access by the European Union 
to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the 
Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance.”27 This section and the 
remainder of Paragraph 10 indicated a firm commitment to a quick implementation of the 
Berlin agreement with the EU. However, this statement must be considered in concert 
with a section from paragraph 9 that stated that NATO would, “ .. .attach the utmost 
importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in 
EU-led crisis response operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within 
the WEU.”28 This issue of national representation remained as one of the critical
26 Joint Declaration on European Defence, UK -  French Summit, 3-4 December 1998, as contained 
in Rutten, Chaillot Paper 47, 21-22.
27 NATO, “Washington Summit Communique,” 16.
28 Ibid., para 9d.
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elements continuing to hold both institutions back from the full implementation of the 
concept.
In paragraph 10 of the Washington Summit Communique, NATO also noted that 
the earlier Berlin decision should be expanded. Specifically, they noted that first, assured 
EU access to NATO planning capabilities must be present; the EU should be able to 
presume availability of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in 
EU-led operations; a range of European command options for EU-led operations should 
be included, to include those involving the DSACEUR; and finally, NATO’s defense 
planning system should be adapted in order to incorporate more effectively the 
availability of forces for EU-led operations. The NAC was asked to continue working 
these details in the context of the EU also developing their portions of relevant 
arrangements to facilitate a mutual agreement.29 These specific aspects of the agreement 
are what then began to be referred to as the Berlin Plus agreement as opposed to the 
original references to the Berlin Decision.
It was also significant that NATO included the importance in the new Strategic 
Concept announced at the 23-24 April 1999, Washington Summit. In both paragraph 13 
as well as 53c, NATO noted that the CJTF was a significant element of the structural 
enhancement of the Alliance. CJTF provided an ability to support the full range of 
NATO missions, from the core task of collective defense as well as the new 
peacekeeping missions. Additionally, it also provided an ability to assist with the 
building of ESDI within the Alliance.30
29 Ibid., para 10.
30 NATO, 1999 Strategic Concept,
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Coming as it did as the first formal meeting following the conclusion of 
Operation Allied Force, the 2 December 1999, Defense Ministers Brussels NAC 
Ministerial was an opportunity to reflect on the decisions of the Washington Summit and 
the efforts to continue with the adaptation of the Alliance. In the case of CJTF and the 
development of complete arrangements for EU-led operations the problems remained. In 
paragraph 18 the ministers noted that soon a NATO-WEU crisis management exercise 
would take place. The Defense Ministers saw positive efforts in the recent 10-11 
December 1999, EU Helsinki Council and Headline Goals. However, they still saw the 
need to work with the WEU in order to complete and implement an agreement on the use 
of NATO assets while recognizing the interests of non-EU European allies. In Paragraph 
21 they also noted that the new command structure was implemented on 1 September 
1999, which now provided NATO with on-call CJTF headquarters to assist in future 
crisis management operations.
Over the next year and a half, seldom did an explicit reference to CJTF in 
Ministerial-level NATO documentation surface. By now CJTF headquarters had been 
identified as part of the NATO structure. Training exercises and trials were on-going, so 
the concept seemed to be sound and well underway. In the case of the first two types of 
CJTFs mentioned originally, that was almost certainly the case, since these only related 
to a new command structure for NATO operations. The first exercise of the new type 
CJTF was conducted 17 - 23  February 2000. During this exercise, the WEU and NATO 
exercised their consultations and crisis management procedures between headquarters
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and nations, using a NATO scenario under conditions of a Petersberg Task.31 The EU 
was involved as an observer. However, in the case of this CJTF that served to bridge the 
gap between NATO and the EU, political problems of national involvement remained 
despite the training. The process of pulling a CJTF staff together and supporting it with 
appropriate national staffs and forces will always be difficult.32 Nearly each NATO 
statement continued to stress that the two institutions were increasingly working 
together, but that they needed to resolve the problem of how to best ensure that non-EU 
European allies were taken into consideration prior to and during EU-led operations.
On 29-30 May 2001, in the NAC Budapest Ministerial, NATO discussed at length 
the growing strength of the relationship between the EU and NATO. In great detail, 
NATO discussed the recent EU initiatives and how those initiatives might work in 
concert with Alliance actions in order to further the goal of supporting a European 
capability and ESDI within NATO. However, there were also certain blunt warnings 
such as in paragraph 49 when they stated that all of these efforts are, “ .. .proceeding on 
the principle that nothing will be agreed until everything is agreed -  the participation
•j-5
issue is also relevant in this context.” CJTF would be unable to achieve its full potential 
until this remaining issue of non-EU member participation was resolved.
Over the next 18 months, NATO continued emphasizing the importance of CJTF 
and its role in support of ESDI, but few of its details changed. While the concept 
remained sound, the full implementation remained hostage to the disagreement between
31 Bonnen, Common European Security, 73. See also, NATO, First jo in t WEU/NATO Crisis 
Management Exercise -  CMX/CR1SEX 2000  -  to be held from  17 to 23 February 2000, NATO Press 
Release (2000) 005, at http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-005e.htm (accessed 21 February 2005).
32 Thomas Cooke, “NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor,” Param eters 28, no. 3 (Winter 
98/99): 127.
33 NATO, Final Communique, M inisterial M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council held in Budapest,
29 M ay 2001, Para 49, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-077e.htm (accessed 2 October 2004.
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NATO, the EU, and several of their respective members. The British attempted to 
resolve the disagreement with Turkey through an agreement in December 2001. In it, 
without naming Turkey at the request of Greece, it was confirmed that ESDP operations 
would not be directed against an ally, and that it would not disrupt obligations between 
EU members and NATO members. Despite this and other details of the draft agreement, 
Turkey still refused to agree.34 Finally, as part of the Prague Summit on 21-22 
November 2002 additional developments came to light concerning the development of 
CJTF.
The Concept Comes To Life 
In the Prague Summit declaration, a new, leaner command structure was 
announced. The strategic command in Europe would be supported by two commands, 
each able to generate a land-based CJTF headquarters, and another standing joint 
headquarters from which a sea-based CJTF capability could be drawn. However, even 
amidst these seeming significant improvements, they continued noting that they needed,
“ .. .to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation by non-EU 
European Allies, in order to achieve a genuine strategic partnership.”35 What this almost 
repetitive statement hid, however, was the fact that the major stumbling block to the full 
implementation of CJTF was finally in the process of resolution.
During the period immediately following the Prague Summit, December 2002 
until March 2003, a number of announcements were made by the EU and NATO that 
culminated with the execution of the first EU-led CJTF. In early December, the EU
34 Jean-Yves Haine, “ESDP and NATO,” in E U  Security and Defence Policy: The f irs t f ive  years  
(1999-2004), ed. N icole Gnesotto(Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 139.
35 NATO, Prague Summit D eclaration, 76.
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agreed that Cyprus and Malta would not take part in any EU-led NATO CJTF operations 
once they became members of the EU. It was also agreed that they would not have 
access to NATO classified information. These statements, in concert with the United 
Kingdom’s earlier efforts to resolve the differences with Turkey, were finally enough to 
lift Turkey’s veto in the NAC.36
On 13 December, Lord Robertson, the NATO Secretary General, noted that the 
NAC and EU had tentatively come to a number of agreements that would lead to EU 
access to NATO planning capabilities while also ensuring that non-EU European allies
' i n
would be considered in EU-led operations involving NATO assets. Three days later, 
both institutions released the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP. In it, they described the 
relationship between both institutions, as well as the principles on which that relationship 
was established. Based on these common understandings, the EU promised to ensure the 
full participation of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP. NATO would 
support ESDP as promised at the Washington Summit, and would give the EU assured 
access to NATO’s planning capabilities. Both institutions recognized that transparent 
arrangements would have to be established in order to most effectively implement this
38 •agreement. The final administrative difference between the two institutions was then 
resolved on 14 March 2003 when a NATO -  EU agreement was signed, finalizing an 
agreement on the handling of classified information between the institutions.39 This was 
an important issue, since the participation of a wide range of political parties were 
involved within the EU, and a number of neutral and other non-Alliance nations also
36 Salmon and Shepherd, Toward a European Army, 176.
37 NATO, Statement by the Secretary General.
38 NATO, E U -N A T O  Declaration on ESDP.
39 NATO, NATO -  E U  Security o f  Information Agreem ent Signed Today, 14 March 2003, 
http://www.NATO. int;/docu/pr/2003/p03-022e.htm (accessed 11 December 2004).
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participated in the EU. Without some sort of agreement, concern weighed heavily on the 
part of NATO that EU use of NATO assets might lead to a loss of sensitive information 
through potential EU leaks.40
This final agreement regarding the handling of classified and sensitive 
information finally opened the door for the full implementation of the Berlin Plus 
agreement. On 17 March 2003, NATO and the EU announced that NATO would hand 
over its mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the EU on 31 March 
2003 under the provisions of the Berlin Plus agreement.41 On 31 March 2003, NATO 
Operation Allied Harmony, officially terminated, and the first EU-led CJTF operation, 
named Operation Concordia began. More than nine years after the introduction of the 
concept, the CJTF was finally implemented in its most complex form albeit in a very 
limited operation.
The Implementation Of CJTF 
Just as the term CJTF holds a number of meanings, so does the implementation of 
the concept. Militarily, the CJTF concept has been working and under development 
within NATO for a number of years. However, the political version of the concept, was 
much more difficult to implement. While the initiation of the first operation was greatly 
anticipated, almost immediately significant disagreement occurred. Only weeks later, on 
29 April 2003, Belgium hosted a summit with France, Germany, and Luxembourg to 
discuss establishing a European planning headquarters to be located in Tervuren near
40 Jolyon Howorth, “Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance,” in Defending  
Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest fo r  European Autonomy, ed. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 225.
41 NATO, NATO  -  E U  Cooperation Taken to a New Level.
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Brussels to improve ESDP operations. Coming as it did during the height of 
disagreement with the US over the Iraq war, this was seen as a significant challenge to 
the agreement not to duplicate military planners for ESDP. Fortunately, over the next 
few months the United Kingdom negotiated a compromise where an EU planning cell 
would be set up at the SHAPE headquarters, and NATO would provide liaison officers to 
the EU Military Staff.42
In the case of the first CJTF under the provisions of Berlin Plus, indicators 
are that it was a successful operation, though the extent of such success can of course be 
dependent on the perspective of the observer. As a start for a new concept, it was a small 
operation. Approximately 350 military personnel from thirteen EU countries and 
fourteen non-EU countries participated in the operation that extended from 31 March 
2003 until replaced by an EU Police mission on 15 December 2003. The NATO 
DSACEUR, German Admiral Rainer Feist, was the Operational Commander, using his 
office at SHAPE as the Operational Headquarters.
While overall impressions of the operation were positive, some administrative 
challenges arose. In one situation, the use of so many non-EU participants challenged 
the NATO -  EU security agreement. Since these nations did not belong to the EU, the 
agreement did not apply to them, and, as a result, NATO had concerns about the security 
of some information. Additionally, the NATO Headquarters in Naples, Italy, Allied 
Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) was used as the location for the EU Command 
Element. France was concerned that this long-term location in AFSOUTH resulted in 
much of the EU planning being done by the NATO Headquarters staff and thereby
42 Leslie S. Lebl, “European Union Defense Policy: An American Perspective, Policy Analysis, no. 
516 (June 25, 2004): 4. See also, Haine, “ESDP and NATO,” 141.
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excessively influencing EU planning. From this particular discussion, it appears that the 
question of a separate EU planning cell has not even yet been completely resolved. 
Nevertheless, it appears that the first step was successful.43 Discussions were already 
underway for the EU to eventually take over the NATO operation in Bosnia in 2004.
This would be a significantly larger operation in both scope as well as numbers of 
personnel.
For the EU and ESDP, the initiation of this successful operation only slightly 
preceded an example of another new type of their operations. On 30 May 2003, the EU 
was asked by the UN to assist in a developing crisis in Bunia, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. Employing France as a lead, or framework nation, a number of EU and non- 
EU nations participated in an autonomous operation known as Operation Artemis, which 
lasted until relieved on 1 September 2003.
Based on one successful CJTF operation, a successful autonomous operation, 
several non-military police missions, and the nearly certain prospect of a more significant 
CJTF mission approaching, the role of ESDP is gaining substance, though its eventual 
form is far from certain.
While the political role of the CJTF remains significant, its military role within 
NATO is also important. Considering the wide range of missions that NATO and its 
member nations are considering, it is important that mission planning, command and 
control, and force structure planning be as effective as possible. The plan to establish the 
CJTF headquarters as groups of individuals from standing commands will result in on­
going challenges. Training of individuals as they rotate in and out of their NATO
43 Annalisa Monaco, “Operation Concordia and Berlin Plus: NATO and the EU Take Stock,” NATO 
Notes 5, no. 8 (December 2003): 1-2. http://www.isis-europe.org (accessed 21 February 2005).
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positions will be important in order to ensure that the CJTF has well-prepared staffs. At 
the same time, they will need to have a well designed and complete command and 
control capability that can be quickly deployed and effectively integrated with other 
NATO commands or EU forces. There is also the question of how effectively their 
parent command can continue to operate in the absence of such a significant segment of 
their staff. All of these are significant issues that must be resolved separate from the 
political issues of supporting ESDP.44
As NATO’s European members and the US continue to consider the unequal 
capability levels between them, the CJTF can in some cases serve to provide a forum for 
improved planning and operations, and perhaps even serve as an impetus for more 
organized improvements in Alliance capabilities.45 Additionally, as NATO enlarges, 
CJTF provides a capability for the Alliance to quickly deploy a complete command and 
control element to any of the new member territories if needed. As a political statement 
as well as a new capability this is an effective contribution.46
Summary
While not a new concept, NATO’s CJTF was a revolutionary development within 
the Alliance. As NATO began to transform itself following the end of the Cold war, it 
brought into use a concept that would effect several different areas. On one hand, it 
provided a changed military structure for the new non-Article five missions that were a
44 Charles L. Barry, Transforming NATO Command and Control fo r  Future Missions, (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, June, 2003), 5.
45 David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, Mind the Gap: Prom oting a 
Transatlantic Revolution in M ilitary Affairs, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), 
82-3.
46 Terry Terriff, “The CJTF Concept and the Limits o f  European Autonomy,” in Defending Europe: 
The EU, NATO and the Quest fo r  European Autonomy, ed. Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler, (New  
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 45.
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significant basis for the continuing existence of the Alliance in the absence of the old 
Soviet threat. At the same time, it also provided a structure that would allow the 
Alliance to maintain a semblance of control over its developing European identity.
Institutionally, CJTF first served as a bridge with the WEU as part of the 
emerging ESDI. Following the UK -  France Declaration at St Malo, it then became the 
focal point for cooperation with the EU and its emerging ESDP. The political and 
institutional activities were reflections of the national interests of many of the nations 
involved, especially those of the US and France. While each side saw an opportunity to 
use CJTF and other aspects of ESDI to their own advantage, the current role and 
employment of the concept is closer to the original vision held by the US as opposed to 
that of France.
All the while, the Alliance continued to fine tune the military structure and 
employment of the CJTF while working to make it a viable framework. Initial 
indicators are that CJTF is proving to be an effective means for the EU to participate in a 
variety of peace operations. How often it is used and how vigorously involvement with 
it continues is probably more an issue of how the EU continues developing its military 
capability, rather than how effective or appropriate the structure is for military 
operations.
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Introduction
This analysis examines what has been learned from the case studies concerning 
the hypothesis: only if NATO is able to effectively transform will it be able to continue 
in its role as the primary European security institution. The re-stated thesis clarifies the 
goal of this research: The degree to which NATO adopts changes in its structure and 
procedures, leading to greater operational effectiveness and efficiencies in the way in 
which it operates, determines the degree to which the Alliance will continue to be able to 
conduct collective defense and crisis management missions.
As discussed in the introduction, there were a variety of options available to 
NATO at the end of the Cold War. For NATO to remain in existence was not necessarily 
the most obvious one, but once the Alliance members made the decision to retain the 
institution, this study has shown that the goals of the actions that have taken place to date 
were logical. The questions identified earlier within this study provide the foundation for 
this analysis. First, what sort of policy changes did NATO implement that kept it from 
disappearing following the end of the Cold War? The change in the bi-polar world 
suggested that NATO would dissolve. Then, how did NATO change its structure and 
procedures in order to ensure that it could operate internally? And finally, how has the 
Alliance addressed the need for appropriate capabilities in this new environment? What 
can be learned from this experience for NATO’s future?
This research examines the nature of effective transformation within the 
institution as the independent variable. In other words, change and transformation is
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
211
taking place. The important issue for effective transformation is for that change to 
support more effective operation of the Alliance. The dependent variable is an 
examination of NATO’s ability to continue to serve as the primary European security 
institution. Selected changes within the institution, both internal or external, are 
examined for the effects that result in the adaptation of the institution over time.
Whether such change is reactive or proactive, and whether it covers internal structure or 
procedures, or external policy adaptation serves to define the eventual nature of the 
institution, specifically, does it result in NATO being effective?
An examination of the issues relating to NATO adaptation requires considering 
change within NATO from two perspectives. First, how have NATO policy changes 
enabled it to adapt externally in order to establish more effective relationships with non­
member states and other regional and international institutions? What policy changes 
were implemented to maintain the vitality of the organization in its dealings with other 
institutions and countries? Second, what internal changes of structure or capabilities 
were necessary in order for NATO to not only adapt to the new international 
environment, but also to effectively represent the needs and interests of the members of 
the Alliance on both a political and operational basis. The critical thresholds contained 
within the background and two case studies highlighted significant examples of how 
NATO reached out to neighbor nations and implemented selected internal changes.
In order to determine the future of NATO transformation, this chapter reviews the 
case studies and the key facts learned from them. Following that, the nature of 
adaptation within NATO is considered for the extent of change in a variety of functional 
areas. NATO structures have changed during the period of this study, and despite on­
going political and military challenges, NATO remains an influential institution. At the
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same time, there is discussion of how NATO is changing from a collective defense 
organization to one of collective security. The purported change must be considered, 
since it is fundamental to the purpose of the institution and the role it serves for its 
member nations.
Next, the challenges remaining to the future of NATO adaptation will be 
considered, primarily from the viewpoint of the potential challenges and pitfalls that 
must be considered. The expansion of this security community-like presence and the 
future enlargement could both be problematic, especially if the changes lead to greater 
conflicts among the memberships of NATO and the EU. These challenges are linked 
with the future of NATO transformation and the critical areas of adaptation. Finally, the 
future potential of NATO transformation is suggested by the changes that have been 
suggested so far in the analysis. What needs to be accomplished if the institution is to 
continue changing in a positive manner? Whose vision will guide the Alliance, and how 
can this vision best be implemented? These are important questions to discuss based on 
the analysis so far provided. As already noted, NATO transformation is a process, not an 
endstate. At any particular point in time, a new crisis might arise that drives NATO to a 
lack of consensus. A change in the international environment, or a change in how 
members perceive the value of NATO membership could cause a crisis within the 
institution. Failure is always an option and success is never certain.
Critical Thresholds
The background chapter examined NATO policy changes that affected external 
relations. Politically, the Alliance must be capable of interacting with other nations and 
institutions. It must represent institutional and national interests within geographic
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regions as well as within functional areas. As NATO began interacting with the 
transformed states of Eastern Europe, policy changes articulated in communiques and 
Summits enabled it to quickly develop a variety of unique means for engaging these 
newly independent nations, as well as other regional neighbors. There was no shortage 
of competing and controversial issues in these initial discussions. To many of these 
nations, this dialogue’s key role was to open a path to NATO membership. And yet, to 
others, if there was no longer a specific adversary for NATO, was it even appropriate for 
NATO to consider new members?
Through those policy changes that facilitated institutional and outreach 
adaptation, NATO reached out to its neighbors. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) first served as a forum for NATO and its newly independent East European and 
Baltic neighbors. As the desire for a more substantive relationship increased, the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was initiated. It provided a more structured 
relationship between NATO as an institution, and each individual nation seeking to either 
join NATO or to establish a more rewarding relationship with the institution. The 
evolution of the NACC into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) at the 29 May 
1997, Sintra NAC Ministerial, provided a more versatile organization that now works in 
concert with PfP.1 It not only includes NATO applicants, but also those nations that only 
wish to share in the exchange of information while participating in training and crisis 
management operations in Europe.
Throughout this period, there were concerns about how to deal with Russia.
Would Russia perceive NATO as a developing threat and if so, how could such a
1 NATO, Final Communique, M inisterial M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council, Sintra Portugal,
29 M ay 1997, www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-065e.htm (accessed 13 November 2001).
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situation be mitigated? The development of a special relationship with Russia and 
Ukraine provided recognition that these nations have interests that an evolving NATO 
must consider. In 1991, both countries joined NATO in the NACC, and then in 1994, 
joined PfP. By 1997, each established specific agreements with NATO, through the 
NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership and the NATO/Russia Founding 
Act. Despite some difficulties with Russia resulting from NATO actions in Operation 
Allied Force, the relationship with Russia was re-established following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 with the signing of the NATO-Russia Joint Council in 
May 2002. There have been challenges in the relationship, but Russia has not been 
provided a veto of NATO actions, and has not completely broken away from NATO 
activities. This despite many who feared strong Russian opposition to NATO 
developments and enlargement. This approach of employing a special relationship with 
Russia and Ukraine effectively co-opted both nations to at least acquiesce in other 
Alliance developments. Both nations can provide input, yet their influence is controlled, 
in essence, isolated from a decisive role within the Alliance.
At the same time, Europe has increasingly become a region of interlocking 
institutions. The CSCE played a role in the changes that took place in Europe between 
NATO and its members, and the Warsaw Pact and its members. With strong NATO 
support, the CSCE remained active in Europe, and eventually became more formally 
institutionalized as the OSCE. In the early 1990s, as turmoil began in the Balkans, the 
UN was involved, sometimes with the support of some individual member nations of 
NATO. By the end of the period, NATO had been transformed and became a potential 
force provider for the UN in the implementation of its decisions. During the period, the 
WEU was once again brought to life. On several occasions it served as a forum for
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European nations responding to UN requests outside of NATO, and then later as a 
European pillar within NATO. Eventually, it served as the foundation for the evolving 
ESDI, representing the needs for the EU members of NATO within the Alliance. As a 
result, NATO now has an on-going partnership with the European Union as the EU seeks 
to develop its own foreign policy perspective and corresponding military capability.
In addition to dealing with individual nations, NATO also increasingly works 
with regions, through the Mediterranean Dialogue, as well as the Southeast Europe 
Initiative, launched in an effort to promote regional cooperation and security. 
Additionally, since the 28-29 June 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO has also been involved 
in Middle East security efforts through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Through 
these various initiatives, NATO seeks a stronger and more effective relationship with its 
neighbors, while simultaneously looking out for its own regional security interests.
Many of NATO’s new initiatives bear little relationship to traditional security 
discussions. Under the authority of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO 
increasingly supports various non-security related dialogues with other nations.
Through these discussions in functional areas, NATO conducts an exchange in 
economic, scientific, and environmental matters that provides practical value to all 
involved. At the same time however, these discussions also serve to support the idea of 
trust and transparency among the nations.
Following the overview, the first case study examined the development of the 
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. Through early calls for a
2 NATO, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) Reaching out to the Broader M iddle East, updated 
24 June 2005, www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html (accessed 19 September 2005).
3 Article 2 states in part that the member states will promote peaceful relations and attempt to 
eliminate economic conflict and encourage economic collaboration among themselves. NATO Office o f  
Information and Press. NATO, NATO Handbook, 527.
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European voice within the Alliance, ESDI was originally seen by the Europeans as a 
way to more effectively represent their interests in dealings with the United States. At 
the same time, the US saw it more as a question of burdensharing, and how the European 
members might more effectively contribute to Alliance capabilities. This evolution of 
ESDI went through a period where the WEU served as a European pillar within NATO. 
Eventually the EU absorbed most of the WEU and then developed its own relationship 
with the Alliance. This particular case study helps answer the question concerning how 
the European relationships within NATO are defined. Does this internal adaptation serve 
to increase institutional effectiveness by coordinating national and regional issues within 
the Alliance, or does it instead serve a divisive role, pitting the European members 
against the US? This question has not yet been answered, and remains one of the 
challenges yet confronting the Alliance for its future transformation.
A concern running throughout this case study is burdensharing and the apparent 
disparity of contributions to Alliance capabilities. An obvious and increasing gap 
between the capabilities of the United States and the other members of NATO noted 
during Operation Allied Force, resulted in the 24 April 1999, Washington Summit 
Declaration o f a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). DCI was intended to identify 
capability shortfalls to ensure that member nations worked to reduce or eliminate those 
shortfalls, thereby improving the overall capabilities of the Alliance. When this proved 
unsuccessful, the Alliance demonstrated the flexibility to abandon this effort and later 
implement the Prague Capabilities Commitment. These types of developments 
necessitate certain types of internal adaptation in order to facilitate the European pillar 
serving as an effective voice for its members.
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In addition, based on some of the other changes in the institution and NATO’s 
growing membership, further institutional reorganization has regularly taken place and 
might continue to be necessary. These reorganizations might result in changes in 
military or civilian structures, as well as the force readiness and deployability of force 
structure. Following each of the changes, NATO must reconsider how best to implement 
its new missions. Structural changes would seem necessary, not only to address the new 
missions and areas of responsibility, but also to ensure that new members are 
appropriately and effectively integrated into the organization. Structural changes might 
also necessitate the need for corresponding procedural changes to provide a more 
effective framework for the new missions, as well as the capabilities provided by new 
members. The need to change the decisionmaking process of an intergovernmental 
organization is a significant issue. Consensus decisionmaking is up to this point one of 
the nonnegotiable foundations of the Alliance. Adaptation of NATO’s military structure 
at each level must provide more effective command and control in these new situations 
and allow the full capabilities of the member nations and the Alliance to be effectively 
employed.
The second case study takes the issues of transformation and ESDI to a greater 
level of detail by examining the development and purpose of the combined joint task 
force (CJTF). The CJTF is a multinational and multi-service force, designed to 
effectively bring force capabilities and command and control elements together in 
support of missions. In a more politically based role, the CJTF has also been accepted as 
a structure that would allow NATO European members to organize and respond to
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regional crises that might not be of interest for all Alliance members.4 It is also a means 
by which European members can have a greater say and involvement in a wider variety 
of crisis situations.
CJTF would serve as the operationalization of ESDI by providing a means for 
selected European members of NATO and other interested nations to respond to a crisis 
situation when the Alliance chooses not to formally participate. The CJTF could 
improve institutional effectiveness by allowing limited resources to be more effectively 
employed while also providing access to limited NATO support. Perhaps even more 
importantly, it ensures that national considerations to participate or not participate in 
particular non-Article 5 crises are accommodated.
These three critical thresholds provided an opportunity to consider the breadth and 
depth of NATO transformation and its reinvention. They allow one to examine not only 
what has taken place to date, but also to provide insight concerning future developments. 
Examined together, they provide the framework for an examination of NATO 
transformation and the nature of NATO’s institutional change based on specific facts. 
Following an examination of these facts and the supporting information, one can 
consider the potential for future change within NATO and how successfully it might yet 
adapt.
NATO Adaptation: Where Has Transformation Been Focused?
NATO has proven resilient and flexible since the end of the Cold War. As an 
intergovernmental institution, NATO’s changes over time reflect the consensus among 
the nations making up its membership. It is through the case studies and the examination
4 NATO, NATO Handbook, 254.
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of NATO’s external and internal changes that one can best determine the reasons for 
what has happened, and project what might yet take place.
The continued existence, and in fact growth of NATO so long after the end of the 
Cold War bears testament to the fact that the institution continued to be perceived as 
being valuable by its members. The Warsaw Pact disappeared almost blindingly quick 
with the withdrawal of Soviet Forces. As previously discussed, the WEU activities and 
influence waxed and waned based on the perception of its serving in potential useful 
roles, but eventually it was mostly absorbed by the EU. Now, it is only a shell of its 
original self, primarily serving to maintain the collective defense agreement of the 
Brussels Treaty. The question for NATO, of course, is to define the nature of its own 
continued existence. What is the endstate of this transformation that NATO has 
demonstrated during these 16 years.
As with the entire study, an assessment of NATO adaptability must be based on the 
words of the institution in concert with the actions it took. It is typical for international 
institutions of all types to make grand announcements and declarations about important 
issues. It is, however, more significant when those same institutions and their members 
actually make the effort and show the initiative to implement these statements and 
declarations. This examination has shown that NATO has repeatedly done so. Not 
always immediately or decisively, but it has done so. Therefore, this study of NATO 
adaptability highlights the words of summits, key Ministerials, and new strategic 
concepts in order to first show how NATO spoke, then how it acted as it adapted to the 
changing international situation. Returning to the premise of the analysis, these changes 
are categorized as those relating to internal structure and capabilities and external policy 
adaptations. The analysis of internal adaptation is through a look at the institution’s
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mission and purpose, its political processes, and its capabilities. The external adaptation 
is analyzed through its outreach and related enlargement, as well as its relationship with 
other institutions.
The fundamental mission of NATO has always been the collective defense 
agreement based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. As a standing alliance in a bi­
polar world, NATO focused the defense of Europe first against the Soviet Union, and 
then against the Warsaw Pact. Right from the beginning, however, NATO 
acknowledged broader interpretations. NATO Secretary General Ismay said that the real 
purpose of NATO was to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. 
Broadly interpreted even then, this highlighted the collective defense of NATO, the 
importance of the Euro-Atlantic relationship, and the collective security aspects of not 
allowing a major power to grow within Europe. While no longer quoted, these broader
tV i • •missions remain important for the Alliance. When the NATO 40 Summit took place in 
Brussels on 29-30 May 1989, the turmoil in Europe was just beginning. Amidst all of 
the uncertainty, the collective defense role of the Alliance was foremost on everyone’s 
mind. Following discussion of potential change in Europe, the Summit Declaration 
stated that, “Credible defence based on the principle of the indivisibility of security for 
all member countries will thus continue to be essential to our common endeavour.”5
In the same document, NATO noted that the changing international environment 
might necessitate a wider variety of military responses. Additionally, the Alliance now 
began discussing new types of threats. “Worldwide developments which affect our 
security interests are legitimate matters for consultation and, where appropriate, 
coordination among us. Our security is to be seen in a context broader than the
5NATO, The 40th Anniversary Brussels Declaration, para. 11.
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protection from war alone. Regional conflicts continue to be of major concern. ... We 
will seek to continue the newly emerging security treats and destabilising consequences 
resulting from the uncontrolled spread and application of modem military technologies.”6 
Initially, in declarations such as that of the Copenhagen Ministerial on 7 June 
1991, NATO declared that it was committed to working with the CSCE in order to 
reinforce its potential for conflict prevention and crisis management. This recognition of 
the potential in the CSCE and later the OSCE remained, but increasingly NATO also 
began to consider how to become more substantively involved in crisis management 
itself. Also implicit in these promises of support is the recognition that the NATO 
mission would be expanding beyond collective defense, and potentially, opening the door 
to out of area missions. The primary emphasis on security and defense of the Alliance 
continued during the next 18 months of change in Europe. However, the emphasis began 
to expand and adapt as defined during the Rome Summit on 7-8 November 1991, and as 
contained in the new 1991 Strategic Concept. In addition to the fundamental collective 
defense role of the Alliance, in its new Strategic Concept, NATO also acknowledged the 
importance of crisis management. This new role was seen as important to the Alliance if 
it was to have a capability to respond to the new smaller, but more unpredictable threats.
By the time of the Rome Summit, Germany was reunited, much of Europe had 
separated from the Soviet Union, and, in fact, the Soviet Union was only weeks away 
from disintegration. The 1991 Strategic Concept clearly articulated NATO’s mission 
and purpose within a new framework. This confirmed the importance of the Alliance 
and the need to frame the strategy within a broader approach to security. Within the four 
fundamental security tasks of the Alliance, defense against aggression now dropped to
6 Ibid., para 2 9 - 3 1 .
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third, and maintaining a strategic balance in Europe, fourth. Of greatest importance was 
the support for a stable security environment in Europe, as well as the need to remain as a 
transatlantic forum for Alliance members. Clearly, from the beginning of change within 
NATO, the groundwork was laid for the transformation of the Alliance’s role from 
collective defense to collective security-like role.
Over the next several years, the Alliance built on these changes as it entered into 
operations in the Balkans and considered ways to employ forces outside Europe or under 
other than NATO auspices. By the Brussels Summit of 11 January 1994, NATO’s 
perception of its mission had changed to the extent that they said that, “ .. .NATO 
increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and
n
fundamental task of collective defence of its members, which remains a core function.”
By the Madrid Summit on 8 July 1997, NATO was welcoming the WEU’s adopting of 
the Petersberg Tasks to support peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and was 
offering greater assistance and support by working to develop means for the WEU to 
operate while using NATO assets.8
It was not until the 23-24 April 1999, Washington Summit that NATO explicitly 
stated these changes. “Elere in Washington, we have paid tribute to the achievement of 
the past and we have shaped a new Alliance to meet the challenges of the future. This 
new Alliance will be larger, more capable and more flexible, committed to collective 
defence and able to undertake new missions.. ,”9 These new missions confirmed the 
transformation that had begun with the employment of NATO forces in the Balkans and 
were later confirmed in the opening statement of the Istanbul Summit in June 2004.
7 NATO, The Brussels 1994 Summit Declaration, para. 7.
8 NATO, M adrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security, para. 20.
9 NATO, Washington Summit Communique, 132.
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“Collective defence remains the core purpose of the Alliance. But the threats that NATO 
faces have changed substantially. ... We are determined to address effectively the threats 
to our territory, forces and populations from wherever they may come.”10 The 
implementation of these new missions has been demonstrated in NATO’s acceptance of 
the ISAF role in Afghanistan.
There are four characteristics that these chapters demonstrate as part of an initial 
assessment of the thesis and as an interim step in answering the research questions. They 
clearly highlight that NATO has shown remarkable flexibility during the past 16 years. 
First, NATO has effectively implemented a wide variety of structural change in the post 
Cold War period. This ability to change structure and the accompanying internal 
processes and procedures is a critical element of further transformation in almost all 
other areas.
The second characteristic is that NATO appears to be perceived as valuable not 
only to its members but to other nations, especially through its various partnership and 
regional dialogue activities. Third, while often operating in a subtle manner, NATO has 
also proven to be an influential institution in dealings with other international 
institutions. This relationship is primarily focused on those situations where NATO is 
acting within the purview of its security role. In those areas, it is clearly the first among 
equals. Since membership among these institutions overlaps but is not uniform, the 
reasons for NATO’s greater influence is significant. This indicates that the organization 
was transforming well beyond its original limits, and as such, is worthy of significant 
review.
10 NATO, “The Istanbul Declaration, Our Security in a N ew  Era,” in The Istanbul Summit Readers 
Guide, (June 2004), 7.
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Finally, there is the issue of NATO’s transformation from a collective defense 
organization to something new. Some literature discusses the new NATO as a collective 
security organization, others as a security community. Neither term is strictly accurate. 
While the new NATO has similarities with these concepts, neither definition fits 
comfortably. This evolution of NATO’s role reflects the manner in which the entire 
regional and global security situation has changed and how member nations chose to 
react. NATO’s transformation from a collective defense organization is a pivotal issue of 
this analysis.
Following an examination of these four characteristics, the positive and negative 
aspects of NATO transformation will be considered. The nature of these characteristics 
can depend on a nation’s or institution’s involvement with NATO on a particular issue.
If the examination indicates that this interaction is supportive of the thesis statement, 
they are presented as a positive perspective. If they are seen as detrimental to the success 
of the thesis, they will be presented as issues dangerous to NATO success, or negative to 
future strength of the institution. Therefore, it is important that the facts be clearly 
associated with their involvement with the future of NATO as described in the 
hypothesis.
NATO: Structural Change
In addition to the NATO mission expanding and transforming over time, the 
military structure of the Alliance also changed substantially. As the Cold War neared an 
end, NATO structure was well defined and substantial. Standing headquarters were 
filled with commanders and staff officers from most nations. There were wide-ranging 
standardization agreements designed to ensure that all aspects of NATO operations could
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be accomplished as efficiently and effectively as possible. Regular NATO training 
exercises helped ensure that multinational military formations could effectively operate 
together if a conflict broke out. Never in history has there been a peace-time alliance 
with such a standing structure. However, as the turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union came to a head in 1989, much of what had been accepted as the norm in NATO 
for decades began to be reconsidered.
The internal changes that took place during the period 1989 to 2004 can be seen in 
three phases that encompass evolutionary, revolutionary, and transformational change. 
Since these changes are internal to NATO, their extent is not always obvious. However, 
a review of these three phases provides an understanding of the extent of change within 
the Alliance.
During the period 1989 -  1994, NATO was in the midst of evolutionary change.
By evolutionary change, it is meant that the Alliance was gradually but consistently 
changing along a particular axis. While assessing the nature of change in Eastern 
Europe, and then responding to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Easter Europe, 
NATO carefully examined its force structure, but hesitated making rapid change during 
such a period of uncertainty. During the 29-30 May 1989, Brussels Summit, NATO was 
primarily concerned with a carrot and stick approach to the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet 
Union. As turmoil began in Europe, NATO reaffirmed the military strength of the 
Alliance as a foundation of collective defense. At the same time, the Brussels Summit 
Declaration sounded hopeful for peaceful change in Europe, and so, there was also 
support expressed for the continuation of conventional force reduction talks in Europe in 
an on-going effort to reduce tensions.
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By the 6 July 1990, London Summit Declaration, the Alliance was more optimistic 
on the potential for change in the balance of conventional forces in Europe. However, 
NATO maintained that any such changes would be contingent on the completion of the 
withdrawal of Soviet Forces from Europe. While they stated that the Alliance would 
continue to require an appropriate balance of conventional and nuclear forces, NATO 
discussed the possibility that in the absence of a Soviet threat, the Alliance could field a 
smaller and restructured active force. This smaller force could remain at a lower level of 
readiness, and as a result of the reduced threat, the Alliance could depend more on 
generating force in time of crisis rather than having those forces standing ready.
Complementing these force changes, NATO also promised to reconsider its 
defense strategy. As the threat disappeared, the concept of forward defense was no 
longer important. This would free up military forces and allow for the restationing of 
these forces for national needs instead of in support of NATO defense plans. The NATO 
nuclear strategy of flexible response could also be reconsidered in the absence of a 
specific adversary now that the Warsaw Pact was gone. At the same time, NATO 
continued offering strong support for the on-going force reduction talks.
Late the following year on 7-8 November 1991, the Rome Summit saw the 
beginning of NATO force structure change. By this time, change was also underway in 
Eastern Europe, Germany was reunited, and it was apparent that the Soviet Union was 
evolving, potentially for the better. Nevertheless, as stated in the Rome Declaration, the 
security policy of NATO was defense based on dialogue, cooperation, and maintaining a 
collective defense capability. As detailed in the new 1991 Strategic Concept, this 
collective defense capability had to be adequate for NATO to ensure the territorial 
integrity of its members. It explicitly stated that the continuing strength of the Alliance
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was collective defense based on practical arrangements that gave the Alliance its 
capabilities. Through the integrated military structure, common force and operational 
planning, and multinational forces, among other attributes, the Alliance and its members 
would continue to enjoy strength. Now, with the potentially positive changes in Europe 
previously noted in the London Summit Declaration seeming more certain, guidance was 
provided to implement those previously suggested force and readiness changes. In 
addition, there was also the directive that NATO would no longer be structured for 
defense near national borders, unless there were national concerns separate from the 
Alliance. Instead, forces would be repositioned and new efforts would be made for 
NATO forces to be structured to facilitate force buildup in response to an emerging 
crisis.
The period beginning with the Brussels Summit on 11 January 1994, was the 
beginning of revolutionary change in NATO. Revolutionary change suggests change 
that is major or fundamental change to an entity or situation. This was evident in the 
Brussels Summit Declaration that called for a continuation of NATO structural 
adaptation through the implementation of ESDI and CJTF. While key features of these 
two actions were political, each also had substantial relationship to the military structure 
and its effectiveness for the Alliance. The Alliance continued to direct that changes in 
force structure and command headquarters should continue in development.
Additionally, the need to improve ESDI and work more effectively with WEU was also 
added to the challenge. At the same time, CJTF was offered as a means by which the 
military structure of NATO could be effectively integrated with partner and other nations 
in types of non-Article 5 situations. As a military element, a CJTF, especially if part of a 
standing headquarters, would necessitate change throughout the NATO command and
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control structures. Such headquarters would have particular requirements for manning 
and equipping that were not necessarily those of the current command structure. As a 
result, the Heads of State directed the NAC to continue examining how best to 
implement the force changes that were currently underway.
The revolutionary changes of the Brussels Summit were reaffirmed regularly over 
the next several years, though limited progress was seen in their implementation. Then, 
with the onset of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, the revolutionary change expanded 
with the Defense Capabilities Initiative at the 23-24 April 1999, Washington Summit. 
Allied Force had shown all NATO members that while structures and procedures might 
be undergoing change, actual capabilities were lacking. European members of NATO 
were unable to provide substantial support to the air operations due to their inadequate 
capabilities in intelligence, in-air refueling, and a limited ability to employ precision 
guided munitions. While on-going force structure changes continued, the DCI was 
implemented in an effort to put substance to the capabilities resident in those forces. The 
expectation that member nations would accept these identified weaknesses and 
consciously work to address identified shortfalls gave hope that the military capabilities 
of the Alliance might substantially improve.
It was left to the Prague Summit in November 2002, for the transformational 
phase of NATO military change to begin. The definition of transformational change 
suggests that the overall character of an organization or institution changes. The ongoing 
extent of change and the substantial nature of change that began with this Summit and 
continued during this period demonstrated that transformation was underway. Earlier 
initiatives such as ESDI and CJTF held promise for improvements, and therefore, 
continued to be supported and worked. Other initiatives such as the DCI were set aside
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and new efforts begun. It had quickly become apparent that as structured, the DCI was 
not leading to any improved capabilities. So, the Summit replaced it with the Prague 
Capabilities Commitment (PCC). By identifying shortfalls, working to have members 
promise to work towards specific improvements, and linking these efforts with the EU 
Capabilities Action Plan, it was hoped that substantial improvements in military 
capabilities might result. In addition to working to develop the most effective means of 
improving Alliance capabilities, the approval of the PCC also demonstrated that NATO 
would not hesitate to discard those initiatives that did not produce the desired results.
At the same time, an entirely new NATO force was created, the NATO Response 
Force (NRF). As already noted, the decrease in the immediate threat to the borders of 
NATO resulted in a force structure that did not need to be so quickly responsive.
However, NATO was now increasingly looking at the potential for employing forces in 
crisis management roles, and in these situations a more rapidly deployable force was 
necessary. The NRF, working in concert with the EU Headline Goals, was seen as a 
means by which NATO could quickly and efficiently respond to regional crises. The 
NRF is a type of force not necessary for the collective defense role of the Alliance. Its 
development highlights the on-going expansion of Alliance missions out of area. It is an 
explicit effort to align developing capabilities with changing missions.
Finally, the last vestiges of the Cold War NATO structure were removed by the 
streamlining of the Alliance military command arrangements approved during the 
Summit. Now, NATO remained with only one operational headquarters, Allied 
Command Operations (ACO) in Belgium, and a new functional headquarters, Allied 
Command Transformation (ACT), in Norfolk, Virginia. Fine-timing earlier initiatives, 
ACO would have three subordinate commands that would contain land and sea based
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CJTF elements. The Alliance would now be able to fully implement the concept 
following the approval of the Berlin Plus agreement.
In 1989, at the beginning of this time period, NATO was uniquely prepared for its 
role of regional collective defense in a bi-polar world. Fifteen years later, a transformed 
military structure was now prepared for a wider variety of missions, and had added 
structural capabilities that seemed to offer options for greater flexibility to carry out new 
missions. Missing from the equation however, is whether the Alliance has yet 
substantively addressed the need for improved capabilities to accompany these 
structures.
NATO: Value Through Partnerships
While undoubtedly more visible than much of NATO’s internal adaptation, its 
external adaptation has been perhaps even more substantial. It was in the 8 November 
1991, Rome Summit Declaration that NATO first said that it wanted its new security 
policy to be one of dialogue, cooperation, and collective defense.11 The Alliance could 
have hardly foreseen how fundamental the traits of dialogue and cooperation would 
become to its overall transformation. NATO has implemented these concepts in so many 
different manners that is important to consider them in two phases. Partnership is the 
first phase that describes how NATO opened a dialogue with those nations formerly 
dominated by the Soviet Union. The second phase is how NATO expanded that 
relationship with those new nations that had been part of the former Soviet Union, and 
eventually, even to the developing of special relationships with Russia and Ukraine.
These new partnerships expanded to include other nations in Europe and nearby regions
11 NATO, Rome Declaration on Peace, para. 4.
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whose only interest was in learning from NATO and potentially participating with the 
Alliance in crisis management operations.
As the nations of Eastern Europe began distancing themselves from the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO expressed interest in opening a more formal 
dialogue with them. From the beginning, the nations were offered the opportunity to 
meet and speak with NATO, but as those nations achieved greater levels of freedom and 
independence they desired something more substantial. In response to this situation 
NATO developed the North Atlantic Cooperation Council on 19 December 1991. As
previously discussed, the purpose of the NACC was to, “...develop a more institutional
• • • • 12relationship of consultation and cooperation in political and security issues.”
Originally this new entity provided NATO with a formalized means of discussing issues 
with those Central and East European countries that were now completely independent. 
However, as the Soviet Union began to disintegrate, there was a perception on the part of 
some nations that their interests were no longer being properly considered within this 
expanded NACC.
Additionally, there was now discussion of Alliance members working with non- 
NATO nations in crisis management situations, as well as concerns about how to more 
effectively work with the countries belonging to the NACC. Therefore, in 1994 the 
concept of Partnership for Peace was established, implementing the cooperation aspect of 
transformation. While to some it seemed a not so subtle effort to keep nations out of 
NATO, it fundamentally changed the relationship of NATO to these partner countries. 
Where the NACC was an open forum of all its members, PfP was an organization that 
targeted on the relationship between each partner with NATO as a whole. Now, nations
12 Ibid., para 11.
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could get the level of attention that they desired, at least in respect to the effort they 
wished to put into the relationship.
While for some time these two NATO bodies seemed to improve the dialogue, the 
NACC was eventually perceived as an inadequate discussion forum. Suggestions were 
made for some sort of Atlantic Partnership Council, which while not adopted, eventually 
led to the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. In 
establishing the EAPC to replace the NACC, NATO stated that they were, “...determined 
to raise to a qualitatively new level our political and military cooperation with our 
partners... The EAPC...will unite the positive experience of NACC and PfP by providing 
the overarching framework for political and security-related consultations and for
1 'Ienhanced cooperation under PfP...”
The EAPC provides NATO with a forum for discussion among interested 
European and neighboring nations with the Alliance as a whole. As a means of dialogue, 
it provides transparency among nations, as well as a means of discussing issues outside 
the light of public diplomacy that sometimes makes decisions more difficult.
As a complement to the NACC and later the EAPC, PfP has proven to be an 
excellent tool. Rather than keeping countries out of NATO as had been expected, PfP 
became the means of most effectively bringing nations into NATO. With the extensive 
societal and military changes necessary in many of the Central and East European 
Countries as well as those former Soviet Union States, there needed to be some means by 
which NATO could ensure that new members would complement the Alliance, 
contribute to security in some manner, and not contribute to conflict within the
13 NATO, Final Communique, Sintra Ministerial, para. 2.
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expanding area of responsibility. PfP was a way of working with each individual country 
to ensure these actions took place.
As an additional benefit of PfP, NATO developed more stable and transparent 
relationships with other countries in Europe and the region. Neutral and non-aligned 
countries make use of PfP as a means of improving their own training, while also gaining 
greater trust in European security through the transparency that these PfP activities 
provide.
NATO: The First Institution Among Equals
At the beginning of the period under discussion, NATO achieved various levels of 
involvement with other institutions active in Europe. The CSCE was the means by 
which treaties were negotiated between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and nations 
belonging to it expanded the points of discussion in attempts to influence the Soviet 
Union in the areas of human rights and various personal freedoms. The WEU saw little 
activity during most of the Cold War, and the EC was active economically, but had few 
direct dealings with NATO. However, as the Cold War came to an end, NATO 
increasingly became seen as an influential actor in Europe. In dealings with other 
institutions, the needs and intentions of NATO seemed more dominant than those of 
other European institutions. This is significant, since substantial overlap exists among 
the membership of these institutions. Therefore, when an institution appears to take 
precedence over others, it may be a situation where that institution is perceived as more 
valuable or important than others to those states that belong to both, at least in particular 
issue areas.
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In 1989, the CSCE was not an actual organization, but rather a multilateral 
conference since its formal opening in June 1973. It remained only a periodic gathering 
of national representatives working a wide variety of issues primarily in the areas of 
human rights and the environment. However, as an organization with a very wide 
membership, it held particular value. With representation all the way from the Soviet 
Union to the United States and Canada, it provided a forum regarding security matters 
and other categories where discussions could be held less directly influenced by the bi­
polar alliances of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
As the Cold War came to an end, NATO used every opportunity to officially 
acknowledge the potential of the CSCE as a means of maintaining open dialogue with all 
the nations in the region. As East European states, and eventually even those states 
formerly part of the Soviet Union began to achieve greater independence, NATO began 
calling for substantial change within the institution. During the 6 July 1990, London 
Summit, NATO suggested that the CSCE adopt certain structural characteristics that 
would change its very nature.14 Only four months later at the CSCE Paris summit, every 
NATO “suggestion” was adopted as part of The Paris Charter for a New Europe. Over 
the next two years, more supporting institutions were developed within CSCE, and by 
1992 CSCE had declared itself a Chapter VIII Regional Arrangement under the UN 
Charter. CSCE had become an institution rather than a process, and so, was renamed 
OSCE at the Budapest Summit in December 1994.15 While it is apparent that NATO 
members are some of the major nations in the CSCE, other members such as Russia 
might have hindered such change if they felt it in their best interest.
14 NATO, The London Declaration, para. 25.
15 OSCE, OSCE Handbook, 15.
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This is not to suggest that only NATO members had ideas for changing the OSCE, 
or even that the ideas of NATO members were all in synch. To some, the CSCE and 
then OSCE provided an opportunity for a fresh start in European security. It was an 
institution that was seen as having helped bring an end to the Cold War, and had not been 
part of either side. On that basis, it could be a more inclusive institution. To nations 
such as Russia, membership in an expanded OSCE seemed an ideal way of remaining 
influential in matters of European security, while potentially eliminating NATO.16 It 
also leveled their relationship with other nations, since the Warsaw Pact had disappeared 
on its own accord. However, to many of the newly independent countries, while the 
OSCE could provide benefits, it did not provide a sense of security such as that accorded 
by NATO membership. As a result, the OSCE has continued its engagement in 
European activities, but has in no way been seen as a threat to NATO’s existence or 
mission.
In contrast to the rather direct NATO influence demonstrated on the OSCE, its 
relationship with the WEU, the EC, and eventually the EU, has been much more 
interactive and diplomatically complex. As has been seen throughout the examination of 
the critical thresholds, NATO always expressed interest in the development of a 
European security identity. It supported not only the efforts of its European members to 
more effectively engage within the Alliance, but also supported EC efforts to expand into 
the areas of security policy and defense. Support for such matters has not been altruistic. 
NATO’s intention, with emphasis on the desires of the US, was that European Alliance 
members contribute more equitably, while all members continued to have their say in
16 Andrew Cottey, “NATO Transformed: The Atlantic Alliance in a N ew  Era,” in Rethinking 
Security in P ost-C old  War Europe, ed. W. Park and G. Wyn Rees, (New  York: Addison W esley Longman, 
1998), 48.
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Alliance matters. Additionally, the expansion of the EC and then EU into security 
matters was seen as a way for Europeans to effectively engage in crisis management 
operations when NATO as an Alliance chose not to do so.
So, as the Cold War ended, and NATO and the EC examined their roles and 
relationships, NATO welcomed the reemergence of the WEU and its offer to serve as the 
European pillar for the EC within NATO. Following the Maastricht Treaty, this became 
more formalized and began to be incorporated as the concept of ESDI, an effective 
representation of NATO members who were also EU members. Following the 19 June 
1992, WEU Petersberg Declaration, there were increasing efforts to develop an effective 
working relationship between NATO and the WEU. By 1994, the announcement of the 
CJTF concept was seen as a means of operationalizing this European pillar and providing 
NATO support to European operations for those situations where the Alliance as a whole 
chose not to act.
The implementation and development of CJTF had two significant effects. First, 
by providing a ready access to NATO headquarters capabilities, it lessened the value of, 
and the need for, the WEU as a bridge between NATO and the EU. Following the 2 
October 1997, signing of the EU Treaty o f Amsterdam, the active role of the WEU 
disappeared and the EU began working directly with NATO.
European efforts to develop CFSP and then expand into more defense-related 
areas with the European Security and Defense Policy are also influenced by this 
operational development. Despite French efforts to the contrary, the second effect of 
CJTF implementation is that it effectively keeps NATO in charge of EU security 
initiatives that require NATO assets. Since European members of NATO and the EU 
have in most cases not yet resolved critical capability shortfalls, this eliminates NATO
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support to EU operations without at least NATO acquiescence. When examining this 
situation it is easy to overlook that many of the members of both institutions are the 
same.
The evolution of EU security policies have largely resulted from the initiatives of 
members such as France. When France speaks of the desire for a more independent 
European voice in security matters through the EU, it is potentially challenging the 
interests of a variety of members of both institutions. Within the EU, NATO members 
such as Great Britain and Denmark, continue to see NATO as the primary tool of security 
policy, and one which they wish to remain preeminent. At the same time, there are EU 
members such as Sweden, Finland, Ireland, and Austria, whose neutral foreign policies 
support issues of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, but not necessarily a more 
independent European defense policy. So, even though a nation such as France might 
wish to effect change that would enhance the role of the EU, success is difficult. A 
variety of factors both within and outside NATO have come together to maintain the 
central influence of NATO in its relationship with the EU.
From Collective Defense To Collective Security?
As in large part a result of the sum of all of its transformational change, NATO 
transformation from an organization of collective defense to one of collective security is 
increasingly significant. However, in order to examine this change, it is important to 
examine the nature of not only the institution, but also the concepts of collective defense 
and collective security. These are terms holding very specific, yet very different 
meanings to different individuals. If a discussion is based on such differences, then
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analytical progress is difficult. Therefore, we will examine the accepted definitions and 
attempt to determine where the changes in NATO fit into the discussion.
From its establishment, NATO was clearly an institution of collective defense. It
was a formal, treaty based entity, where a number of countries agreed to pool their efforts
and resources against a well-defined outside threat. Each member was bound by their
signature on the North Atlantic Treaty in the case of an armed attack on one of them to
take, “.. .such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore
1
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” As such, an alliance is usually 
seen as an example of a collective defense system or arrangement. This is a situation 
where one group of nations comes together in order to pool their strengths against a 
potential adversary. Whether an alliance by informal or formal agreement, until the 
period of this analysis the accepted belief was that an alliance could not exist in the 
absence of the distinct threat.
With the ongoing turmoil in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War, there was 
no lessening of the importance of this collective defense agreement. No one could 
predict how the Communist leadership of these nations would respond to the changes in 
the countries, and more importantly, one could also not be certain how the Soviet Union 
would react. Even assuming that President Gorbachev was sincere in his efforts and 
statements advocating reform, prudence still dictated that security was critical based on a 
potential challenge within the Soviet Union to such changes. It remained possible that 
Russian leadership might have attempted to turn back the clock of change in the 
governments of Eastern and Central Europe.
17 NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty, (Brussels, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, undated),
Article 5.
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However, as the Soviet Union disappeared and the threat from Russia lessened, 
policy makers, politicians, and academicians began questioning the rationale for the 
continued existence of NATO. How can an alliance based on collective defense exist in 
the absence of the previously defined threat? As discussed in the case studies, it was in 
this period that NATO saw itself as an organization lending stability to the region, 
continuing to provide security, and recognizing that to some of the newly free or 
independent nations of Central and Eastern Europe there was still a place for security. 
NATO documentation increasingly referred to the collective security provided by the 
institution, and how that was a contribution to the region and the nations existing there.
It is here that the second definition must then be examined. NATO’s regular use of
the term collective security, while somewhat logical, does not fit into the more normally
accepted definition. Collective security is usually accepted as a condition where nations
come together for mutual protection from each other. It is agreed that no nation of the
1 8group will threaten or attack any other member of the group. As NATO discussed its 
role in collective security, it was discussing the increasing peace and stability within the 
region, but Alliance membership did not contain that specific prohibition of war against 
the other members. Instead, as Stephen M. Walt discusses, NATO was increasingly 
seeing itself as an ideologically based Alliance. In this case, nations with a common set 
of domestic ideologies, and primarily based on a defensive agreement, find it easier to 
ally against potential threats.19
In fact, it is completely inaccurate to say that NATO has transformed from a 
collective defense organization to one of collective security. In all summit declarations,
18 Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan, International Relations, The K ey Concepts, (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 48.
19 Walt, The Origins o f  Alliances, 40.
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NATO continues to reinforce that its primary purpose remains collective defense. It is 
the ideological nature of the Alliance that implicitly provides the support that enables it 
to also provide a form of collective security. While the Soviet Union no longer remains 
as a threat, the Alliance now recognizes the new threat from terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.20 The challenge is that while these threats 
are just as real and dangerous as that previously embodied in the Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Pact, they are not as well-defined. They do not fit into the Westphalian concept 
of security based on relations between nations. In fact, as evidenced by recent operations 
in Afghanistan, there is a complex interdependent web of many of these threats within 
nations and regions, sometimes with, but often without, the knowledge, tolerance, or 
support of governments. These more complex threats do not lend themselves to 
simplistic or traditional solutions, doctrinal responses, or textbook definitions.
As a result of these very different changes, NATO now finds itself in some ways 
much more reflecting the form of a security community rather than an expression of 
collective security. According to Karl W. Deutsch, a security community is a group 
where there, “...is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each
91other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.” More involved than 
the definition of collective security, a security community assumes some level of 
integration. By Deutsch’s definitions, NATO would be considered a pluralistic security 
community, since the integration is loose and is based on the agreement of sovereign
20 Beginning with the 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO noted, “Risks to Allied security ...may arise 
from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial 
disputes...” para 10. By the Brussels 1994 Summit Declaration, NATO was specifically identifying 
terrorism and the proliferation o f  WMD as new threats (paras. 1 8 - 1 9 ) .
21 Karl W. Deutsch, et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light o f  H istorical Experience, First University Paperback, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), 5.
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states. As a security institution involved in more than just internal conflict resolution, it 
appears that NATO has developed its own definition. Since the perceived need for the 
security provided by the collective defense aspect of the Alliance remains, and the 
security community also seems applicable, we will use the term “defensive security 
community,” when referring to the nature of the relationship evolving within NATO. 
Additionally, one could also make the case that this multi-faceted definition is to a 
certain extent individualized to many of the old, new, and prospective members.
Attributes such as collective defense from outside threats and the linkage of the 
United States and its military power to Europe can be assumed to be consistently desired 
by all NATO members. There are however some varied interpretations of these 
attributes, as well as some other attributes that might be at somewhat more divergent 
purposes between individual nations or some groups of nations.
It seems likely that to all European NATO members, the Alliance remains 
important not only for the security of its collective defense, but also for the linkage of the 
United States and its capabilities to Europe. While there have been differences between 
the US and some European nations in recent years, there has been no real effort to 
separate the US from the Alliance, or for European members to withdraw in any 
substantial way from the commitments of the Alliance. While we have witnessed a 
variety of attempts to restructure control within NATO, mostly on the part of France, 
such efforts have proven unsuccessful. In 1996, the French suggested an initiative where 
they would rejoin the military structure of NATO as soon as the command of AFSOUTH 
changed to a European from an American. The US did not agree, so no changes were 
made. Nevertheless, while France did not rejoin the military structure, it increasingly 
works closely with the other NATO members in ongoing operations. Additionally,
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France has also attempted to use the EU as a means of providing a counterweight to 
NATO. The several years necessary to develop the political implementation of the CJTF 
in large part resulted from French efforts to control use of Alliance assets in an EU 
employment situation. However, as previously discussed, the final conditions of the 
Berlin Plus agreement leaves NATO with the final say, however France or other EU 
members might define or interpret the decision.
There is however, a potential down side to the collective defense interpretation 
most nations hold of the Alliance. While all certainly perceive their safety as greater due 
to their membership, the extent of national contributions relative to that security are 
increasingly at question. Though it is unlikely that any nation would admit it, one could 
make the case that the increasingly smaller defense expenditures of most NATO 
members results from a combination of a perception of a diminished threat, in concert 
with an expectation that defensive needs would be provided by other NATO members in 
general and the US in particular. Efforts on the part of the EU to develop a separate 
military capability notwithstanding, few new European capabilities are being developed. 
There have been efforts to more effectively organize European defense efforts. For 
example, during the 20 June 2003, Thessaloniki Council, the decision was made to 
establish the European Defense Agency (EDA), which would serve to work in the areas 
of research, acquisition, and armaments.22 The EDA was finally established on 12 July 
2004 with a goal of coordinating ECAP efforts at, “...developing defence capabilities in 
the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European armaments 
cooperation, strengthening the European defence industrial and technological base
22 European Union, Thessaloniki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 19.
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(DTIB) and creating a competitive European Defence equipment...”23 At the same time, 
there is also underway a reexamination of available capabilities and how they can be 
used to respond to a wider variety of crisis situations.24 The question of relative 
contribution to the Alliance versus a perception of some as free riders holds potential for 
increasing discord in the future.
Additionally, to those nations who have been NATO members either since its 
beginning or throughout much of the Cold War, the security provided by NATO was also 
related to the influence they were able to have on those nations interested in joining the 
Alliance. By establishing membership requirements for civilian control of the military 
and the need to ensure that border disputes were resolved, the current members helped 
stabilize their own region, and ensured that there would be fewer potential crisis spots 
that might lead to future conflicts. Such an effort is hardly selfish or self-serving, since it 
simultaneously provides a more stable regional environment for these newly independent 
nations to begin to transform themselves into democratic, free-market economies.
The new NATO members have broader definitions of security that are included in 
this security community definition. For them, the linkage of the US to NATO also 
provides them with a counterweight to those larger and more influential European 
powers already members of NATO or the EU. Evidence of this was seen during the 
initial stages of US efforts to remove Saddam Hussein from Iraq, when President Chirac 
of France suggested that nations desiring EU membership should not consider siding
23 EU, Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP o f  12 July 2004 on the establishment o f  the European  
Defence Agency, (Brussels, 17 July 2004), 1.
24 An assessment o f  improvements can be found each six months in the Capability Improvement 
Chart series published by the Council o f  the European Union. The most current is the Capability  
Improvement Chart I  /  2005, published in Brussels by the Council o f  the European Union. It provides an 
assessment o f  the progress o f  capability shortfalls as earlier identified in the Headline Goals, as well as the 
impact o f  the shortfall. It also identifies whether or not there is a readiness issue and if  there are projects or 
initiatives working towards resolution o f  the shortfalls.
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with the US during this conflict. On a related aspect, some nations see their position in 
Europe more secure through their membership in NATO. As an intergovernmental 
institution, each member has a say in all decisions. When the matter is important, they 
have the ability to halt change and decisions that might be desired by other members, as 
demonstrated by Turkey’s ability to hold up the Berlin Plus accord for seven years. So, a 
nation belonging to a significant regional institution such as NATO possesses much 
greater influence than if it was separate from the Alliance.
Another reason to accept this broader definition of a security community results 
from the perspective and participation of neutral nations in the region. Through PfP, 
nations with neutral foreign policies remain involved with NATO members. Both 
NATO members and the PfP members gain transparency in security matters due to the 
mutual activities and discussions. As a result, there is greater trust and confidence that 
there are no hidden threats among them. At the same time, the neutral nations gain 
valuable experience through working with NATO nations, while also explicitly providing 
themselves with a venue to discuss emerging threats to their own security on the basis of 
their PfP agreement.
So, it is not a transformation of NATO from a collective defense to a collective 
security institution that has taken place. Instead, it is a two-part transformation that has 
occurred. First, NATO’s definition of collective defense has been transformed. It is no 
longer an Alliance facing a symmetrical, well-defined force in the Warsaw Pact. Instead, 
it faces a new threat, based primarily on international terrorism and the spread of WMD
25 NATO, Partnership fo r  Peace: Invitation Document issued by the H eads o f  State and government 
participating in the M eeting o f  the North Atlantic Council, (Brussels, 10 January 1994). 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110a.htm (accessed 13 November 2001). This document states that 
among other features, PfP will expand and intensify political and military cooperation, increase stability, 
and provide consultation to any active participating if  that partner perceives a direct threat to its security.
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that requires a new perspective on security. At the same time, and in large part because 
of these new threats, NATO is establishing a new type of pluralistic security community 
designed to provide regional security among members. This new entity also protects 
from instability on its periphery, and enable all members to confront threats to their 
security from whatever region they might arise. This is what we are calling a defensive 
security community.
Challenges Remaining From NATO Enlargement 
Through a wide variety of situations, this paper has examined the many ways that 
NATO has adapted to a transformed world. Alliance changes have been internal and 
external, in policies, structure, and capabilities, and have centered on how the institution 
and its members deal with other nations and institutions. Much of the NATO 
transformation so far noted has been seen in a positive light. Each individual aspect 
seems to have been in anticipation or response to some outward change or influence. In 
most cases, it appears that these changes have in large part resulted in a more effective 
organization than before. However, these adaptations must be considered in how they all 
fit together at a particular point in time.
Examining these changes and individually seeing them as a positive or successful 
change potentially gives too much weight to each. The success or failure of some 
changes is often more a matter of perception, expectation, or point of view, rather than 
fact. For example, the fact of NATO enlargement can elicit very different responses. To 
some, the addition of new members is a political act since it expands the area of security 
and stability provided by the Alliance, and provides more nations to share in a larger 
sense of security based on the larger contributions of all. Conversely, to others, more
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members means the actual value-added of the Alliance is lessened by the more widely 
divergent perceptions of the security provided by the Alliance, by the more difficult 
decisionmaking, and by the redundant or diluted capabilities resulting from so many 
different members.
Therefore, these examples of internal and external transformation must be looked 
at in total as well as individually. Isolated changes might only signify minor institutional 
maintenance that keeps the organization running. On the other hand, a wide range of 
institutional changes might signify a patchwork effort to keep an institution relevant or 
useful at all costs. The effect might be a transformation of the institution based on the 
sum of potentially uncoordinated changes. The transformed institution might not be 
effective, and not the one that was desired or intended.
All potentially contentious issues cannot be addressed or resolved as part of a 
single study. It is, however, important to consider a few of the more controversial 
aspects that have been part of this study so far. First, one must consider the enlargement 
of NATO and all of the implications. What does the increased size and membership of 
the institution say about the future effective transformation of the Alliance? Second, 
while related to the first, what are the implications of unequal institutional memberships 
of member nations as NATO transforms? Can one institution change so substantially 
without having an effect on other interdependent institutions? How NATO works within 
this institutional environment is important for analysis.
NATO Enlargement: Members and Relationships
The expansion or enlargement of NATO can be seen in a variety of ways. As 
already discussed, the Alliance has expanded its mission well beyond Article 5. The
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Alliance expanded in membership, but also in other characteristics. In addition to 
enlargement, the Alliance has also established new relations with nations such as Russia 
and Ukraine. Through PfP and the EAPC, NATO has developed more substantive 
relations with a wide range of other nations from Ireland and Sweden to Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan. At the same time, NATO has also initiated and expanded dialogues with 
regions, through avenues such as the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Southeastern Europe 
Initiative, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
NATO has also expanded its role functionally. Foremost are the substantial 
changes based on its increased involvement in crisis management. In conjunction with 
the new emphasis crisis response, there has also been the development of its Euro- 
Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) to coordinate NATO 
disaster assistance. Additionally, there has been increasing support for the expansion of 
those Article 2 discussions in a wide variety of areas, but primarily in the areas of 
scientific, economic, and environmental exchanges. This indicates a wider involvement 
of the Alliance in many other areas of society beyond strict definitions of security.
Not only has the membership expanded from 16 to 25 members, but the area of 
responsibility has expanded as those nations joined. Bigger is not necessarily better, and 
the larger number of members brings any number of new issues into consideration. As 
NATO grows, can it continue to operate effectively? That of course is one of the 
primary questions of this hypothesis. Can an institution that increases in membership so 
significantly, still effectively make decisions and operate on a day to day basis? The 
discussion on this matter often relates to one of two predominant perspectives. The first 
is that the consensus decisionmaking of NATO is a cornerstone of the Alliance that 
cannot change. At the same time, to others, if the Alliance is to remain relevant in
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confronting international problems, there must be further changes that increase the 
effectiveness of the Alliance. Both sides of this discussion significantly impact on the 
transformation of NATO.
The Conflicts From Institutional Membership
Closely related to the challenges from the nature of NATO’s new defensive 
security community are the challenges relating to the sometimes complementary but 
often competing institutional memberships of the member nations. While there are a 
large number of European institutions, only a few are critical for our consideration. As 
previously covered in detail, the EU is a critical actor, increasingly working in concert 
with NATO throughout this time period. Likewise, the WEU was briefly a significant 
actor in matters of European and transatlantic security issues during the period of this 
analysis. The evolution of the CSCE to the OSCE during this period also signified an 
important security-related development. The role of these institutions is an important 
part of gaining a comprehensive perspective of NATO transformation.
The changing relationship between NATO, the EU, and the WEU has been a 
major development during the past 16 years. While the WEU and its role diminished as 
the EU absorbed most of its functions, those that remain are critical. Article 5 of the 
Brussels Treaty remains in effect and applies to those signatory members. While they 
are all NATO members, it means that those members also have certain EU obligations. 
Therefore, when acting in an EU security role, they run the risk of unintentionally 
involving NATO due to the overlapping membership.
It is however, the issue of NATO’s overlapping membership with the EU where 
the greatest potential for conflict exists. It is through the different national capabilities
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and contributions promised to the two institutions, encumbered by assorted obligations, 
and separate national interests, that NATO and the EU run the greatest risk of coming in 
conflict. Such a conflict could well result in a rift among either those members in 
common, or those belonging to only one of the two institutions.
The concept of ESDI is one area of overlap with great potential for conflict as well 
as cooperation. For how long can EU members of NATO expect to balance issues 
between the two institutions? In the employment of the C JTF or the consideration of 
other European security matters, they must work closely with those non-EU or North 
American NATO members to ensure that their interests and options are acceptable to all. 
At the same time, as the EU increasingly develops a more comprehensive CFSP and 
ESDP, the non-NATO members might well have concerns or national agendas that place 
the NATO members in conflict. For example, what if the development of security and 
defense policies within the EU are based on the limitations of those neutral members? At 
the same time, those EU NATO members could have commitments within the Alliance 
for the same missions and with policies unacceptable to other EU members. The 
challenge will be how to resolve such diametrically opposed obligations and decisions 
without affecting Alliance solidarity.
While the issues previously mentioned are all serious and could well cause 
significant rifts in either or both institutions, the issue of capabilities, specifically, 
military forces, is one that is heard more often. Since the EU began expanding its 
interests in the area of security matters, especially with the announcement of the Helsinki 
Headline Goals in 1999, there has been a perception that the two institutions were now in 
more direct conflict. To some, the announcement of the NRF during the NATO Prague 
Summit was in response to the Helsinki Headline Goals and was an effort to ensure that
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NATO remained preeminent in the area of operating forces. On the surface, it now 
appears that those nations who are members of both institutions are attempting to use 
their limited military forces for two purposes. Considering that most nations have 
significantly reduced their forces and capabilities in recent years, to commit them to two 
institutions with similar, but certainly not identical interests could be perceived as 
counterproductive and possibly dangerous. This is also complicated by the fact that 
many European nations also routinely provide forces to the UN for peacekeeping 
operations. Between varying levels of commitment to three institutions, as well as 
protecting their own national interests, it might seem to some that promises made to the 
NRF and those that are part of the Headline Goals are hollow commitments. 
Unacknowledged by many however, is the fact that in terms of overall personnel
numbers, European governments have actually met the Headline Goals in the wide
26variety of deployments that they have supported the past several years. The 
misunderstanding is that in many cases, there is no holistic view or common 
understanding when it comes to the issues involved with the employment of military 
forces. There are separate perceptions of how to support NATO issues, how to support 
EU issues, and even how to support national issues. However, each of these three issues 
are considered in isolation without delineating the mutual responsibilities and 
relationships among the various actors. As a result, it appears the institutions and their 
members are uncertain regarding the potential implications of the overextended forces 
and capabilities.
26 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace, “Not Such a Soft Power: the External Deployment o f  
European Forces,” Survival 46, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 40.
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The Future Of NATO Transformation
NATO has unquestionably transformed itself since the end of the Cold War. There 
is no doubt that the Alliance that manned the borders opposite the Warsaw Pact is not the 
Alliance that went to war in Kosovo, or now provides security and assistance in 
Afghanistan. There are more members in NATO, and a wide variety of nations with 
which the Alliance has close relations. In many cases, these nations are not in or 
immediately adjacent to the North Atlantic Area as originally defined in the Treaty. At 
the same time, NATO is increasingly cooperating with nations in nearby regions, and has 
opened scientific, economic, and similar dialogues with a wide variety of nations. Most 
significantly, by the time of the 28 June 2004, Istanbul Summit, NATO’s missions had 
expanded well beyond collective defense. As a result, the Alliance has more wide- 
ranging responsibilities now expressed in a global context instead of its previously well- 
defined area of responsibility. As already noted however, transformation as change is 
not necessarily good or bad, it just exists. It is how that change relates to the goals and 
purposes of the institution and its member nations, which determines the relative value of 
such change. Therefore, it is important that one now considers this transformation within 
the context of the relative value and importance of what has taken place to date, as well 
as the way ahead in order to determine if future transformation is to be positive.
When examining this question, one can wonder whether or not NATO will remain 
or disappear. If NATO remains, what exactly is its purpose? And of course, to 
determine the nature of a NATO that remains, one must consider how it changed to 
become what it is today. On the other hand, if NATO disappears, what is the regional 
and global environment it leaves behind? Is there a new institution replacing NATO, or 
does NATO change so significantly that whatever remains is no longer considered the
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institution? Focusing more narrowly, three particular options are offered that relate to 
the hypothesis and offer options regarding the eventual nature of NATO transformation 
as it proceeds from its current level.
The first option is NATO remaining as it is now. Clearly, structure, procedures, 
and missions would remain as they are now. While there might be discussion of change, 
very little would occur. This assumes that the status quo is workable, and that the 
Alliance is currently providing an acceptable level of support and assistance to its 
members, to include the critical collective defense assurance that has always served as its 
foundation. The possibility exists however, that in this situation, any new crisis could 
provide critical if the Alliance was unable or unwilling to respond or adapt effectively.
The second option is where NATO continues to make incremental changes in order 
to maintain current functionability. This possibility builds on the first, and assumes that 
the nature and level of activity within the Alliance is perceived as useful and productive 
by its members, and as such, provides a value added that those members would wish to 
maintain. In this situation however, an additional assumption is made based on the 
significant number of changes that have taken place during the post-Cold War period.
This assumption is that the institution must continue to make additional changes just to 
maintain the current level of effectiveness. These would be necessary in order to ensure 
that the current level of effective transformation is supported by additional changes that 
either fix identified inefficiencies, or to provide improved processes or capabilities 
necessary for continued effective operation. In a sense, this is making isolated repairs to 
maintain the current levels of activity.
The third option develops these issues a step further. In this option, the assumption 
is that NATO has effectively begun transforming itself, but the institution still requires
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additional changes and improvements in order to keep transformation viable. The 
expansion of the mission, the enlargement of membership, and the involvement of the 
Alliance in an increasing number of issue areas require further internal consolidation if 
they are to be effectively implemented. Therefore, these additional changes would not 
just ensure that the NATO remains as it is today. Instead, these would be additional 
changes necessary to ensure that current expectations for NATO improvement could be 
effectively implemented. These changes would be orchestrated as long-term 
improvements and part of the continued transformation of the Alliance.
It is on this third option that the remaining research will focus on. It is clear that 
NATO is a transformed institution, but it is just as clear that it is not yet at an optimal 
operating stage. Between the continued uncertainty of the international environment, on­
going developments within the EU, and the questions of the role of member nations 
within international institutions, NATO requires additional changes for a successful 
transformation. The identification and implementation of these changes are critical in 
considering adaptation still required.
As discussed for example, the many areas of transformation within NATO were 
characterized by varying levels of implementation. At the same time, additional aspects 
of NATO structure, process, and procedures require change if positive transformation is 
to be completely and effectively implemented.
Three critical areas within the Alliance and its relations with member nations and 
other institutions hold the key to successful long-term transformation. These areas are 
Alliance decisionmaking, burdensharing, and relations with the EU. These areas are 
those often referred to in analysis and discussion concerning NATO in a wide variety of 
venues. They are however, often discussed in isolation, and usually not in depth. It is
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only through examining them in concert with each other that one can develop a more 
comprehensive view of the dangers and opportunities for NATO and how they relate to 
NATO’s potential for effective transformation.
Improving Alliance Decisionmaking?
As an intergovernmental organization, NATO decisionmaking would not seem to 
be an issue. The basic principle of such an institution is that all members must agree on 
all decisions. If one nation is against some action, it cannot take place. While the EU 
has a variety of decisionmaking procedures for different situations, it would go against 
NATO’s very premise to adopt any supranational characteristics or any sort of weighted 
voting procedures. Therefore, several aspects of decisionmaking must be considered 
when suggesting change within the Alliance.
The first area of change is in the need to accommodate the larger membership of 
the Alliance following enlargement. An institution that operates on consensus cannot 
help but find decisionmaking difficult when there are more voices and more opinions to 
be heard regarding each decision. One might expect that in the case of collective 
defense, decisive consensus would be readily achieved. If one member was attacked, the 
others, even under a larger membership would be prepared to respond. However, two 
situations could develop from even such a seemingly obvious situation. First, with 
NATO’s greatly expanded area of responsibility, it is conceivable that a nation could be 
threatened or attacked in a way that is not such an obvious Article 5 commitment to other 
members of the Alliance. This might originate from a conflict resulting from historical 
animosities among neighboring countries, or perhaps the case of an uncertain terrorist­
like attack. At the same time, the expanded missions and operations of the Alliance
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could potentially lead to a situation where a member feels it has been attacked by another 
nation or non-traditional entity such as a terrorist organization, but it is not seen as an 
Article 5 commitment by members who are not similarly involved. For example, if a 
CJTF is involved with a coalition of the willing in a non-Article 5 operation, how do 
other NATO nations react if a particular member of the CJTF force is attacked and 
suffers great loss as part of the operation? Would such a situation result in the 
implementation of Article 5?
The second aspect of decisionmaking relates directly to the first. With the 
expanded missions within NATO, there must somehow be a way in which nations can 
feel they are contributing as they desire, yet are not committed when they wish to remain 
separate from a particular situation. In the context of collective defense, the only 
response that is expected is full support from everyone participating. On the other hand, 
when the decision relates to a much wider variety of crisis response missions, each nation 
must be able to consider its participation as more than just a matter of Alliance solidarity. 
It must also be able to consider how the mission affects its own national security 
interests, both internal and external. The member must also be able to consider how 
participation affects its own defense capabilities and those capabilities promised to the 
Alliance. Not every nation has a full range and depth of capabilities within their force 
structure. Requirements of a more internationally active NATO could easily overwhelm 
some of its member’s resources. This is especially important since there is a movement 
towards niche capabilities on the part of many members. In this situation, member 
governments are identifying specific capabilities that are important for operations and 
those they can focus on providing in conflict situations, rather than attempting to possess 
the full range of military capabilities. The experiences of Polish and Czech units in
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
256
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have convinced other members to develop niche 
capabilities in areas such as special operations forces, military police, explosive ordnance
9 7disposal, and military intelligence.
The final concern in accommodating decisionmaking is in how to most effectively 
incorporate EU members as part of the process. Any explicit organizational 
representation of the EU within the Alliance is not an inclusive element. The dynamics 
of a European element and a North American/US element would be one situation, but an 
EU element within the Alliance is completely different. While the European 
membership of NATO and the EU are getting closer, they are not yet uniform, and will 
not be so anytime soon. As previously discussed, these membership discrepancies are 
what makes potential improvements in decisionmaking difficult and complex. Not only 
might it be a problem for EU members to work in concert with the non-EU members of 
NATO, but difficulties in effectively working Alliance issues which incorporate their EU 
partners could make the situation more dangerous. If NATO members outside of the EU 
believe that neutral nations such as Finland, Sweden, or Ireland had an undue influence 
on Alliance decisions, achieving compromise could be even more difficult.
Whose Interpretation of Burdensharing?
The topic of burdensharing is one that was contentious throughout the Cold War 
and still continues. During the Cold War it was a question of who provided what forces 
and what capabilities, how were they paid for, how were risks shared, and which implicit 
or explicit costs were considered. Since there was seldom an agreed upon definition,
27 Jeffrey Simon, NATO Expeditionary Operations: Impacts Upon New M embers and Partners, 
(Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2005), 20.
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there was seldom consensus. All the concerns and discussions from the Cold War 
remain in one form or another relative to collective defense, but now, with the expansion 
of the NATO missions, there are even additional burdensharing considerations. Now it is 
also a question of which nations have expeditionary forces, or even just capabilities 
necessary to deploy forces outside the area.
Additionally, today there is an increasingly important aspect of burdensharing that 
is seldom mentioned, that of the relative contributions of hard power versus soft power. 
Or, to put it another way, those capabilities necessary for the conduct of winning the war, 
and those capabilities necessary for nation building, post-hostilities, and the eventual 
winning of the peace. There remains a wide disparity on how such capabilities are 
perceived not only on each side of the Atlantic, but also within Europe. If members are 
not in agreement on the relative effort and value of each other’s contributions, it could be 
increasingly difficult to not only work in crisis management operations, but also in 
collective defense situations.
EU/NATO Relations
Finally, there are a range of political and force structure issues with the EU that 
NATO must resolve for further progress to be made in effective transformation. 
Unfortunately, in many cases, since there are two institutions involved, NATO can only 
accomplish so much unilaterally. In many situations, the EU must likewise work to 
resolve these issues if mutual effectiveness is desired.
Politically, NATO and the EU must reconcile an ESDP developed for the EU with 
the somewhat different needs for the membership of NATO. The development of an EU 
defense policy could quickly hinder many of the improvements related to improved
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dialogue within the Alliance. Just as important, NATO and the EU must determine how 
to reconcile the evolving challenges from the demands on operational military forces. 
NATO’s efforts to provide a crisis response force through the NRF are perceived as in 
conflict with the EU Rapid Reaction Force and the Headline Goals. Additionally, those 
NATO initiatives currently part of the Prague Capabilities Commitment might also be 
seen as competing with the EU’s European Capabilities Action Plan, as both are 
employed to improve specific national capabilities. The intent on the part of both 
institutions is for the PCC and ECAP efforts to be coordinated, but real progress still 
depends on national decisions.
NATO: A Future Vision 
NATO has transformed and continues adapting, but the reinvention is not yet 
complete, and in a very real sense, never will be. The transformation of NATO to a 
defensive security community requires additional work if the institution is to continue 
working for the betterment of its members. In order to examine the future vision of 
NATO and how it might work more effectively, we will continue with the three part 
analysis previously discussed. First, there is the question related to NATO’s external 
relations and how it can effectively accomplish its missions while working with the EU. 
Or, in other words, how can two institutions and their varied memberships work more 
effectively together? The overarching issue in this problem is in how NATO and the EU, 
along with their memberships can develop a common vision, or at least complementary 
visions. Next, changes in decisionmaking are necessary within the institution in order to 
more effectively determine how the institution operates and plans to implement these 
new visions. Finally, the issue of burdensharing must be considered for how each
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member contributes to the institutional success and to the resolution of problems within 
the region. NATO members have defined a new role for the institution in Europe and the 
world through the expansion of its mission. Now it requires a means by which the goals 
to be accomplished can be articulated to the satisfaction of all members. It also requires 
that a means to implement those goals, along with capabilities or resources to execute 
that implementation be developed. It is in this area that NATO can achieve more 
substantial improvements if transformation takes place in a more coherent fashion, and in 
conjunction with other developments in Europe.
Understanding Each Other’s Vision
During the cold war, NATO strategy could be more direct. The Alliance 
established a military strategy aimed at deterring war with the Soviet Union. If such 
deterrence failed, they would focus on defeating their Soviet adversary. The end of the 
Cold War changed that. Now it was necessary for NATO and its members to articulate a 
more cohesive and wide-ranging vision of what the institution should accomplish, how it 
should go about doing it, and how members would support that. Unfortunately, the lack 
of the well-defined threat makes such common vision much more difficult. The 1991 
and 1999 Strategic Concepts have served in part to provide such common vision for 
NATO and its members. What is obvious yet often overlooked however, is how this 
vision is only acceptable to members until it is perceived as coming in conflict with 
national interests.
The NATO Strategic Concept provides a transatlantic vision of how to respond to 
emerging challenges, how to address a wide variety of security issues, and how the 
member nations should work together in a variety of situations. In a Cold War period,
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this transatlantic concept could be framed by being limited to actions relating to a Soviet 
threat, and by limiting those threats to those based within the defined regions of the 
North Atlantic Treaty. Now, NATO's threats are global, and the limits of the North 
Atlantic Treaty boundaries are gone. The result is the uncertainty on the part of the 
institution and members regarding how to most effectively confront international 
problems. Instead, what all must recognize is the need for coordination and respect 
among a spectrum of visions. Nations and institutions have interests. They cannot be 
seen as a hierarchy, since to each member and institution; its own interests are 
preeminent. Instead, they must be considered as a framework of interests, held together 
by the corresponding relationships between them. This can be accomplished by the US 
and its NATO and European allies developing a more complementary approach to 
security interests. They must make conscious decisions as to when those interests are 
best approached by means of the Alliance, by the EU or other coalitions of the willing, or 
by unilateral means. The NATO Strategic Concept must continue to serve as the means 
by which the Alliance members articulate those goals held in common. Which are the 
actions and decisions so important to all members that they are willing to come to one 
another’s defense, or are willing to work with one another in times of crisis 
management?
However, there must be a recognition and acceptance that other visions and 
strategies are also concurrently in effect. On one side of the Atlantic there is an 
American strategic security concept. Articulated in an annual National Security Strategy 
(NSS), this concept describes US national interests, goals, and approaches to problems, 
and provides the foundation for a hierarchy of strategies such as a National Defense 
Strategy, and a National Military Strategy. Many of the issues and approaches are
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similar to European approaches, but not all. These different approaches are one of the 
realities of an Alliance among sovereign states. The European Union has developed a 
similar expression of EU interests in a European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS, 
while similar to the American NSS, is not yet an expression of overarching security and 
defense strategy. Through further and careful development of ESDP, the EU can begin 
to selectively identify those differences in interests that it has as a regional institution 
representing its European membership, from those transatlantic interests of NATO. The 
challenge is for those differences to accommodate both the EU members of NATO as 
well as the neutral members of the EU. Finally, the NATO Strategic Concept, the 
ESS/ESDP, and the strategies of the individual members must be designed in such a 
manner as to facilitate cooperation whenever possible, and tolerance, understanding, or at 
least neutrality, towards the needs of the others when there is a difference.
Such acceptance of each others’ differing interests is the foundation of the 
increasingly prevalent concept of the coalition of the willing. For both practical as well 
as political reasons, not every country will be willing or able to conduct operations in all 
situations. Such refusal should not be perceived as a rejection of institutional obligations 
or mutual support if it is based on clearly articulated national or institutional vision. 
Additionally, development of a detailed and directive EU vision in matters of defense 
could prove problematic. There is the very real risk that policies decided by the EU 
membership become the non-negotiable perspective of the EU NATO members. This 
would go against the grain of NATO consensus agreement and could well prove fatal. 
Therefore, this is one area where the EU should strive for consensus, but continue to 
allow for an “opt-out” in matters of defense, either for their neutral members, or for those 
NATO-EU members.
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The Need For A Coordinated Vision.
Many of the current problems within the Alliance as well as between the Alliance 
and other institutions relate to the lack of the before mentioned vision. Once such a 
common vision exists, the potential to determine how to confront and resolve problems is 
much clearer. It is then a matter of identifying the nature of the problem and where it fits 
within the framework of interests previously mentioned. In the case of those crises or 
issues that are clearly focused on the Alliance as a whole, NATO can respond. Through 
its regional and partnership dialogues NATO can also invite those other nations that 
might prefer to join in. Therefore, other EU members or nations need not feel excluded 
by this NATO response. In fact, such a response fits comfortably within the defensive 
security community concept previously described. For a crisis that is clearly an 
American security interest, but not necessarily a European one, the US should be 
comfortable about acting unilaterally, or with those selected NATO or other friends and 
allies who have similar interests. The US should not, however, see the lack of NATO 
direct support as confrontational or unreasonable. A framework of national interests will 
only work when there is recognition that except in cases of collective defense, each 
nation must consider what is in its own best interest. The US rightly insists on such an 
understanding, and must recognize and tolerate the same in others.
In the case of more regionally-based crises, the European members of NATO or 
the EU might wish to respond when it is not necessarily appropriate for the Alliance as a 
whole, or more explicitly, for the US, to be involved. Currently, great progress has 
been made in this area. In those cases where NATO as an institution chooses not to 
participate, but is not adverse to a response, the CJTF provides an ideal means of 
assisting those nations that wish to act. It is also possible for nations to develop their
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
263
own “coalition of the willing” and come together separate from NATO and CJTF if that 
is more appropriate. This option provides another relief valve for nations, ensuring that 
NATO members are not getting involved with something not in their own interests, or 
conversely, for nations that may choose not to use a CJTF, that NATO influence is not 
limiting their ability to act in their own interests.
Cooperative Vision, Cooperative Strategy
Discussions abound concerning the problems of capabilities needed and available 
to carry out Alliance missions, or now, to serve as EU forces. Burdensharing is no 
longer just a matter of acquisition, but of participation and capabilities that are available 
to be provided in response to Alliance requirements. As NATO implements the NATO 
Response Force (NRF) and the EU develops a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) 
by means of its Headline Goals process, there has been increasing concern that this must 
signify an over-commitment of force capabilities that might well undermine any real 
improvements. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Once again, the framework of interests provides the foundation of successful 
transformation in this area of burdensharing. Additionally, just as security encompasses 
more than direct military matters, so must burdensharing consider all that Alliance 
members and partners contribute to crisis situations and crisis response. Therefore, one 
must consider individual national interests, the way in which military capabilities are 
used to implement these visions, and the nature of both hard and soft power and the 
relative contributions of members accordingly in order to truly assess equitable 
burdensharing.
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First, it is a reasonable assumption that a nation will initially plan for using its 
capabilities in support of its own national interests before it commits to any institution or 
treaty. At the same time, NATO assumes that in an obvious collective defense situation 
nations will respond accordingly with whatever contribution is available and appropriate.
The actual contributions and commitments of Alliance and partner military forces 
are an issue in planning to respond to crisis situations, but not always for the most 
obvious reasons. As already discussed, many of the European members of NATO and 
other European countries do not currently have substantial military capabilities. While 
NATO can mitigate some of those shortfalls by the sharing of assets, in the long run, it is 
a dangerous situation that could easily leave the Alliance unable to adequately meet 
threats. This may in part be mitigated by the coordinated development of niche 
capabilities among member states. Whether as part of the collective defense foundation 
of NATO or in its increasing role as a defensive security community, a basic assumption 
is the relatively equitable contribution of all nations to the security of others. The 
commitment of those limited forces to independent multinational operations, NATO, or 
the EU, does not, however, automatically signify a problem. While to many analysts 
such commitments represent an over extension of limited resources, European nations are 
just now beginning to treat their force structure as the US has for years. The US military 
has routinely used a process known as force apportionment to support planning and crisis 
response. This apportionment process recognizes that there are inadequate forces to 
solve every problem simultaneously. So, forces are apportioned, which means that 
generic type forces are promised to a military commander for planning purposes. This 
enables the commander to prepare plans based on realistic capabilities. If a developing 
crisis situation proves to be substantially different than what had been envisioned, or the
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forces are not all available, changes in forces to be provided are made accordingly. 
Similarly, European members of NATO might well have interests outside those of their 
NATO commitments. It is then their responsibility to align or apportion those forces as 
their interests deem most appropriate, whether for NATO, EU, or particular national 
interests. What is incumbent on them however, is to prioritize those commitments, and 
recognize that in each situation they will be forced to reconsider the new crisis and any 
on-going situations and respond accordingly. This is not a means of replacing 
capabilities that do not exist, only of more effectively employing those capabilities that 
are available.
Finally, burdensharing must also be defined to include all elements of power that 
contribute to the successful resolution of a conflict. To some critics, the EU is an 
economic power and should contribute accordingly to economic aspects, help pay for 
combat operations, and support peacekeeping operations. NATO on the other hand 
would respond to the military and combat aspects of security. However, such 
simplistically defined burdensharing does not account for the sharing of risks, and the 
likely accurate perception that only as full participants in a conflict will European nations 
have an equitable role in decisionmaking. This does not however, lessen the importance 
of all elements of power in the settling of conflict or crisis situations. The lessons 
learned from the US Operation Iraqi Freedom indicate that inadequate attention to all 
elements of national power throughout the range of a conflict can have a long range 
impact on crisis management.
What is needed is a truly international and wide-ranging approach to crisis 
management where not only are military matters carefully considered, but all elements of 
power and all agencies of affected governments and international institutions
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incorporated into the solution. To use the framework of current US military planning, 
what is necessary, is total involvement of nations and organizations in the planning for 
crisis situations across all phases of the planning. In an effort to more adequately plan 
for contingencies, the US military develops plans that begin with efforts to deter the 
potential adversary, and through positive activities in the region, potentially preclude 
conflict. If this fails, then following deployment of adequate force capabilities, they will 
seize the initiative and achieve decisive success. This would be followed by transition 
from a military force to a force helping provide for long-term stability and the 
establishment of a peaceful environment. The first and final phases must particularly 
include all elements of power if the crisis is to be effectively managed. It is also in these 
areas that many European nations and the EU can most effectively contribute to crisis 
situations. They should not do so to the exclusion of participation in combat operations, 
but their effective contribution in those areas might well lessen the demands on the need 
for combat forces from countries such as the US or others before or after those decisive 
operations.
Such a philosophical change in Alliance planning would not be easy. It is difficult 
enough for a nation to incorporate all elements of its own government in their own plan, 
let alone to discuss how to work issues among not only international forces, but also 
national and international agencies and ministries. Nevertheless, NATO is uniquely 
suited for such a potential endeavor. Through many years, NATO has gained experience 
in multinational planning and all of the challenges inherent in it. Recent operations, 
especially those that have transitioned to EU operations have necessitated coordination 
with entities outside the Alliance structure. Based on that increasing experience, and the 
availability of NATO headquarters to serve as a venue for planning out of the public eye,
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the potential exists. These changes are all feasible within the current structure of 
NATO, but as with most changes within an intergovernmental organization, are primarily 
dependent on the efforts of members in general, and major members such as the US in 
particular.
Contribution To Scholarship 
This study enhances our understanding of how NATO, as an institution has 
understood the challenges of profound changes in its operational environment and how 
this institution has survived considerable adaptation. The focus of this research has been 
to examine a select number of exemplary cases that detail NATO’s transformation from 
1989 -  2004. The analysis of key NATO documentation to illustrate the institution’s 
transformational direction and consensus building demonstrates the breadth of change 
NATO has undergone. Capturing the breadth of change is critical to a literature 
dominated by more narrowly focused inquiries. Oftentimes, analysis of these issues 
focuses on either the failures or problems of NATO since the end of the Cold War, or on 
the positive successes during the same period. In other cases, previous analyses focus on 
a narrow range of Alliance issues. While each perspective offers valuable contributions, 
the study of the comprehensive nature of NATO’s transformation has remained 
incomplete. Instead, this study has examined a variety of developments within NATO 
during this tumultuous period. It provides a more comprehensive assessment on how 
these developments are interrelated and how they are contributing to long term change 
within the institution. Based on this study’s analysis, the three challenges of NATO 
external relations, decisionmaking, and burdensharing all deserve more detailed study. It 
has, however, been demonstrated by the case studies and this analysis that these three
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issues are central to continued effectiveness within NATO. It is left to later studies to 
examine these issues in greater detail.
The research was completed based on an analysis of what NATO said through its 
official documentation and statements, followed by observation and analysis of the 
actions it then took. At the same time, major national issues of many of its members 
were examined as part of the analysis. The analysis also included a search for 
interrelationships between those nations and NATO as well as other institutions and 
NATO. Despite this approach, much remains hidden in the activities of international 
organizations as well as the bureaucracies and governments of nations. Any outside 
analysis can only make prudent assumptions about the reasons behind many of the 
decisions and actions and what the actual long-term goals of particular actors might be. 
Nevertheless, the actual change that results is most important. Such a concrete change is 
something that can be seen and assessed.
The Extent Of NATO Transformation 
The extent of NATO adaptation during the period of analysis has been substantial. 
As previously mentioned, extensive change in and of itself does not necessarily signify 
positive change. It is the complementary nature of the change, and the way in which it is 
perceived by members and neighbors as having a positive influence on the capabilities 
and effectiveness of the institution, that determines the true nature of the change. In 
order to more effectively examine the nature of the adaptation as seen in the case studies, 
we will conclude by consolidating the lessons of the analysis into four categories. By 
looking at who makes up NATO, why it continues to exist, what makes up the changes
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during the period, and how the institution brought about such changes, one can hopefully 
understand the extent of change and adaptation within the institution.
First, who makes up NATO membership is the fundamental issue. At the end of 
the Cold War NATO consisted of 16 members. They had joined together over time to 
link the US to Europe and to assist one another in case of a conflict involving the 
Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, NATO enlargement 
became a major issue as quickly as nations were freed from Soviet control or dominance. 
The case studies showed how enlargement served both current members as well as 
applicants. For NATO, the carrot of future membership held out to non-members helped 
provide regional stability. It did this by providing an incentive to would-be members to 
focus the transformation of former Communist states to democratic states living at peace 
with their neighbors. They were challenged to resolve internal problems and border 
conflicts that might otherwise give rise to future conflicts. To the applicants, NATO 
membership was a guarantee that domination as practiced by the Soviet Union would not 
again affect them. At the same time, the membership also provided security and 
confidence by allowing many smaller or otherwise lesser developed nations to have a 
stronger link to the United States than might otherwise be possible on a strictly bi-lateral 
basis. NATO enlargement was seen as an advantage by many European nations that did 
not necessarily desire NATO membership. The institution had demonstrated during the 
Cold War that it could be trusted, and the interdependence engendered by NATO 
membership provided regional security and transparency to members and non-members 
alike.
The question of why NATO continued is one that has been considered and 
analyzed extensively. In the context of this particular analysis, the answer to the question
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is fairly straightforward. NATO survived the tumultuous period for two primary reasons. 
First, the transition of NATO from a collective defense organization to a defensive 
security community was subtle. The perceived need for the collective defense role of 
NATO continued well after the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union’s uncertain 
existence, followed by Russia’s instability, and then the emergence of other more non- 
traditional but serious threats supported this role. So, while the particular focus of 
NATO’s collective defense has changed from the Soviet Union to the threats of terrorism 
and the proliferation of WMD, the fact that the members still felt threatened has not 
disappeared. Had NATO experienced several years without a visible adversary, and with 
no obvious dangers nearby as erupted in the Balkans, it might have been a different 
matter. However, with old threats replaced by new, NATO’s continued existence was 
never seriously questioned by its members. Additionally, as an institution that had 
operated effectively for decades, members saw value in the continued existence of the 
Alliance. This value was sufficient to keep the nations active within the Alliance while 
new threats replaced the old. As an institution NATO had proven itself valuable to its 
members. Within the confines of meetings and discussions, nations are able to discuss 
issues apart from public view and separate from other diplomatic channels. Keeping 
such an institution in existence was an additional consideration during this period.
What NATO did during this period to bring about these changes was to transform 
its mission. This is a situation where transformation is exactly the correct word. To say 
that NATO changed its mission would be too simplistic, and also incorrect. The 
collective defense foundation of the Alliance remains at its core. What has happened is 
that the institution has built on the foundation of collective defense and expanded it.
Going beyond the description of collective security, this analysis has shown that NATO
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has evolved into a new type of a security community, defined here as a defensive security 
community. Based on Deutsch’s security community definition, this expanded concept 
accommodates the Alliance’s increasing involvement in out of area missions.
This mission transformation is not just a single event that took place, but like the 
why of NATO existence, it continues evolving. During 1989-1990, NATO continued to 
see its role primarily in the collective defense of Europe. As the US began considering 
operations against Iraq to liberate Kuwait, NATO was asked for assistance. While the 
nations of the Alliance recognized the threat, it was still too soon for the institution to go 
from a well-defined threat and area of responsibility in the Atlantic Area to a distant 
intervention. Nevertheless, the experience of NATO membership proved invaluable to 
those NATO nations that chose to participate in the US coalition. At the same time, as 
previously shown, NATO implemented a number of actions that assisted US operations. 
This support was either through other countries providing relief and replacements for US 
and other supporting national forces removed from the NATO area, or through support 
provided to the deployment and security of coalition forces.
Emerging crises in the Balkans provided the next push to the transformation of 
NATO missions and its movement out of area. NATO member nations attempted to 
assist in the region but with no success. European efforts, either individually or through 
the EU, proved inadequate for bringing peace or stability to the region. Based on the 
painful lessons of NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Alliance responded in 
Kosovo. Following a UN request, and the appearance of a humanitarian crisis that might 
go beyond Kosovo to eventually affect NATO members, Operation Allied Force was 
initiated and eventually provided the foundation for a NATO deployment in the region. 
While Allied Force was a successful operation since the Serbs withdrew from Kosovo, it
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cannot be called an effective operation. Individual NATO members deserve some of the 
blame for that inefficiency and ineffectiveness. Announcements that there would be no 
ground intervention can be blamed at least in part for the Serb’s holding out so long. Just 
as important however, was the near complete lack of military capabilities demonstrated 
by the European members of NATO. However, these difficulties must also be seen 
however in the context of an Alliance going to war for the first time, with much greater 
political agreement than could have been believed, in a situation that would never have 
been foreseen under its original mission. While no excuse for the problems that were 
identified, the operation did signify a major stage in the Alliance’s transformation.
This mission transformation and movement out of areas was nearly completed by 
the events of September 11, 2001, and its subsequent operations. The declaration of 
Article 5 by the North Atlantic Council following the attack on the US was a significant 
event, however limited its use was by the US. Eventual NATO support of US operations 
in Afghanistan, and the acceptance of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
mission demonstrated a global intervention mission that would have been 
incomprehensible and completely unacceptable only a few years earlier.
This slow yet steady transformation was brought about in part by NATO adopting 
a number of different actions during the period. NATO increasingly stepped into the 
field it described as crisis management. It is now seen as a fundamental security task of 
the Alliance, and may involve military or nonmilitary measures responding to a threat or 
international situation. Drawing from the Petersberg Tasks adopted by the WEU and the 
EU, crisis management provided NATO with purpose and ongoing experience in a wide 
variety of humanitarian and peace keeping situations. NATO’s establishment of the 
EADRCC has provided an expanded capability for humanitarian assistance for regional
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crises, yet it is nearly unknown outside of the Alliance itself. Following September 11, 
NATO initiated Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean in the hopes of more 
effectively patrolling ship movements and protecting commercial traffic from terrorism. 
These significant yet nearly unknown missions provided NATO with greater experience 
in the new mission environment, while also implicitly supporting the expansion of 
NATO missions outside of the North Atlantic Area.
How NATO brought these changes into effect has been simply by methodically 
doing what it planned to do since the beginning of the end of the Cold War. This how of 
NATO change is one of the more extensive characteristics, and is the manifestation of 
the previous characteristics. These changes are the operationalization of the 
enlargement and mission changes, and as a result, provide the ultimate foundation of the 
success or failure of NATO transformation. As highlighted earlier, as soon as change 
began in Europe, NATO declared that it wanted to address these changes through 
dialogue and cooperation with its neighbors. Additionally, as the security situation 
changed in Europe, the Alliance pledged to restructure its forces based on the new 
situations. Both of these declarations have been fully implemented.
In the area of dialogue and cooperation NATO’s efforts since the end of the Cold 
War have been substantial and wide-ranging. From the beginning, NATO claimed that it 
wished to open a wider dialogue both within the Alliance as well as with neighbors under 
the provisions of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. These discussions in a wide 
variety of non security-related areas such as science programs, efforts relating to 
environmental and societal issues, helped play a role in institutional transparency with 
nations. They also provided neighboring nations additional assistance as they 
transitioned away from the Soviet Union’s influence.
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NATO also immediately moved to engage those East European nations that were 
rapidly separating from the Soviet Union and Communism through the establishment of 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). While this forum proved successful, 
the emergence of new nations from the disintegration of the Soviet Union caused NATO 
to reexamine the forum. This was necessary since some of the members felt that they 
were getting less attention and interest from NATO as these other nations joined. At the 
same time, the US was looking for ways to engage NATO and other nations in potential 
coalitions for peacekeeping or other humanitarian operations. As a result, the Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) was formed, and then the NACC transitioned to the Euro Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC). In this way, NATO complemented the open forum of the 
NACC, and then EAPC, with the more individualized relationship provided by PfP 
participation.
Recognizing that some nations required more attention, NATO also worked to 
selectively establish individual relationships. The Alliance established partnerships with 
Russia and Ukraine, and has continued to develop them despite differences over actions 
such as Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. While many experts believed that Russian 
interests would not allow them to participate without a major voice and probably a veto 
on NATO actions, they have not been provided such power. Despite that, Russia has 
remained engaged with NATO, evidently determining that regular dialogue and the 
potential to influence NATO is better than self-selected isolation from the Alliance.
On a regional basis, NATO initially made significant efforts as it developed the 
Mediterranean Dialogue in an effort to contribute to cooperation and confidence building 
between NATO and the participating nations. Since its beginning in 1994 it has grown 
from five to seven nations, and the areas of activities have substantially expanded during
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the period. Finally, during the Prague Summit, NATO called for an enhanced 
Mediterranean Dialogue to provide for greater assistance among all of the participants in 
areas of mutual interest. Beginning a few years after the Mediterranean Dialogue at the 
Washington Summit, the South East Europe Initiative was aimed at promoting regional 
cooperation and stability in the Balkans. Most recently, NATO established the Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative as an effort to improve cooperation and dialogue with nations of 
the Middle East.
Throughout the entire period of the study, NATO also increasingly cooperated with 
major institutions in the region. NATO members used the NATO forum to call for 
changes in OSCE that eventually transformed that institution from a committee to a 
standing organization. As the EC eventually sought to expand into areas of security, it 
employed the WEU to work with NATO in the early stages of the development of a 
European pillar within the Alliance. For a period, NATO and the WEU worked closely 
together. Then, as the EU began to consider how best to more directly represent those 
security interests, the WEU was mostly absorbed by the EU. Eventually, NATO began 
working with the EU in the development of a partnership to allow both institutions and 
their members, both in common and separate, to best accommodate their needs. The 
Berlin Plus agreement, the coordination of the DCI and PCC with the EU’s European 
Capability Action Plan, and the transfer of operational missions in the Balkans from 
NATO to the EU are substantive examples of this still developing relationship.
NATO also stated that it was going to restructure its forces as the security situation 
changed in Europe. The institution kept its word and has implemented a wide variety of 
changes accordingly. Throughout the period of analysis, the Alliance continued to fine- 
tune the readiness of its force structure. As it became more obvious that they did not face
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the same monolithic threat as before just across their common borders, the readiness of 
forces was down-graded and more of the force structure was based mobilization time 
rather than an ability to immediately respond to attack. In a limited fashion, NATO has 
gone full circle concerning force readiness with the development of the rapidly 
deployable NATO Response Force (NRF) as directed by the 2002 Prague Summit. The 
NRF can be seen as a response to the increasing non-traditional threats now facing 
NATO and its members, as well as the wider variety of missions that the Alliance is 
accepting. At the same time, the NRF was also seen by some as an effort to ensure that 
NATO remained the institution of first choice to respond to crisis situations by 
undercutting the development of the European Rapid Reaction Force.
Another important aspect of force structure change during this period is in the 
reduction of subordinate NATO headquarters. This is significant, since nations, 
especially smaller ones or new members, often prefer to have a headquarters in country 
for the prestige as well as economic advantages that they perceive the headquarters offer. 
Nevertheless, throughout the period, as the threat situation changed, NATO continued to 
reexamine its command and control structure and made changes accordingly. One of the 
most significant changes was when the two operational commands, SACEUR and 
S ACL ANT, were changed. Following the Prague Summit in November 2002, SACEUR 
became the single operational command, and SACLANT transformed into Allied 
Command, Transformation (ACT) and became the Alliance lead in its own formal 
transformation process. While seemingly a logical adaptation, this change was clearly a 
result of US pressure to force the Alliance to change.
A significant aspect of NATO force structure change was in the design and 
implementation of the CJTF. This headquarters has provided the Alliance with a variety
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of improvements to its operational capabilities on a political as well as military level. 
First, the CJTF provides NATO with the means to more effectively employ its own 
forces by creating small headquarters that are used to operating together and can quickly 
deploy to lead or support a NATO mission. Second, as a headquarters designed to 
provide a well-rounded nucleus to a larger staff, it is uniquely suited to serving as a 
headquarters when other nations outside of the Alliance will be participating. The use of 
the CJTF ensures that the Alliance has a complete package of necessary command and 
control elements, while providing a framework uniquely suited for a coalition of the 
willing.
Finally, and most significantly, is the development and implementation of the 
concept of the CJTF in a role supporting European Union operations. For those 
situations where NATO as a whole chooses not to participate in an operation, CJTF 
provides a construct where NATO assets can support EU operations, while a European 
NATO officer, the DSACEUR, provides NATO linkage as the overall operation 
commander. Already employed in Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Operation Proximo in FYROM, CJTF appears to be a successful compromise between 
NATO and the EU. While this final agreement took years to bring about, its apparent 
success is all the more significant following French efforts to make it more of an EU 
controlled entity, and efforts by Turkey to hinder its employment, in part as a negotiating 
ploy for EU membership.
Future Proposals For NATO Transformation 
NATO has achieved its current success based on the changes made during the past 
16 years. As summarized above, its transformation has been significant. Nevertheless, it
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is only through a concerted effort to address NATO’s ends, ways, and means, or vision, 
burdensharing, and an effective relationship with the EU, that the reinvention can be 
firmly entrenched.
The acceptance of this concept of shared and complementary vision by the member 
nations of NATO and the EU would significantly improve the European security 
environment and directly affect the successful transformation of NATO. The 
complementary vision of the nations and institutions would lay the foundation for 
improved decisionmaking within NATO. It would do this by ensuring that there was a 
common understanding of issues, enabling members to work together when appropriate, 
and more importantly allowing members to define the level of involvement if they 
choose to participate. Since all understand the respective interests, refusal to participate 
in other than Article 5 missions would not be considered acting contrary to the 
institutions purpose. The ability of NATO to affect such a policy is only possible due to 
its being an intergovernmental institution. Since unlike the EU, NATO has no 
supranational authority, member nations could define their levels of participation as 
appropriate to their respective vision documents.
With the complementary vision as a foundation, burdensharing becomes more 
simplified and straightforward. Each member must ensure that they have a reasonable 
contribution to the Alliance’s collective defense requirements. Beyond that, participation 
in additional missions, from the perspective of contribution and leadership, would 
depend on the nature and extent of their desired involvement. Whether through 
providing combat power, logistical assistance and financial assistance, or in providing 
particular assistance to the post-hostilities of a peace-enforcement operation, each nation 
would be able to participate in accordance with their strengths.
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At the same time, the complementary vision is similarly the answer to the 
challenges presented by the need for a better relationship with the EU. If both 
institutions share the vision, then it is easier to decide when a NATO response is most 
appropriate versus an EU response. At the same time, such a shared understanding 
would also simplify the potential difficulties inherent in ESDI and the varying 
memberships between NATO and the EU. This understanding would allow the two 
institutions to truly be partners in important matters. They would be able to work 
together when it was most appropriate and mutually advantageous, while also respecting 
their differences and maintaining a suitable distance in other situations.
The development and acceptance of this cooperation requires that NATO and EU 
members continue to have mutual interests so they see the advantage in this greater 
degree of support, interaction, and trust. The potential for this greater cooperation is 
supported by the EU’s difficulties in developing a constitution and gaining greater 
centralized control in the areas of security and defense policy. As long as the EU 
security initiatives remain outside the supranational pillars, the institution, and more 
importantly its members, will retain the flexibility to work with NATO. If and when the 
EU is able direct the security policies of its members, the EU and NATO will almost 
certainly find themselves in greater disagreements. In the mean time, it is only through 
this common vision that NATO can continue to effectively transform itself.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
280
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Altenburg, Wolfgang. “NATO’s Integrated Military Structure, A Unique Success.” 
NATO’s Sixteen Nations, Special Edition 34, no. 1 (1989): 36 -  47.
Asmus, Ronald D. Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New 
Era. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
Bailes, Alyson J. K.. “NATO’s European Pillar: The European Security and Defense 
Identity.” Defense Analysis 15, no. 3 (1999): 305 -  322.
________ . The European Security Strategy, An Evolutionary History, SIPRI Policy
Paper No. 10, Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
February 2005.
Baker, James A. Ill with Thomas M. Defrank. Politics o f Diplomacy, Revolution, War 
and Peace, 1989 -  1992. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995.
Barany, Zoltan. The Future o f NATO Expansion: Four Case Studies. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Barry, Charles L. Transforming NATO Command and Control for Future Missions. 
Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National 
Defense University, 2003.
Baun, Michael J. “The Maastricht Treaty As High Politics: Germany, France, and 
European Integration.” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4 (1995-96): 605 -  
624.
Becher, Klaus. “Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe’s Role in the World After the 
2003 European Security Strategy.” European Security 13, no. 4 (2004): 345 -  
359.
Bensahel, Nora. “Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO’s Development of the 
Combined Joint Task Force.” European Security 8, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 52 -  
72.
Black, J.L. Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms? New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000.
Bonnen, Preben. Towards a Common European Security and Defence Policy. The Ways 
and Means o f Making it a Reality. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
281
Brenner, Michael and Guillame Parmentier, Reconcilable Differences: US -  French 
Relations in the New Europe. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2002.
Brimmer, Esther, ed. The EU ’s Search for a Strategic Role, ESDP and Its Implications 
for Transatlantic Relations. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 
2002.
Brown, Michael E. “The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion.” Survival 37, no. 1 (Spring 
1995): 3 4 -5 2 .
Brune, Lester H. The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions. Claremont, CA: 
Regina Books, 1998.
Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1998.
Buzan, Barry. “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century.” 
International Affairs 67, no. 3 (July 1991): 431 -  451.
Calleo, David P. “Transatlantic Folly: NATO vs. the EU.” World Policy Journal (Fall
2003): 17 -24 .
Cameron, Fraser and Gerrard Quille. ESDP: The State o f Play. European Policy 
Centre, EPC Working Paper No. 11, September 2004.
Carpenter, Ted Galen. Beyond NATO: Staying Out o f Europe’s Wars. Washington, DC: 
Cato Institute, 1994.
Carpenter, Ted Galen and Barbara Conry, ed. NATO Enlargement: Illusions and 
Reality. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998.
Carroll, Eugene J. Jr., “NATO Enlargement: To What End?” In NATO Enlargement: 
Illusions and Reality, edited by Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, 199 — 
208. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998.
Chace, James. “A Strategy to Unite Rather than Divide Europe.” In NATO Enlargement: 
Illusions and Reality, edited by Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, 177 -  
186. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998.
Christopher, Warren. A New Atlantic Community for the 21st Century. Speech delivered 
at the State Theater in Stuttgart, 6 September 1996. US Mission to NATO: DoD 
Statement. http://www.NATO.int/usa/state/sl9960906a.html. (accessed 6 March
2004).
Clinton, Bill. My Life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
282
Cole, Ronald H. Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution o f Joint
Operations in Panama, February 1988 -January 1990. Washington, DC: Joint 
History Office, 1995.
Cooke, Thomas. “NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor.” Parameters 28, no.
3 (Winter 98/99): 124- 137.
Cornish, P au l. “European Security: The End of Architecture and the New NATO.” 
International Affairs 72, no. 4 (1996): 751 -  769.
________ . “NATO at the Millennium: New Missions, New Members.. .New
Strategy?” NATO Review 45, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 1997): 21 -  25.
Cornish, Paul and Geoffrey Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The 
Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture.” International Affairs 77, no. 3 
(2001): 587-603.
Cottey, Andrew. “NATO Transformed: the Atlantic Alliance in a New Era.” In
Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe, edited by W. Park and G. Wyn 
Rees, 43 -  60. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998.
Croft, Stuart, John Redmond, G. Wyn Rees, and Mark Weber. The Enlargement o f 
Europe. New York: Manchester University Press, 1999.
Cromwell, William C. “Europe, the United States, and the Pre-war Gulf Crisis.” 
International Journal 48 (Winter 1992-3): 124 -  150.
Crozier, Brian. The Rise and Fall o f the Soviet Empire. Rocklin, CA: Prima Publishing, 
1999.
CSCE. Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Follow-up Meeting, 1986 
-1989. Vienna, 1989.
Daalder, Ivo H. Getting to Dayton: The Making o f America’s Bosnia Policy. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
Daalder, Ivo H. and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
Davis, Jacquelyn K. Reluctant Allies & Competitive Partners: U.S. -  French Relations at 
the Breaking Point? Herndon, VA: Brassey’s, 2003.
De Nevers, Renee. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: The End o f an Era. Adelphi 
Papers 249, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990.
De Santis, Hugh. “The Graying of NATO.” The Washington Quarterly 14, no. 4 
(Autumn 1991): 51 -5 4 .
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
283
________ . “NATO’s Manifest Destiny: The Risks of Expansion.” InNATO
Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, edited by Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara 
Conry, 159 -  176. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998.
Deutsch, Karl W. et al, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light o f Historical Experience. First University Paperback, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968.
De Wijk, Rob. NATO on the Brink o f the New Millennium: The Battle for Consensus. 
Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1997.
Donfried, Karen and Paul Gallis. European Security: The Debate in NATO and the 
European Union. CRS Report to Congress, 25 April 2000. 
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/crseu.htm (accessed 23 October 2003).
Duffield, John S. “NATO’s Functions After the Cold War.” Political Science Quarterly 
109, no. 5 (1994-95): 763 -  787.
Eisenhower, Susan. “The Perils of Victory.” InNATO Enlargement: Illusions and 
Reality, edited by Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, 103 -  120. 
Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998.
European Commission, Enlargement Directorate-General, Enlargement o f the European 
Union: An historic opportunity, Brussels: European Communities, 2003.
European Commission, The Amsterdam Treaty: A Comprehensive Guide, Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1999.
European Economic Community. Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community, Rome. 25 March 1957.
European Union, The Common Foreign and Security Policy: Introduction, Brussels.
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00001.htm (accessed 10 September 2005).
________ . Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP o f 12 July 2004 on the establishment o f
the European Defence Agency, Brussels, 17 July 2004.
________ . The EU at a Glance -  European Treaties.
http://europa.eu.int/abc/treaties/index_enhtml (accessed 21 October 2003).
________ . Headline Goal 2010. Statement approved by General Affairs and External
Relations council on 17 May 2004 endorsed by the European Council o f 17 and 
18 June 2004.
________ . Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999,
150/99Rev 1, Brussels, annex 3.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
284
________ . Presidency Conclusions: Copenhagen European Council, Bulletin of the
European Union 12-2002.
________ . Statement on Improving European Military Capabilities, 13802/01 (Presse
414) General Affairs 2386th Council meeting, Brussels, 19-20 November 2001.
________ . Thessaloniki European Council 19 and 20 June 2003 Presidency
Conclusions, Brussels, 1 October 2003, 11638/03.
________ . Treaty on European Union.
http://europa.eu.int/eur_lex/en/treaties/dat/EU_treaty.html (accessed 21 October
2003).
Fishel, JohnT. The Fog o f Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration o f Panama. 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 15, 1992.
Foehrenbach, Gerd. “Security Through Engagement: The Worldview Underlying
ESDP.” In The EU ’s Search for a Strategic Role, edited by Esther Brimmer, 3 -  
22.Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2002.
Froehlich, Stefan. “Needed: A Framework for European Security.” SAIS Review 14, no. 1 
(Winter-Spring 1994): 3 5 -5 3 .
Fry, John. The Helsinki Process: Negotiating Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1993.
Fulbrook, Mary. Anatomy o f a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-1989. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995.
Giegerich, Bastian and William Wallace. “Not Such a Soft Power: The External
Deployment of European Forces,” Survival 46, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 163 -  182.
Glaser, Charles L. “The Security Dilemma Revisited.” World Politics 50 (October 
1997): 171 -201.
Gompert, David C. and Uwe Nerlich. Shoulder to Shoulder, The Road to U.S.-European 
Military Cooperability, A German-American Analysis. Santa Monica, CA:
Rand, 2002.
Gompert, David C., Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki. Mind the Gap: Promoting 
a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs. Washington, DC: National 
Defense University Press, 1999.
Gorbachev, Mikhail. Memoirs. New York: Doubleday, 1995.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
285
Grant, Robert P. “France’s New Relationship with NATO.” In NATO’s Transformation, 
The Changing Shape o f the Atlantic Alliance, edited by Philip H. Gordon, 53 -  
76. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997.
Granville, Johanna. “The Many Paradoxes of NATO Enlargement.” Current History 
(April 1999): 165- 170.
Grayson, George W. Strange Bedfellows, NATO Marches East. Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1999.
Griffiths, Martin and Terry O’Callaghan. International Relations, The Key Concepts. 
New York: Routledge, 2002.
Hagman, Hans-Christian. European Crisis Management and Defence: The Search for  
Capabilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Haine, Jean-Yves. Force Structures. European Union Institute for Security Studies,
2004. http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/10-jyhfc.pdf (accessed 23 January 2005).
________ . Berlin Plus. European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2004.
http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/03-jyhb%2B.pdf (accessed 23 January 2005).
________ . “ESDP and NATO.” In EU Security and Defence Policy: The first five
years (1999-2004), edited by Nicole Gnesotto, 131 -  144. Paris: European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, 2004.
Hellmann, Gunther and Reinhard Wolf. “Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the 
Future of NATO.” Security Studies 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993): 3 -  43.
Hitchcock, William I. The Struggle For Europe. New York: Doubleday, 2002.
Hopmann, P. Terrance. Building Security in Post-Cold War Eurasia: The OSCE and 
U.S. Foreign Policy, Peaceworks no. 31. Washington DC: United States Institute 
of Peace, September 1999.
Howe, Jonathan T. “NATO and the Gulf Crisis.” Survival 33, no. 3 (May/June
1991): 246-259.
Howorth, Jolyon. “ESDP and NATO: Wedlock or Deadlock?” Cooperation and 
Conflict: Journal o f the Nordic International Studies Association 38, no. 3
(2003): 235-254.
________ . “European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union:
Hanging Together or Hanging Separately.” Journal o f Common Market Studies 
39, no. 4 (November 2001): 765 -  789.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
286
________ . Saint-Malo Plus Five: An Interim Assessment o f ESDP, Policy papers no. 7.
Paris: Notre Europe, November 2003.
________ . “Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance.” In Defending
Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy, edited by Jolyon 
Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, 219 - 238. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Howorth, Jolyon and John T.S. Keeler. Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest 
for European Autonomy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Hyland, William G. “NATO’s Incredible Shrinking Defense.” In NATO Enlargement: 
Illusions and Reality, edited by Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, 31 -  40. 
Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998.
Institute for National Strategic Studies. Allied Command Structure in the New NATO. 
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997.
ISIS Europe. “The Rapid Reaction Force: The EU takes stock.” European Security 
Review 9 (December 2001).
Johnson, Lonnie R. Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996.
Kaplan, Lawrence S. NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution o f an Alliance. 
Westford, CT: Praeger, 2004.
Kirchner, Emil J. “Second Pillar and Eastern Enlargement: The Prospects for a European 
Security and Defence Identity.” In Europe in Change, Two Tiers or Two Speeds? 
edited by James Sperling, 46 -  62. Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1999.
Kober, Stanley. “Russia’s Search for Identity.” In NATO Enlargement: Illusions and 
Reality, edited by Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry, 129-142.
Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998.
Kupchan, Charles A. and Clifford A. Kupchan. “Concerts, Collective Security, and the 
Future of Europe.” International Security 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991): 114 -  161.
Langton, Christopher, ed. The Military Balance, 2004 -  2005. London: Oxford 
University Press, 2004.
Law, David M. and S. Neil MacFarlane. “NATO Expansion and European Regional 
Security.” In Will NATO go East? The Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic 
Alliance, edited by David G. Haglund, 35 -  56. Kingston Ontario: Queen’s 
University Centre for International Relations, 1996.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
287
Lebl, Leslie S. “European Union Defense Policy: An American Perspective.” Policy 
Analysis, no. 516 (June 25, 2004).
Le Gloannec, Anne-Marie. ” Europe by Other Means.” International Affairs 73, no. 1 
(January 1997): 8 3 -9 8 .
Lieven, Anatol. The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to 
Independence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993.
________ . “The NATO-Russia Accord: An Illusory Solution.” In NATO
Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, edited by Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara 
Conry, 143 -  158. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998.
Lindley-French, Julian. “The Revolution in Security Affairs: Hard and Soft Security 
Dynamics in the 21st Century.” European Security 13, no. 1-2 (2004): 1 -1 5 .
________ . “The ties that bind.” NATO Review On-Line, Autumn 2003, 6 - 9 .
Lindstrom, Gustav. The Headline Goal. European Union Institute for Security Studies,
(2004).
Lynch, Dov and Antonio Missiroli. ESDP Operations. European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf (accessed 15 
September 2005).
MacKinnon, Craig. “The Eurocorps, A New Direction for European Defence?” 
Peacekeeping & International Relations 26 (Jan-Apr 2000): 19 -  20.
Mattox, Gale A. “NATO Enlargement and the United States: A Deliberate and 
Necessary Decision?” In The Future o f NATO, Enlargement, Russia, and 
European Security, edited by Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque, 79 -  
94. Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999.
Mattox, Gale A. and Daniel Whiteneck, “The ESDI, NATO and the New European 
Security Environment.” In Europe in Change, Two Tiers or Two Speeds? edited 
by James Sperling, 121-138. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.
McCarthy, James P. “Opportunities for Strengthening Security in Central and Eastern 
Europe.” Vital Speeches o f the Day 59, no. 3 (15 November 1992): 66 -  69.
McFaul, Michael. Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to 
Putin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.
Mearsheimer, John J. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War.” 
International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5 -  56.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
288
Menon, Anand. “From Independence to Cooperation: France, NATO and European 
Security.” International Affairs 71, no. 1 (January, 1995): 19 -34 .
Menon, Anand, Anthony Forster and William Wallace. “A Common European 
Defence?” Survival 34, no. 3 (Autumn 1992): 98 -  118.
Meyer, Steven E. “Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO.” Parameters 
33, no. 4 (Winter 2003-04): 83 -  97.
Miller, Paul David. Retaining Alliance Relevancy: NATO and the Combined Joint Task 
Force Concept. Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1994.
Missiroli, Antonio. “Counting Capabilities: What For?” In The E U ’s Search for a
Strategic Role, ESDP and Its Implications for Transatlantic Relations, edited by 
Esther Brimmer, 57 -  66. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 
2002 .
Monaco, Annalisa. “Operation Concordia and Berlin Plus: NATO and the EU Take 
Stock.” NATO Notes 5, no. 8 (December 2003). http://www.isis- 
europe.org (accessed 21 February 2005).
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain.” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 
(July/August 2003): 74 -  89.
Morrison, James W. NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments, 
McNair Paper 40. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995.
Nation, R. Craig. War in the Balkans, 1991-2002. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, Army War College, 2003.
NATO. “The 1991 Strategic Concept.” NATO Review 39, no. 6 (December 1991): 25 -  
32.
________ . “The 1999 Strategic Concept. ” In The Reader’s Guide to the NATO Summit
in Washington, 23-25 April 1999. Brussels, 1999.
________ . The Brussels 1994 Summit Declaration.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b94011a.htm (accessed 11 November 2001).
________ . The Brussels Declaration from the 40th Anniversary o f the Alliance.
29/30 May 1989. http://www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b890529a.htm (accessed 4 
November 2001).
________ . Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and Ukraine. 9 July 1997.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/ukrchrt.htm (accessed 13 November 2001).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
289
 . Defence Ministers Review NATO’s Missions and Transformation.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/update/2003/! 2-december/l 120 la.htm 
(accessed 24 April 2004).
 . EU and NATO Agree Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2003p03-089e.htm (accessed 24 April 2004).
 . EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP. Brussels, 16 December 2002.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm (accessed 15 May 2004).
 . Fifth Anniversary o f the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination
Centre. http://www.NATO.int/docu/update/2003/06-june/e0603b.htm (accessed 
24 April 2004).
 . Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council in
Berlin, 1996. http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm (accessed 28 
November 2003).
 . Final Communique o f the Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council
in Brussels. 17 Dec 92. http://www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b921217a.htm 
(accessed 4 November 2001).
 . Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council held at
NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 1 December 1994, M-NAC-2(94)116. 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/comm/49-95/c941201a.htm (accessed 11 June 2004).
 . Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic
Council in Brussels. 18 December 1996. Available from 
www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1996/996-165e.htm (accessed 6 March 2004).
 . Final communique, Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council in
Defence Ministers Session in Brussels. 12 June 1997. www.nato.int/docu/pr/p97- 
071e.htm (accessed 1 October 2005).
 . Final Communique Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council in Defence
Ministers Session held in Brussels on 2nd December 1997. 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-149e.htm ( accessed 4 December 2004).
 . Final Communique Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council held at
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 11 Jun 98.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-071e.htm (accessed 4 December 2004).
 . Final Communique o f the Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council
including the Oslo Decision on NATO Support fo r Peacekeeping Activities under 
the Responsibility o f the OSCE. Oslo, 4 June 1992.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b920604a.htm (accessed 13 November
2001).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
290
 . Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council,
Sintra, Portugal. 29 May 1997. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-065e.htm 
(accessed 13 November 2001).
 . Final Communique Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council in
Luxembourg on 28 May 1998. http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-059.htm 
(accessed 4 December 2004).
 . Final Communique Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council held at
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 19 December 1999. 
http://www.natoint/docu/pr/1999/p99-166e.htm (accessed 4 December 2004).
 . Final Communique Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council held at
NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 14 and 15 December 2000. 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-124e.htm (accessed 2 October 2004).
 . Final Communique o f the Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council
held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 2 December 2003. 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-152e.htm (accessed 17 April 2004).
 . Final Communique Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council held
in Budapest, 29 May 2001. http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-077e.htm 
(accessed 2 October 2004).
 . Final Communique Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council held in
Florence on 24 May 2000. http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2000/00-052.htm 
(accessed 2 October 2004).
 . Final Communique Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council held in
Madrid on 3 June 2003. http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-059e.htm 
(accessed 17 April 2004).
 . Final Communique Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council held in
Reykjavik on 14 May 2002. http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/02/p02-059e.htm 
(accessed 2 October 2004).
 . Final Communique, Ministerial Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council, Sintra
Portugal. 29 May 1997. www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-065e.htm (accessed 13 
November 2001).
 . First Joint WEU/NATO Crisis Management Exercise -  CMX/CRISEX2000 -
to be held from 17 to 23 February 2000, NATO Press Release (2000)005. 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-005e.htm (accessed 21 February
2005).
 .The Future Tasks o f the Alliance. www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b671213a.htm
(accessed 31 January 2004).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
291
 . Intervention by the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hans van
Mierlo. Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session. 10 
December 1996. http://www.NATO.int/docu/speech/1996/s961210p.htm 
(accessed 14 February 2005).
 . Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) Reaching out to the Broader Middle
East, updated 24 June 2005. http://www.nato.int/issues/ici/index.html (accessed 
19 September 2005).
 . “The Istanbul Declaration. Our Security in a New Era.” In Istanbul Summit
Reader’s Guide, 2004, 7-8.
 . “Istanbul Summit Communique,” Istanbul Summit Reader’s Guide, (2004): 9.
 . Istanbul Summit Reader’s Guide, 2004.
 . The London Declaration. London. 6 July 1990.
www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b900706a.htm (accessed 4 November 2001).
 . Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation Issued by the
Heads o f State and Government. 8 July 1997.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm (accessed 19 February 2005).
 . NATO Briefing: Active Endeavour. Brussels. December 2003.
 . NATO -  EU Cooperation Taken to a New Level. 17 March 2003.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/update/2003/03-march/e0317a.htm (accessed 12 
November 2004).
 . NATO - E U  Security o f Information Agreement Signed Today. 14 march
2003. http://www.NATO.int;/docu/pr/2003/p03-022e.htm (accessed 11 December 
2004).
 . NATO Handbook. Brussels. 2001.
 . NATO Issues: September 11 -  One year on.
http://www.NATO.int/terrorism/index.htm (accessed 6 June 2004).
 . NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. http://www.NATO.int/med-
dial/summary.htm (accessed 6 June 2004).
 . NATO Military Structure Briefing. August 2005.
 . NATO Takes on Afghanistan Mission. NATO Update: 11 August 2003.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/update/2003/080august/e081 la.htm (accessed 24 
April 2004).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
292
 . NATO Today. Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2002.
 . NATO’s Core Security Functions in the New Europe. 7 June 1991.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/comm/49-95/c910607b.htm (accessed 10 March
2002).
 . The North Atlantic Treaty. Brussels, NATO Public Diplomacy Division.
undated.
 . Partnership for Peace: Invitation Document issued by the Heads o f State and
government participating in the Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council. Brussels. 
10 January 1994. http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110a.htm (accessed 13 
November 2001).
 . Partnership with the countries o f Central and Eastern Europe (statement
issued by the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ministerial Session). 7 June 
1991. http://www.NATO.int/docu/basictxt/b910607a.htm (accessed 13 November 
2001).
 . PfP Education and Training Seminar 2003.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/update/2003/10-october/el021a.htm (accessed 24 
April 2004).
 . “Prague Summit Declaration.” In The Prague Summit and NATO’s
Transformation: A Reader’s Guide. Brussels. 2004.
 . The Reader’s Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington 23 -  25 April 1999.
Brussels, 1999.
 . Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation. 8 November 1991.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108a.htm (accessed 3 January
2004).
 . Statement by the Secretary General. 13 December 2002.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-140e.htm (accessed 11 December
2004).
 . Statement by the North Atlantic Council Concerning September 11.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm (accessed 21 May 2004).
 . Statement on Capabilities Issued at the Meeting o f the North Atlantic Council
in Defence Ministers Session held in Brussels. 12 June 2003. 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-066e.htm (accessed 10 February 2004).
 . Statement on Defense Capabilities Issued at the Meeting o f the North Atlantic
Council in Defence Ministers Session. 6 June 2002.
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-074e.htm (accessed 2 October 2004).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
293
_________ . Statement On Kosovo. Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council held in Luxembourg on 28th May 1998. 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-061e.htm (accessed 2 May 2004).
________ . Study on NATO Enlargement, September, 1995.
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm (accessed 31 January 2004).
 . Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, on the
North Atlantic Council Decision On Implementation O f Article 5 o f the 
Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the United States. 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/seech/2001/s011004b.htm (accessed 6 June 2004).
________ . Training, Education and Interoperability. Available from
http://www.NATO.int/docu/update/2003/! 1-november/el 11 lb.htm (accessed 24 
April 2004).
________ . “Washington Summit Communique.” In The Reader’s Guide to the NATO
Summit in Washington, 23 -  25 April 1999, 13 -2 3 . Brussels, 1999.
NATO Parliamentary Assembly. CJTF and the Reform o f NATO. Committee Report, Mr. 
Rafael Estrella (Spain) General Rapporteur, 24 October 1996, DSC (96) 8 rev. 1. 
http://www.NATO-pa.int/archivedpub/comrep/1996/an230dsc.asp (accessed 12 
February 2005).
Oakes, Mark. “European Defence: From Portschach to Helsinki.” International Affairs 
and Defence Section, House o f Commons Library, Research Paper 00/20. (21 
February 2000).
OSCE. OSCE Handbook, Third Ed., Second Impression, Vienna, June 2000.
 _____ . Charter for European Security, Istanbul, November 1999. OSCE.
http://www.OSCE.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/istachart99e.htm 
(accessed 24 April 2004).
Parmentier, Guillaume. “Redressing NATO’s Imbalances.” Survival 42, no. 2 (Summer 
2000): 9 6 -  112.
Perry, William J. Six Postulates for a Future NATO, Prepared remarks by Defense
Secretary William J. Perry to the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic Seminar, 
Norfolk, VA„ June 27, 1996.
Peters, Dirk. “The Debate about a New German Foreign Policy after Unification.” In 
German Foreign Policy Since Unification, ” edited by Volker Rittberger, 1 -1 0 . 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001.
Pond, Elizabeth. Beyond the Wall: Germany’s Road to Unification. Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institution Press, 1993.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
294
Quille, Gerrard. “Implementing the defence aspects of the European Security Strategy: 
The Headline Goal 2010.” European Security Review, no. 23 (July 2004).
________ . “Battle Groups to Strengthen EU military crisis management?” European
Security Review, no. 22 (April 2004).
________ . “Making European Defence Work: Copenhagen, Berlin Plus and
ECAP.” European Security Review, no. 16 (February 2003).
Reynolds, David. One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945. New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2000.
Rogel, Carole. The Breakup o f Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia. Westport CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1998.
Rutten, Maartje, compiler. From St Malo to Nice: European Defence Core Documents, 
Chaillot Paper 47. Institute for Strategic Studies, Western European Union, (May 
2001).
Rynning, Sten. “The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture.” Security Dialogue 
34, no. 4 (2003): 479 -  496.
Salmon, Trevor C. and Alistair J. K. Shepherd. Toward a European Army. A Military 
Power in the Making? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003.
Schake, Kori. Constructive Duplication: Reducing EU reliance on US military assets. 
London: Centre for European Reform, 2002.
Schmidt, Gustav. “Getting the Balance Right: NATO and the Evolution of EC/EU
Integration, Security and Defence Policy.” In A History o f NATO -  The First Fifty 
Years, Volume 2, edited by Gustav Schmidt, 3-28. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
Schmitt, Burkard. European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, July 2004. http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/06- 
bsecap.pdf (accessed 16 September 2005).
Shepherd, Alistair J.K. “The European Union’s Security and Defence Policy: A Policy 
without Substance?” European Security 12, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 39 -  63.
Shevtsova, Lilia. “The August Coup and the Soviet Collapse.” Survival 34, no. 1 (Spring
1992): 5 -  18.
Simon, Jeffrey. NATO Expeditionary Operations: Impacts Upon New Members and 
Partners. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, March 2005.
Smyser, W.R. From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle Over Germany. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1999.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
295
Solana, Javier. “A European Security and Defence Identity within NATO.” Remarks at 
the WEU Colloquy, European Defence and Security Identity. Madrid, 4 May 1998. 
http://www.NATO.int/docu/speech/1998/s980504a.htm (accessed 30 
September 1999).
Solomon, Gerald B. The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997: Blessings o f Liberty. 
Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.
Sperling, James. Europe in Change: Two Tiers or Two Speeds? Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999.
Stent, Angela. Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the 
New Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Stokes, Gale. The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse o f Communism in 
Eastern Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, NATO Launches Response Force -  15 
October 2003, SHAPE News, Mons, BE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe. http://www.NATO.int/shape/news/2003/10/i031015.htm (accessed 24 
April 2004).
Szayna, Thomas S. “The Czech Republic, A Small Contributor or a ‘Free Rider’?” In 
America’s New Allies: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO, 
edited by Andrew A. Michta, 112 -  148. Seattle: University of Washington Press,
1999.
Terriff, Terry. “The CJTF Concept and the Limits of European Autonomy.” In 
Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy, 
edited by Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler, 39 -  60. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003.
Tofte, Sunniva. “Non-EU NATO Members and the Issue of Discrimination.” In 
Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy, 
edited by Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, 135 -  156. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003.
Toje, Asloe. “The First Casualty in the War against Terror: The Fall of NATO and 
Europe’s Reluctant Coming of Age” European Security 12, no. 2 (Summer 
2003): 63 -  76.
Tripodi, Paolo. “Alba: Italy’s Multinational Intervention in Albania.” Contemporary 
Review (Oct 1997): 178 -  183.
Tucker, Robert W. “1989 And All That.” Foreign Affairs 69, no. 4 (Fall 1990): 93 -  
114.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
296
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Electronic Library, DOD Dictionary.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/s_index.html (accessed 20 February 2005).
U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control. Charter o f Paris fo r a New Europe. 
Signed, 21 November 1990. http://www.state.gOv/t/ac/trt/4721.htm (accessed 4 
June 2004).
Van Evera, Stephen. Guide to Methods for Students o f Political Science. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1997.
Vasiu, Mihaela and Michael Schmitt. “NATO Enlargement on the Eve of the Second 
Round.” Connections: The Quarterly Journal no. 1 (January 2002): 73 -  95.
Vayrynen, Raimo. “Toward Effective Conflict Prevention: A Comparison of Different 
Instruments.” The International Journal o f Peace Studies 27, no. 1 (January 
1997).
Walt, Stephen M. The Origins o f Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1987.
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory o f International Politics. New York: McGraw Hill, Inc, 1979.
________ . Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1954.
________ . “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” International Security 18,
no. 2 (Fall 1993): 4 4 -7 9 .
Wessel, Ramses A. “The State of Affairs in EU Security and Defence Policy: The
Breakthrough in the Treaty of Nice.” Journal o f Conflict and Security Law 4, no.
2 (2003): 265-288.
WEU. Declaration o f Western European Union on the Role o f Western European Union 
and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance. 
http://www.weu.int/documents/970722en.pdf (accessed 10 October 2005).
________ . Petersberg Declaration, Bonn. 19 June 1992.
________ . Rome Declaration, Brussels, 24 October 1984. http://www.weu.int,
Key Texts (accessed 20 June 2004).
________ . WEU Related Texts Adopted at EC Summit Maastricht - 1 0  December 1991,
on The Role o f the Western European Union and its Relations with the European 
Union and with the Atlantic Alliance. www.EU.int (accessed 4 June 2004).
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
297
Young, Thomas-Durell. Reforming NATO’s Military Structures: The Long-Term Study 
and Its Implications for Land Forces. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, 1998.
Yost, David S. NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security. 
Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1998.
Zelikow, Philip. “The New Concert of Europe.” Survival 34, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 12 -  
30.
Zelikow, Philip and Condoleezza Rice. Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A 
Study In Statecraft. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
298
VITA
Robert M. Antis 
Graduate Program in International Studies 
621 Batten Arts and Letters Building 
Old Dominion University 
Norfolk, Virginia 23529-0086
Education:
PhD 2006 International Studies
Old Dominion University 
Norfolk, Virginia
MA 1980 West European Studies
Indiana University 
Bloomington, Indiana
BA 1975 Political Science
Michigan State University 
East Lansing, Michigan
Fields of Specialization: European Security
American Foreign Policy
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
